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●

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Gus Tyler's article is an answer to Herbert Hill's sharply critical view of the ILGWU which appeared in our last issue. We look forward to continuing and broadening the debate on the relationship between the Negro and labor movements. This is surely one of the most important political and social issues in American life today.

Mr. Hill has informed our Board that he is writing a detailed answer to Mr. Tyler's article below. Naturally, Mr. Tyler will have the right to rebut. Other material on the question of Negroes and the labor movement will be found in the correspondence section in this issue.

The Truth About the ILGWU

Gus Tyler

On August 17, 1962, the Labor Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Herbert Hill, began to read "testimony" to the House Education and Labor Committee investigating the "extent" of discrimination, exploitation and corruption in the garment industry and the union. Hill never had a chance to finish his statement. Committee members objected to its inclusion in the record because it was not factual testimony but "opinions, conclusions, and characterizations." (*New York Times,* August 19, 1962)

Unable to have his "testimony" accepted by the Committee (to which he was a special consultant) as submitted, Hill used the facilities of the NAACP to circulate the statement widely. The same piece appeared as an article in *New Politics,* Vol. 1, No. 4.

When David Dubinsky, President of the ILGWU, appeared before the Committee to refute charges, he was repeatedly told that the Committee would *not* entertain replies to Hill *since the Hill statement was not part of the record.*

On October 8, Hill's "testimony" became the basis for a resolution passed by the NAACP Board of Directors demanding further Congressional investigation of the ILGWU. The resolution stated that "the union leaders have as yet made no adequate answer to charges."

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Since the Hill testimony is the basis for a widening rift between the NAACP and the progressive labor movement, it may be worthwhile to see how much truth there is in this basic body of charges.

To set the Hill charges in perspective, here is the ILGWU policy and record:

1. The doors of the union are open to all workers, regardless of race, creed or color. Among members it counts Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, French Canadians, Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese, and the older ethnic groups of Jews, Italians, Irish, Poles, Russians, Germans, and Scandinavians. Just how many the union does not know since it does not put a racial or religious tag on dues-payers. But Negroes and Spanish-speaking members alone—relative newcomers—run into the tens of thousands.

2. The union admits all races, creeds and colors to its skilled craft locals, the cutters and pressers. These add up to hundreds of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, plus other Latins, Japanese, etc.

3. The union runs extensive training and placement programs to upgrade skills and teach new skills especially for newcomers. In the skilled operating category, this program in the union's greatest center—New York with about half the union membership —is attended by workers, 90% of whom are Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

4. The union runs an unusual leadership training program to recruit and train leadership from all groups, with a special care to find present staff and future top leadership reflective of the composition of the industry and the union.

5. All union facilities are integrated: locals, meetings, summer camp, health centers. This is true of the union everywhere.

6. The union has, for years, been a force in civil rights movements—and has been recognized as such.

And now to the details.

HILL CHARGE: "As a matter of practice and policy, Negroes and Puerto Ricans are barred from membership in these locals"—Local 10, Cutters; Local 60, Pressers; and the Pressers Branch Local 89.

THE TRUTH: In Local 10, there are 199 known Negro and Spanish-speaking members (the ILGWU has many Cubans, Panamanians, Colombians, Dominicans, Salvadorians, Mexicans, etc., as well as Puerto Ricans) as of the summer of 1962. There are probably more. An exact count is difficult since the union does not tag its membership by racial categories. The 199 names were found in a shop count. (The count rose to 239 by November 1962.)

The 200 or more Negroes and Spanish-speaking members of Cutters' Local 10 is an impressive demonstration of integration, since in this trade where there is very little "turnover" of employ-

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ment, the total number of jobs covered by Local 10 has fallen in the last decade. Despite a *diminishing* number of available jobs, there are at least 200 Negroes and Spanish-speaking members in the cutters' union.

HILL CHARGE: "Local 60 has an all white membership."

THE TRUTH: One out of every five *pressers* (a skilled craft) in Local 60 is either Negro or Spanish-speaking, mainly Puerto Rican. This, too, was accomplished in the face of diminishing jobs for pressers in the New York market.

HILL CHARGE: "Locals 10, 60 and 89 are lily white."

THE TRUTH: The charge is pure fabrication, as we have seen, in the case of Locals 10 and 60. The charge is comical in the case of Local 89. This local was created at a time when dressmakers' Local 22 conducted its meetings in Yiddish, because the members could not speak English. The newcomer Italians did not understand Yiddish, so they set up a parallel local to conduct the union's business in Italian. Local 89 still does so, with the result that it is not "lily white," but pure Italian, with no Negroes, Jews, Puerto Ricans or other non-Italians in the membership. To put Negro pressers in Local 89, as Hill seems to suggest, would be to disfranchise them completely from union participation unless they were Italian-speaking Negroes.

Negro dress pressers (who work in the same shops as Italian Local 89 dress pressers under the same contract with the same wage rates) are members of Local 60—where the business is conducted in English, a language more convenient for most of the Negro pressers.

HILL CHARGE: "Negro and Puerto Rican workers (in the New York Dress Joint Board) are limited to membership in Local 22 and in the unit known as 60A which is the 'jim crow' auxiliary of Local 60."

THE TRUTH: The locals of the Dress Joint Board are 10, 22, 60 and 89. There are Negro and Puerto Rican members in *every single one* of these locals except 89, the Italian affiliate of the Joint Board. Local 60A is not "jim crow," it contains all races, religions, etc. It is composed of *dress shipping clerks* no matter what their race, creed or color. It is a *craft* affiliate of Local 60 and *not a racial* grouping. Most of its members are Negro and Puerto Rican, but to call it a 'jim crow' local for that reason would be the same as calling the Sleeping Car Porters' Union a jim crow union because all or most of its members are Negro.

HILL CHARGE: "To anyone acquainted with the realities of the union's operations, the reason for denying a separate local union charter to 60A is that, given the ethnic composition of the

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membership, there would inevitably be a Negro or Puerto Rican local union manager."

THE TRUTH: In the ILGWU, around the country, shipping clerks do *not* have separate locals, whether they are White, Negro, Gentile, Jewish or Mexican. Generally, ILGWU locals are *industrial,* not *craft.* The cutter and presser locals in New York and a few other areas have an historic basis that does not apply to parts of the country or even to the trades in New York that have been more recently organized.

More important: a majority of the combined members of Local 60 and Local 60A are Negro and Puerto Rican. Each member has an equal vote—whether in 60 or 60A. If the present manager is not a Negro or Puerto Rican, it merely indicates that the members of this union prefer not to cast a "racial" vote.

Hill's suggestion that a separate local of shipping clerks would elect a Negro manager is both inaccurate and vicious. It is inaccurate because Local 60A is "mixed" with no one ethnic group—Negro, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Irish, Jewish, or Italian—in a simple majority. What is more, if a predominantly Gentile labor movement could elect a Jew, Samuel Gompers, as its president for more than three decades; and if a Protestant U.S. could elect a Catholic as President; and if the NAACP could choose a white Jew as its labor secretary, there is no reason to believe that the members of Local 60A would elect a manager on a racist rather than unionist basis. The proposal is socially vicious because to create a separate Local 60A *just to guarantee the election of a Negro or Puerto Rican manager* is to *create* a jim crow local—separate but equal. ILGWU members prefer integration: craft and color.

HILL CHARGE: "These workers (members of Local 60A) earn in the vicinity of $50 a week."

THE TRUTH: This may have been true before Local 60A organized the shipping clerks into a union. A study of 536 shops, employing 1,220 members of 60A, shows:

3%	*earn from*	*$46*	*to*	*$49 a week.*
13%	*earn from*	*50*	*to*	*60 a week.*
21%	*earn from*	*60*	*to*	*70 a week.*
22%	*earn from*	*70*	*to*	*80 a week.*
17%	*earn from*	*80*	*to*	*90 a week.*
9½%	*earn from*	*90*	*to*	*100 a week.*
14½%	*earn more than $100 a week.*			

This means that about two-thirds (63%) earned from $70 a week up to more than $100. The truth is that the shipping clerks owe a vote of thanks to the pressers local, whose relatively stable membership, high dues rate (more than twice that of the ship-

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ping clerks), and experienced staff made these gains possible. Standing by themselves, the clerks would have great difficulties primarily because of the very high turnover of workers in their craft. The clerks enjoy all benefits of being united in *industrial* union fashion with a more highly skilled craft. No student of labor relations has to be told why—and to destroy these advantages to create a jim crow local is bad economics and worse inter-group relations.

HILL CHARGE: "Over a number of years, Negroes, who are members of other locals of the ILGWU, have attempted to secure membership in Local 10 but are almost without exception denied membership."

THE TRUTH: Among the more than 200 members of Negro and Spanish-speaking origin (including Puerto Ricans) there are members of Local 10 who were transferred from Locals 23, 66, 91, 105 and even 60A.

HILL CHARGE: "It is quite possible that for public relations purposes the ILGWU will produce *one* or *two* Negroes or Puerto Ricans who claim to be members of Locals 10 and 60."

THE TRUTH: The actual count in Locals 10 and 60 of members from these ethnic groups is well over 500. They do not "claim" to be members; they *are*. They have been for years.

On a November 9th broadcast, Hill stated "there are in the vicinity of 50 (Negro) cutters of Local 10 in the city."

Here it is clear that when Hill said "one or two" he had no regard for the truth. Now when he says 50 he still has no regard for the truth. This is the old McCarthy numbers game: a couple of thousand Communists in the State Department; a couple of hundred Communists in the State Department; maybe a couple in the State Department.

HILL CHARGE: Local 10 had been found "guilty" of excluding Ernest Holmes from membership because he was a Negro.

THE TRUTH: On November 4, 1962, WNBC-TV broadcast the following:

> On September 9, 1962, in the second half of a broadcast of "Our Protestant Heritage," over this station, a guest, Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary of he National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, made certain spontaneous and unrehearsed remarks concerning the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and two of its leaders.
>
> Mr. Hill stated that, in the Ernest Holmes case, Local 10 of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union had been found guilty of discrimination by the State Commission For Human Rights.
>
> The fact is that this case is still being investigated by the Commission and no final determination of guilt has been made.

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The full story will be available when the investigation is completed.

HILL CHARGE: "To prevent the admission of non-white persons into that local union (Local 10)," the leadership exerts "rigid control of admission into various training programs . . ." including the "referral of young persons to the Fashion Institute of Technology High School."

THE TRUTH: Local 10, of course, does *not* prevent the admission of Negroes and Puerto Ricans. They are members of Local 10.

"The Fashion Institute of Technology High School" is nonexistent. There are two separate schools of major importance to the needle trades in New York where the trade is taught. The first is the High School of Fashion Industries, run by the New York Board of Education. The other is the Fashion Institute of Technology, a two year college level school, licensed by the State of New York. Despite the fact that these two schools have been the great training-ground for the industry since 1933, Hill has done so little research into the way people are trained and placed in the New York garment trades that he does not even know the *names* of these schools.

Neither Local 10 nor any other union controls admissions, formally or informally, to the High School of Fashion Industries or to the Fashion Institute of Technology. Any grammar school graduate who wishes to may enroll in the High School. If that High School discriminates against any student, then the NAACP ought to denounce the New York Board of Education. The truth of the matter is that in the High School of Fashion Industries, the student body is presently about 40% *Puerto Rican* and about 30% *Negro*. The school graduates cutters as well as operators and has for years been successfully placing its graduates.

HILL CHARGE: "The ILGWU . . . continues to operate the union in the interests of a small and declining number of white garment workers with high *seniority*."

THE TRUTH: In the New York metropolitan area as in almost 95% of the ILGWU shops, there is *no seniority clause* in contracts. The ILGWU contracts call for *equal division of work* when there is not enough to go around.

The terrible irony is that the ILGWU is one of the few, perhaps the only, major union calling for equal division of work. In the ILGWU, the Negro or Puerto Rican in New York, or Mexican in the Southwest, or Japanese on the West Coast is *not* the *last hired* and the *first fired*. Once a member of the union, any worker —regardless of origin—shares the work equally. No union in America—or anywhere in the world—has a greater job security clause for newcomers to the trade and union.

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HILL CHARGE: "A shortage of skilled sewing machine operators in developing (in New York). The leadership of the skilled craft locals of the ILGWU must bear a share of the responsibility."

THE TRUTH: There is a shortage of skilled sewing machine operators. Nobody knows this better than the ILGWU. Some employers have either closed shop in New York or threatened to fold up for lack of skilled operators. Hill's charge implies that the ILGWU prejudice is so deep that rather than teach Negroes and Puerto Ricans these advanced skills, the union would prefer to lose the industry and lose its strength at its prime center in New York.

The truth is that as far back as 1938, the ILGWU worked with Max Meyer to set up the Central Needle Trades High School (now the High School of Fashion Industries) to train skilled workers. The school is a huge establishment, advertising its existence in subway car cards pleading for increased enrollment. Its student body numbers about 2,000. Its ethnic composition: 40% Puerto Rican and 30% Negro.

In addition, the High School runs evening sessions. Here there is open enrollment for any worker in the trade to learn any skill: operator, cutter, pattern maker. Last year, more than 700 ILGWU members attended. 90% *(ninety percent)* were either Negro or Puerto Rican.

In addition: to encourage ILGWU members to upgrade skills, New York locals run special union-sponsored classes—advertised by and recruited by the locals. The High School teaches the classes on its premises. 532 ILGWU members attended last year. 90% *(ninety percent)* were Negro or Puerto Rican. These classes have been run for years.

(For any reader who may doubt that Hill could so have perverted the truth, I propose that you get the facts by writing either to Michael Katzoff, Principal, or Theresa Fanelli, Teacher-in-charge of the Evening Session, at the High School of Fashion Industries, 225 West 24th Street, New York 11, N.Y. Or better yet: organize a committee and go and look.)

HILL CHARGE: The two Puerto Rican locals "are denied Puerto Rican leadership."

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THE TRUTH: The entire leadership of the Puerto Rican locals —Director of Organization, Business Agents, organizers, local Presidents, and Executive Board members—is Puerto Rican. The sole exception: Jerry Schoen, a state-side man with many years of experience who serves as Manager. (Schoen was apointed only after Alberto Sanchez, Puerto Rican Director of Organization, *turned down* the job as *manager* to stay with organizing.)

Perhaps more pertinent for those who prefer the "color-blind" approach to this problem is the letter submitted by Hipolito Marcano, President of the Puerto Rican Federation of Labor, to the sub-committee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, on this matter:

> The workers in Puerto Rico never look at the national origin, color, race, religion or political ideas of their leaders with the only exception of communist affiliation which is barred by our State Federation Constitution. A labor leader's worth cannot be measured by his religious beliefs, his origin or color of his skin but by his service, dedication and devotion to the cause of the working people whom he represents. We learned that lesson at the turn of the past century, when our labor movement was founded—not by a Puerto Rican—but by a native born Spaniard, Mr. Santiago Iglesias.
>
> The workers in the garment industry in Puerto Rico were earning 2 cents an hour in 1940, when President Dubinsky and other "continentals" representing labor were appointed as part of the first Wage & Hour Committee to investigate this industry. Today those workers average over $1.00 an hour and their wages are constantly increasing in addition to very reasonable fringe benefits. A great change has taken place and is going on. Organized labor has done a substantial part to win that battle for the enrichment of our life as a free and democratic community. We don't care about the color, origin or religion of the leaders who have done that task of constructive leadership. The credit goes to the Union and in this particular industry the credit goes to the ILGWU for a job well done and for which we are grateful.

HILL CHARGE: "In the locals where there is a major concentration of non-white workers . . . the so-called minimum wages are in fact the maximum wages."

THE TRUTH: ILGWU members, with rare exception, work on a piece work system. This means that a rate is set for a given operation and workers are paid for what they produce. The minimum is set so that the *slowest* worker will, on the set rate, make the minimum; the faster worker makes proportionately more—some twice as much or more. The average wage and the maximum wage in an ILGWU shop on piece work are *never* the minimum or even near the minimum.

In addition, ILGWU contracts provide for supplementary benefits—medical care, hospitalization, optical care, vacations with

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pay, holidays with pay, death benefits, retirement benefits, severance payment, etc.—that automatically add 10%, 15%, or 20% to the money wage. This does not exist in similar ways in non-union shops.

ILGWU contracts provide that the union *minimum* shall not only be above the Federal minimum but shall automatically rise whenever the legal minimum rises.

ILGWU policy is to set union wages as high as possible without jeopardizing the jobs of unionized shops that must meet non-unionized competition in one of the most fiercely competitive industries in America. To pave the way for higher *union* wages, the ILGWU has successfully spearheaded repeated campaigns to raise the Federal legal minimum. For an account of the pioneer role of the needle and textile unions in the fight for an improved Federal minimum, see *A Legislative Campaign for a Federal Minimum Wage—1955* by Gus Tyler, published by the Eagleton Foundation, Rutgers University, New Jersey. Also see *Dissent,* Summer 1961, "Marginal Industries; Low Wages, High Risks" by Gus Tyler.

HILL CHARGE: "I cite the Fine Art Pillow and Specialities Company of 37 West 26th Street in Manhattan as a typical example of conditions . . . Here, virtually all non-white workers, male and female, who are union members are paid $1.15, $1.20 or $1.25 an hour."

THE TRUTH: According to a payroll check, 54 of the 104 employees are paid more than $1.25 an hour. These are overwhelmingly Negro and Puerto Rican. Of the *top ten* earners—from $1.53 an hour to $3.23 an hour—seven are Negro or Puerto Rican.

The further truth is that Fine Art Pillow is about as typical of ILGWU conditions as Mississippi is typical of America. This is a rubber and plastic shop in a trade where union jurisdiction is contested by dozens of legitimate unions plus dozens of racket unions. Of the thousands of ILGWU shops in New York, Hill chose this one for an on-the-spot check. And even then, Hill got the facts all wrong.

HILL CHARGE: There is "systematic exclusion of Negro and Puerto Rican members from effective participation in the leadership and policy making procedures of the union." Hill refers specifically to the fact that the ILGWU constitution sets up rules on caucuses and qualifications for holding top offices in the International union.

THE TRUTH: The caucus clause dates back to the 1920's, when the ILGWU was in a battle with the "standing" caucuses of the Communist Party. Whatever the merits of the clause—a good subject for a full set of articles—it certainly is no bar to Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Cubans, Portugese, French and other minorities

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running for and winning office in the union. Dozens out of these backgrounds presently hold both appointed and elected office. If this "clause" is a sign of the "Decay of a Labor Union," then the ILGWU has been decaying ever since it beat the Communists seveeral decades ago and increased its membership ten-fold.

Other qualifications provide that to run for President a member must be elected as delegate to the ILGWU convention. Hardly a disqualification! If a member can not be elected by his own local, he is hardly Presidential timber. In any event, this clause applies to all members—regardless of race, creed or color.

To run for the General Executive Board (top legislative body of about two dozen elected at the convention) a candidate must have served as a paid officer with the benefit of three years experience. Hardly a disqualification! Virtually every paid officer of the ILGWU has seen three years' service, including the dozens of Negroes and Puerto Ricans on staff.

Most important: *Every Convention of the ILGWU is a Constitutional Convention.* At any convention, a *simple majority* may remove all these qualifications to elect anyone the delegates want under any qualifications they set up.

The truth is that the ILGWU has made labor history by a most extensive and expensive program for leadership development, unparalleled in the world labor movement, with a conscious concentration on the development of leadership that would reflect the newer ethnic groups in the industry and the union.

In 1938, the ILGWU set up an Officer Qualification Course to prepare candidates for elective union posts. Enrollment was open to all members of two years standing. 832 applied. Of these 19 were Negro and 8 were Spanish-speaking—a total of 27 in 24 years.

Why so few? The answer is the composition of the union, where 80% of the members are female, with little interest in and less time for full-time union jobs. Of the 832, only 106 were women.

Because of the predominantly female composition of the ILGWU, especially among the newer ethnic groups, the union set up a full-time, full-year Training Institute in 1950 *to reach outside the trade,* if necessary to recruit leadership talent. (The only such program in the entire American labor movement.) In the first 11 years of its existence, the Institute graduated 30 trainees of Negro or Spanish-speaking origin. (90 applied. One out of three was graduated, a *higher* percentage than for the Institute as a whole.)

Some idea of the philosophy of the Institute and of the ILGWU can be obtained from a letter written by an ILGWU Vice-President when one Spanish-speaking graduate left the union

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staff. The letter was addressed to a Puerto Rican social agency in February, 1960:

> No one knows better than you that in the last few years many Spanish speaking workers, especially Puerto Ricans, have entered our industry and union. To develop staff and leadership from this community of working people we have a special Training Institute, a full year course. We look forward with keen interest to the growth and maturation of such new personnel so that in the coming years they may be able to play a major role in our union.
>
> To us, C..... represented more than an individual. He represented a trend. His progress, we felt, would be an encouragement for other young men and women with his interests to serve in the labor movement.
>
> To put it bluntly, we feel that C.....'s departure represents a setback to our program of developing Spanish-speaking staff and leadership in our union.

In the report of the General Executive Board of the union to its 1959 convention, progress was reported. "The call for the development of such leadership in the ranks of the ILGWU, on the basis of merit only, has taken the form of numerous appeals in the Spanish language press and in *Justicia* for Spanish-speaking ILGers to enroll in the ILGWU Training Institute. The results of the recent ILGWU elections indicate that a corps of such leaders is already emerging from the ranks."

The report went further. "President Dubinsky urged that the Puerto Rican government establish a training institute for developing community, civic and labor leadership for the thousands of islanders who are in transition. This would be the greatest preventive to their being exploited by misleaders and charlatans taking advantage of language and initial cultural confusion in the slum environment, as well as in the homeland island itself."

The ILGWU offered to provide on-the-job training on the mainland for these Puerto Rican trainees and pledged to place them on ILGWU staff immediately after graduation.

Without appearing to be superior or self-righteous, may I ask whether there is any other union in the world that can show a comparative record of trying to develop new leadership—with a specific eye on new ethnic groups?

HILL CHARGE: "Workers who take home $49.00 a week tell each other jokes about the greed of union business agents."

THE TRUTH: The ILGWU has one of the tightest systems ever devised by a union to check on the conduct of its officers: an army of accountants with a special corps of accountants to check accountants. In the last 30 years, the union has had occasion to drop some 40 of its officers for improper conduct.

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The Hill charge is trial by rumor and humor. It is an anonymous smear: the kind of smear used to characterize races, religions, the NAACP, or the labor movement by reference to some piece of gossip embedded in jokes. No facts. No names. No evidence. Just a report on alleged jokes.

The truth is that, although I knew this anonymous piece of evidence—trial by rumor—was in the Hill "testimony," I was shocked that *New Politics* did not use the editorial scissors here.

To characterize a union or any body of humans by the anonymous smear—the great mark of McCarthyism, of the anti-semite, of the white racist, of the bigot—is hardly "evidence." This is the lynch spirit.

(Unfortunately, this piece is limited to answering charges. For those who would like to know what the ILGWU has done over 62 years to promote inter-group understanding and civil rights—may I suggest a reading of "Equal Opportunity-Union Made," Educational Department, ILGWU, 1710 Broadway, New York City, N. Y.).

GUS TYLER *is the Director of Politics, Education and Training of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.*



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A SYMPOSIUM

CUBA

BLOCKADE

CRISIS



Recent events have placed the burning issue of Castro's Cuba in a new perspective. President Kennedy's blockade, followed by Soviet Russia's removal of missile bases and bombers raises the issue to transcendent — terrifying — international importance.

Consistent with this magazine's policy of bringing significant controversies to our readers' attention we have asked the following writers to assess and debate the meaning of recent events in and over Cuba. The symposium airs many of the conflicting views within a wide range of radical and socialist thought. It may be noted that three of the nine articles are by editors of New Politics: Robert J. Alexander, Hal Draper and Samuel Shapiro—each representing a different attitude.

The economic and political changes that Castro has wrought in Cuba are of course inseparable from the swelling international crisis. Accordingly, we have divided the symposium into two parts. The first four articles emphasize the implications of the blockade for the United States and for the peace of the world. The other five emphasize the internal nature of Cuban society.

We welcome comments and criticisms from our readers.

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Norman Thomas

A Terrible Risk of Nuclear War

NEVER BEFORE HAVE I begun an article by calling attention to the date of its writing. The magazine deadline means that I must write it after receipt of the news that Castro will give up bombers which he says are obsolete anyhow, probably because Mikoyan, in behalf of Khrushchev, issued something like an ultimatum. I cannot, however, wait for the President's meeting with the press at which he may or may not say what he regards as still-to-be-settled questions about inspection, continuance of the blockade, etc.

It is certain, however, that to the world in general, Khrushchev will seem to have carried out his promises for the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. It is equally certain that the world will expect President Kennedy to keep his promise made in his letter to Khrushchev to refrain from military invasion of Cuba.

One must expect that Khrushchev will stand out as a lover of peace or at least as a responsible statesman unwilling to risk thermonuclear war for the sake of turning Cuba into a Soviet armed base. Why, then, did he take the risk of sending missiles? I have seen no satisfactory answer. Did he do it purely as a test of Washington? Was his withdrawal an acknowledgment of Soviet inferiority in the weapons of obliteration? Was the whole affair a maneuver to strengthen his hand in later demands on the United States with regard to Berlin, our base in Turkey and perhaps American intervention in South Vietnam? Time may tell. In any event, the answer is not essential to my comment on a crisis that brought us face to face with the unspeakable horrors of nuclear war. The crisis starkly illumined the truth that in the domain of international law and the conduct of nations there are sharply contradictory facts.

The first is that in an anarchic world of sovereign states what passes for international law gives Cuba the right to choose its own weapons for its own defense, seeking aid where it will. Washington not only asserts this right for the U.S. as a matter of course, but

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also for other nations on its side of the cold war. Consider how many bases we have put up on foreign soil surrounding the Soviet Union. Turkey is the example most often cited where we have a base very close to the Russian border. Yet the Soviet Union has not so far made any such protest as we made over Russian weapons in Cuba.

Concerning the Turkish base, I have heard our position defended in the same five minutes by contradictory arguments that it is comparatively obsolete, but necessary for the defense of Turkey. It has also been stridently (for instance, in *Time)* argued that the fact it was a base in the service of NATO made a difference. The U.S., it is argued, was not acting along national lines in maintaining a base in Turkey while refusing to countenance Russian bases in Cuba. In the first case it acted for NATO and in the second for the Organization of American States. This is a thin excuse. The plain truth is that Washington has done repeatedly in the Eastern hemisphere what it will not permit the Soviet Union to do in the West and that it demands rights for Turkey as a sovereign state that it denies Cuba. It will not forever be a tenable position.

The second fact is that, regardless of international law, no nation which feels itself strong enough to object successfully will quietly let a smaller neighboring nation, with whose government it is on unfriendly terms, turn itself with outside aid into a base capable of extensive damage either to the big power or to smaller neighbors over which that power asserts rights of protection. Faced with this fact, in the setting of the religion of nationalism and cold war, international law or precedent will not have much influence. There will be casuists to trump up some excuse. But the fact will be national interest.

In the case of Cuba, the U.S. finds particular reason for anxiety because of Dr. Castro's "volatile temperament." I. F. Stone, in his excellent *Newsletter,* has given impressive evidence of the way the American press has treated news from Cuba, suppressing or distorting some of it, exaggerating Castro's emotionalism, and presenting sensational rumors as if they were crude facts. Nevertheless, there is much evidence that Khrushchev also held some such idea regarding Cuba. An American businessman, W. E. Knox, who interviewed him during the Cuban crisis, writing in the *New York Times Magazine,* November 18th, quotes him as follows:

> But the Cubans were a very volatile people, Mr. Khrushchev said, and all the sophisticated hardware furnished for their defense was entirely under the control of Soviet officers; it would be used only in the event that Cuba was attacked, and it would never be fired except on his orders as commander-in-chief of all forces of the Soviet Union. Then, with something of a twinkle, he added that even the Americans would not trust their NATO allies by turning over thermonuclear devices to them.

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The arrest of a group of alleged saboteurs by the FBI, some of whom were accredited to the UN, has tended to confirm American opinion in favor of a tough stand on Cuba.

Indeed, as I see the country—and I have faced many audiences in many parts of it, since the President inaugurated the naval blockade—American opinion is at the moment more thoughtlessly belligerent than the President's. In the existing context of the cold war and the American opinion about it, Kennedy acted with moderation in the use of the naval blockade in preference to more violent action. The tone of his correspondence with Khrushchev, insofar as it has been released, bears this out, especially his pledge against military intervention. (It is a bit alarming, however, to find "sources close to the State Department" explaining, according to the press, how many aggressive acts we can take against the Castro government short of military intervention.)

I WAS ONE OF THE MINORITY who criticized Kennedy's imposition of a naval blockade, technically an act of war, without even preliminary appeal to the UN. It was a terrible risk to hazard nuclear war against mankind (for that's what every nuclear war must be) in order to prevent Russia from doing in Cuba what we have done in Turkey. This time the gamble paid off, but not without an effect upon American thinking, and perhaps governmental policy, which could be disastrous. Unquestionably the President has encouraged our loud-voiced advisors who tell us that all we need to do is to "get tough" or to "stand firm" and that our enemies will back down before our power. It is absolutely certain that the attempt to keep peace indefinitely by a series of threats will result in war by accident, by madness, or by the coldblooded miscalculation of men in power who may reckon that we can safely strike without too great loss by retaliation because of a temporary superiority in striking power and reserve force.

What Cuba proves, above all, is that it is necessary to work harder than ever for general disarmament down to a police level. One of the earliest steps in such disarmament should be the end of military bases of big powers on other people's soil. It is the business of a peace movement to emphasize this fact.

During the height of the crisis, it was too late for us lovers of peace to be anything much more than dogs running around and barking while the train of history rushed toward war—to use a striking figure of speech which Dr. Albert Szent-Gyorgy employed in talking informally to a group of us. Yet, for the record, it was worthwhile even to bark.

It is our business, however, to be more effective in changing the political context which dictates crises. To be sure, it is fair to us "barking dogs" to say that in the case of Cuba, we had advocated

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a very different line than the government had followed, beginning back in the days of America's complacent friendship with Batista. The people who asked us "what would you do?" at the very height of the crisis were like patients who had steadily disregarded all their doctors' advice and then in the final agony ask the doctors to save them. Nevertheless, it is obvious that we peace lovers have to do a better job than we have done—build a real movement—if other crises over Berlin, South Vietnam, perhaps even over the Indo-Chinese war, are not to threaten us with obliteration. What we have to do is to push our whole program of disarmament, strengthening of the UN, orderly disengagement from commitments threatening war, and a holy and cooperative war against the poverty, illiteracy and preventable disease from which so many nations suffer.

TO RETURN TO THE CUBAN CRISIS, there are reasonable things for the President to do now, and I think that he has influence to carry the American people with him although he may have to work to do it.

He can support the Brazilian suggestion to the UN that the South American continent—and also Africa—be kept entirely clear of nuclear weapons. He can scrupulously live up to his promise that there will be no military intervention in Cuba.

He can agree to a UN inspection and verification of that promise in line with his insistence on verification of Cuba's freedom of nuclear weapons and the capacity to use them. If we believe in the UN and the growth of law in place of war, we should gladly assent to this arrangement, which cannot possibly be regarded as in any sense humiliating. Neither is it an abandonment of the people of Cuba to a Communist tyranny which can be cured by Yankee arms. Threat of such invasion will tend to unite the people and the government. We could not drop freedom among the bombs on Cuban soil. Invasion would arouse new hatred among the Latin American peoples, if not their governments.

Finally, the President could agree to close our naval base at Guantanamo and return the territory to a Cuba definitely free of capacity to wage any sort of aggressive war against any of her neighbors. Perhaps the area of the base could be dedicated to some conspicuous service to humanity and the cause of peace. It is generally admitted that under modern conditions of war, the base has no great military value. Its presence by no means helps the Cubans to set their own house in order. Its presence is an irritant to the people and to any government. To make a constructive use of this territory for peace would be a very appropriate American initiative.

November 20, 1962

NORMAN THOMAS, *the veteran American socialist, is the author of many books, his latest,* Great Dissenters, *was published last year.*

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Victor Alba

A False "Crisis"

WHAT ARE THE RESULTS of the so-called Cuban "crisis" (a crisis, I believe, which exists not in reality, but in the unjustified fear of the public, because no one familiar with Soviet reality could suppose that the blockade of Cuba might lead to war)?

For the United States, the crisis has served to blackmail the USSR a little and to eliminate an obvious, but not serious, military danger. For Latin America, that crisis has demonstrated that Soviet promises can not be relied upon, and that no country can accept an alliance with the Communists without running the inevitable risk of ending up as a pawn of Soviet diplomacy. In addition, the crisis has again given Latin Americans the feeling that the existence of the United States (which itself constitutes one of the continent's most serious problems) has at least the compensation of providing their defense. Perhaps all this might, in the more or less distant future, lead to the creation of a Latin American army, which would reduce the permanent threat of military coups in Latin America. Whatever one's position on the crisis, it is apparent that Latin Americans were surprised that the United States did not invade Cuba. The failure to invade seemed illogical, even to those who least desired such a dénouement.

It might be interesting to distinguish how the European reponse to the situation differed from the Latin American, and how the myths and rhetoric, which in Latin America evaporated with the "crisis," remain prevalent in Europe. And this despite the fact that the "crisis" was European, not Cuban.

The explanation of the hazardous Soviet decision to install missile bases in Cuba must be sought far from the Caribbean. Cuba was no more than an instrument.

The answer is in Europe. The most widely held reasoning in Washington follows.

The USSR began to realize it had "missed the boat" after the war, when it failed to conquer Western Europe. Stalin believed that the loss of their colonies would result in the destruction of

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the economies of the Western Powers. His theory was fettered to the clichés of the Lenin era regarding imperialism. It turned out, however, that, without the colonial powers knowing it themselves, the colonies were not a profitable business, but a burden; as soon as Europe was unburdened of these colonies its prosperity grew apace. Today, Europe with the Common Market is more powerful than the Soviet bloc, and the United States-Western Europe alliance surpasses in the economic field (decisive in any military contest) any non-existent and well-nigh impossible alliance of the Soviet bloc with the underdeveloped countries.

The USSR still maintains one hope for the dissolution of European unity: by maneuvering in Berlin it might succeed in separating Germany from the rest of Europe (at least so Moscow hopes). And it harbors the hope of breaking the United States-Western Europe alliance by giving Europeans the impression that the United States is unwilling to risk war to defend them.

By installing missile bases in Cuba, Moscow hoped to attain one of these objectives (or perhaps both at once).

In effect Moscow supposed (and this is demonstrated by the second of Khrushchev's three letters to Kennedy, the only one that was not answered) that if it had bases in Cuba, at the very gates of the United States, it could propose to the White House a trade: Cuba for an "arrangement" in Berlin (thus separating Germany from Europe); or Cuba for the American bases in Turkey or Italy or anywhere (thus creating the impression in Western Europe that the United States is really unwilling to defend Europe in case of Soviet aggression).

The American blockade and Kennedy's refusal to exchange Cuba for the Turkish bases has saved Western European unity and reaffirmed that strategy which makes the defense of Europe with the collaboration of the Europeans the basis of US diplomacy and military preparedness.

THE SITUATION BEING THUS, how can the response of many people in Europe be explained?

There were those who accused anyone who denounced Stalin's crimes and paranoia as agents of Hitler . . . and then Khrushchev confirmed and even augmented these denunciations. There were those who maintained that the Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba were invented by the United States as a pretext for invasion . . . and then Khrushchev took it upon himself to confirm the existence of these Soviet weapons by promising to remove them from Cuba upon realizing that he could not complete the installation of his arsenal, and that his attempt at extortion was wrecked by the blockade of the United States Navy.

There were those who were sure that the blockade could not

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be legally carried out without a declaration of war, and recent history refuted them with the memory of the Russian blockade of Berlin, hardly thirteen years ago.

There were those who believed Washington was preparing an invasion of Cuba . . . and the American police interned those Cuban exiles who seemed disposed to attempt a small raid on their own account. And, above all, there were those who insisted that this or that violates the principles of international law.

All these positions are anachronistic, with no relation to the real world.

Those who maintain them do not see that the existence of new weapons, in which consists the very nature of the cold war (with its mixture of interests and ideologies), is an unprecedented historical fact. International law provides no practical solution. And the fundamental principle of law, that of equity, is violated by those obtuse purists who would treat alike the USSR and Burma, Cuba and San Marino.

All this is derived from the concept—eagerly embraced and enthusiastically promoted by the Communists—that Communism is merely another political doctrine and the USSR merely another state. This was all right for the liberals of a century back, but shocking in a socialist or liberal of 1962.

Curiously, many who think this way now thought otherwise in 1933 when Hitler took power. They criticized—and with justice—the appeasers and those who spoke of the Germans' right to self-determination and of the principle of non-intervention. They believed—again with justice—that self-determination depends on the people and that it be expressed in election, that against threats to the peace there can and must be collective action, and that the use of saber rattling and fear of war as instruments of extortion must be answered with firmness rather than with appeasement. They said—and correctly—that the only language Hitler understood was firmness and action backed by force.

This was true of Hitler, as it is of Khrushchev, as it was for Stalin in Greece fifteen years ago and in Korea twelve years ago. As Leon Blum, the French socialist leader, said in 1945: "It seems to me that there was one way, and perhaps the only way, to prevent the 1939 war. That was to carry out a preventive operation starting at the time of Hitler's taking power. I honestly believe today that France and England, with Poland, could have and should have done this in 1933."

The blockade against the Soviet delivery of atomic arms to Cuba is a preventive operation of the kind that could have helped prevent the Second World War.

Nor are the Communists just another political party, but a Party in the service of interests alien to their own class and na-

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tion, a Party whose methods include the destruction of liberty, and which, upon taking power, of necessity reduces the living standard of the new subjects. In this alone the Communists are not like other parties, and cannot be treated like other parties. We say of Fascists that there can be no freedom for the enemies of freedom. This remains valid no matter how the enemies of freedom label themselves.

In the same way I do not see how there can be equality or protection of law for a country whose object is the destruction of equality and international law, and which proposes to replace the old imperialism and moribund colonialism, against which we have always struggled, with new forms, more dangerous because better disguised, of these two systems of world domination.

The history of the last thirty or forty years shows that the USSR as a world power has respected not a single one (I repeat, not a single one) of the treaties it signed, nor has it failed to miss any opportunity to interfere in the politics of other countries, nor has it hesitated to use arms to seize the territory of independent nations (sometimes with the help of, and in alliance with, the Nazis), nor does it hesitate to threaten the rest of the world with nuclear devastation.

NEHRU, BECAUSE HE BELIEVED that a Communist country was "like any other," saw India invaded. Because he called the warnings which were directed to him "propaganda," he failed to arm himself in time with a healthy mistrust. Because he considered what was said of his defense minister Krishna Menon "calumnies," he was forced to fire him only after ascertaining that Menon had left the army without arms. Because he believed Soviet promises and turned a deaf ear to the lessons of history, he found the USSR evading its promised assistance and making common cause with the Chinese Communist invaders.

Meanwhile we read in the newspapers that some people are still putting forth legalistic formulations such as saying that there are also bases in Turkey, or such as viewing the Cuban situation as strictly a US problem.

What Nehru recently said of himself applies:

"We are getting out of touch with realities in a modern world. We are living in our own creation, and we have been shaken out of it."

Translated from the Spanish by Richard Schoen.

VICTOR ALBA *has written extensively on Latin American affairs. He is now free-lancing in Mexico and coordinating the work of the Centro de Estudios y Documentaćion Sociales and its review* Panoramas. *His next book will be a history of political workers, and union movements in Latin America.*

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Hal Draper

Kennedy's Disastrous Cuban Policy

THE LONG AND SHORT of U.S. policy in the last Cuba crisis was that Kennedy threatened to engulf the world in a nuclear war unless Moscow capitulated to his demands.

We won. We showed 'em. They can't push us around. Kennedy was right all the time. Just meet 'em with force and they'll back down. That's the language they understand. This was the triumphant talk that arose, after a sigh of relief, when Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the bases and the world receded from the brink. This reaction is the most dangerous thing that has happened in American public opinion since the beginning of the Cold War. Not only is it basically false, as we shall see, but it means that, the next time, there will be so much the less resistance in the United States to an aggressive, adventuristic military-based foreign policy in reaction to Cold-War crises.

Those who reacted with this kind of triumphant talk are, in the last analysis, sure of only one thing: that bringing the world to the brink of war was better than appeasement of the Kremlin; that "better dead than red" is better said than "better red than dead." It is only insofar as they choose between these alternatives that they manage to work up any confidence in their policy. But for the next time, or for some next time after that, there had better be a third way, or else this world is through.

It is most particularly "the next time" that I am interested in here: that is, the implications of this crisis for the future. For I am going to suggest, among other things, that a greater shift has taken place in Washington than the celebrants seem to realize. Just before Kennedy announced his blockade, Joseph Alsop wrote in his column: "Complicating the dreadfully dangerous Berlin problem by a harebrained, immediate attack on the Cuban problem would be an action so irresponsible that it deserves to be called criminal." Alsop had, earlier this year, had a sufficiently cast-iron stomach to report in a *Saturday Evening Post* interview that Ken-

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nedy contemplated the possibility of the U.S.'s using nuclear weapons first; this he had *not* been moved to call criminal. It is not often that such a very reasonable person denounces the government's act as a crime, even in advance. It should make one wonder even in the midst of rejoicing.

I offer five propositions on the Cuba crisis.

1. *Pro-Castro or Anti-Castro?*

THE FIRST PROPOSITION is that this is *not* the issue as far as U.S. policy is concerned.

Of course, anyone who thinks that Castro is the paladin of revolutionary progress and liberty in Cuba has a simple job in choosing sides. It is not that simple for me. I am not an admirer or political supporter of either Castro or his regime; I believe he is leading the Cuban revolution into the ditch; I believe he is an increasingly authoritarian dictator, and that as long as this is true he is ruining the Cuban revolution—whether he breaks with the Communists tomorrow or not. (The purely Stalinophobe basis of anti-Castroism is liable to get a little shaky.) Not the least of Castro's sins has been his willingness to make Cuba a pawn in the Cold War between the rival imperialist war camps.

In fact, on the Cold-War level, the whole debate that took place in the UN reeked of the Pot and the Kettle. As I. F. Stone rightly put it in visceral terms, "The speeches of both Stevenson and Zorin to the Security Council Tuesday night [October 23] were equally nauseating." Adlai Stevenson, a broken man convicted last year of lying before the whole world, trumpeted about the "world civil war . . . between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world," but his pluralistic world put the gun to the heads of the Latin American states and came up with a monolithic vote of the OAS. The Russian liar, on the other hand, spoke of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states —such as Hungary, no doubt. Whatever Khrushchev's calculation may have been, exactly, in planting missile bases on Cuba in this situation, his motivation certainly was neither to defend Cuba nor ease war tensions.

But there is a great gulf between rejecting Castro's leadership of the Cuban revolution and supporting Washington's onslaughts on Cuba. One did not have to be a supporter of Nasser to condemn the British-French-Israeli imperialist aggression on Suez in 1956. One did not even have to be a supporter of Imre Nagy to condemn the Russian suppression of Hungary, and many a Communist Party was ripped open because there were Communists who saw this point. It is true that much of the exposé literature about the bureaucratization of the Castro regime is used for—and some of it was written to be used for—the whitewashing of Washington's

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squeeze on Cuba, just as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. lamented Castro's "betrayal" of the Cuban revolution for the sake of whitepapering the CIA-mounted invasion. But this use of scholars does not make the truth about Castro less true; it merely makes it necessary to face also the truth about Kennedy. Castro's anti-democracy motivates nothing whatsoever in the Cuba policy of a United States which mobilizes a Somoza and an Ydigoras to denounce this anti-democracy.

Nor, remember, was it those missile bases which steeled Kennedy's heart against Cuba, although we must assume that they precipitated the last crisis.[1] A year ago there were no missile bases in Cuba, and no jet bombers; indeed, émigré gunboats could shoot up Cuban harbors with impunity. But the U.S. invaded. After the fiasco, Kennedy's speech to the editors' convention virtually threatened that he was not giving up the idea: "Our patience is not endless," he intoned. It had nothing to do with missile bases or offensive threats then, did it? A half-decent memory makes it difficult to swallow the story that that is all Kennedy is mad about.

Subversive thoughts like these are held even by Kennedy's best friends. The *New York Times* of October 23 stated that his British supporters defended action against Cuba because Castro's regime "would accelerate a general swing to the left in Latin America."

On that same October 23rd, I found myself at the University of Chicago, one of whose luminaries is Prof. Hans Morgenthau, an ardent supporter of the blockade, whose only complaint was that Kennedy had not done something sooner. In the university paper one could read:

> Morgenthau stated that the threat posed by the presence of missiles in Cuba "does not add materially to the direct military threat already present."
>
> The signfiicance of the presence of missiles is twofold, stated Morgenthau. First, it is a threat to U.S. prestige. Second, it creates an effective showplace of modern weapons to show to other Latin American countries, and in this way could aid in the training of subversives in Latin America. [*Chicago Maroon,* Oct. 24.]

This is a more cynical view of what was involved, but, I think, a more candid one. For Moscow, too, the Nagy regime in Hungary would have been a danger not because it was run by "fascists" or by the CIA, but because its very existence would accelerate the desire to go-and-do-likewise in East Europe, because it was a blow to the Kremlin's prestige, and because it was a kind of showplace.

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1. In my opinion, an examination of the evidence—especially the chronology— strongly supports the view that Kennedy's move was at least *triggered-off* by the exigencies of the election campaign; I am not discussing this factor here simply to save space.

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KENNEDY'S ENTIRE CASE for the blockade was based on the distinction between "offensive weapons" and "defensive weapons." This distinction was made something fundamental and absolute. Without it, there would not be a shred left to the U.S. position even formally. Considering the almost-total lack of any defense of this theory, one would think it was well established and respectable. Yet the fact is that every informed person knows it is a fraud.

I know of three attempts to discuss this theory, though no doubt there were more. The *New York Times*' military expert Hanson Baldwin remarked (the day after Kennedy made his announcement) that "the manner in which a weapon is used rather than the weapon itself is the best yardstick for classification" as defensive or offensive. He added that "the MIG jet fighters [not bombers] now in Cuban hands emphasize even more than missiles the danger of classifying any weapon as 'defensive' or 'offensive.' . . . All of these types are useful as fighter interceptors. But all can easily fly over Florida and other parts of the southeastern U.S., and like our own fighter interceptors many of them could be armed with various types of conventional or nuclear arms, including rockets and bombs."

David Lawrence's Washington column on October 24 said:

> For several months the American government has known that missile bases were being built and equipped in Cuba. But, up to now, the official assumption has been that all this was "defensive" on Cuba's part. There is, however, little difference actually between a missile base built for defense and one built for offensive purposes.

He made no effort to relate this interesting observation to the cheers for Kennedy in the rest of this column.

The Irish delegate to the UN discussed this in his speech of October 24. Here is his attempt:

> There is some force to the argument often used that whether a weapon is to be regarded as offensive or defensive depends less on its intrinsic character than on the intentions of those who possess it. Whatever may be the intentions of the Soviet or the Cuban government, however, it appears undeniable that the installations, missiles and aircraft now in Cuba are capable, in the hands of ill-intentioned persons, of constituting a deadly threat to the security of North and South America.

Or, to put the same thought in other words, the distinction is absurd. The criterion has become *political*—the evil intentions in the mind of the other fellow. It will be time to discuss this seriously when the UN, or even the U.S., dreams of applying this distinction to any other country.

But why is it necessary to quote authority on this? There is a more decisive question which has only to be asked to explode this fraudulent position: *Are the United States' military prepara-*

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tions offensive or defensive? Take its ICBMS (on which it has specialized whereas Russia has concentrated on smaller-range missiles), its Polaris submarines, its strategic bombers, its overseas bases on Russia's border—*are these offensive or defensive weapons?*

Or is it only and exclusively in the case of a tiny country threatened by a giant that weapons automatically become offensive if they are capable of striking outside of its own borders?

Kennedy insists that jet bombers too are "offensive weapons" and must be removed from Cuba. Is there any other country in the world that would allow itself to be stripped in this way on the claim that it is automatically an offensive threat against its neighbors? While the U.S. itself has been arming the Latin American caudillos, has it been supplying their armies only with "defensive weapons?" Let us have an accounting.

I have not, myself, seen a single honest admission from supporters of the blockade that what Castro, with Russian aid, was resorting to, in the face of the real threat of invasion by the U.S., was the famous policy of the deterrent—nothing more!

Now, I am against deterrent politics as it is practised in this Cold War; but I am not against it only when it is practised by Cuba to deter the United States. The supporters of Kennedy, however, are for it. It is the very heart of U.S. foreign policy today. They extol it as the only way to keep in check a would-be aggressor. Anyone who is dubious about it as the last word in international wisdom is denounced or derided. Shall the Cubans remain unconvinced by all this?

It is a hundred times true that for Moscow to build up Cuba as a nuclear-missile base is provocative, but *it is only left critics of U.S. policy who have the moral right to denounce either Khrushchev or Castro for this.* In supporters of the Kennedy policy which produced the blockade, such denunciation is a kind of naive hypocrisy which has become so built-in to current American thinking that it can even be done by honest men.

3. *Who Won What?*

THE GLEE OVER the Famous Victory is a little premature. One can easily understand the outburst: in the first place, there was an election won; in the second place, Americans have not had much to crow over in a long time. It tickled every D.A.R.'s patriotic heart to see us upstanding Americans ordering Russian ships around.

But who really won what? This is still to be seen: who will reap the greatest gain from this episode.

The dominant American reaction is clearly a sick one. It has the function of relieving the doomful sense of frustration that hangs over America's role in the Cold War.

What is emphasized almost exclusively in the American cele-

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bration over the blockade is Khrushchev's "loss of face": he backed down; he capitulated; we were top dog; our "nerve did not flinch" (Lord Home). The image, of course, is exactly the same as that of juvenile pre-delinquents playing the game of Chicken. The press writes almost as a matter of course that Russia lost influence in the world because it backed down when Kennedy rose in all his wrath and brandished his thunderbolts.

Russia lost influence with whom?

The press tells of reactions in foreign capitals, by political spokesmen, etc. We have still to find out whether the Kremlin lost influence with plain people when it declined to meet Kennedy's war challenge.

Does anyone think it was only Bertrand Russell who reacted by hailing Khrushchev as the preserver of peace? Now, no one need work hard to prove to me that Russell is not a political genius, but derogatory remarks about his political capacity are beside the point. Brazilian peasants or Italian workers or Indonesian officers are also not as politically sophisticated as the types who write apologias for State Department.

What has Khrushchev really lost? (Besides "face," that is.) Did he lose Cuba? Leaving aside the questions of whether he "had" Cuba, what exactly does Russia need a Cuban satellite for? I am not sure that anyone pays much attention to the official theory that Moscow has or had any permanent perspective for Cuba as a serious military base. And a Cuban satellite will certainly not be an economic asset to the Russian empire.

The basic use that Khrushchev has for Cuba is as a *political* pawn, as a battering-ram in *political warfare* against the United States. And when the instrument is used up in his hands and has to be tossed away, this is an old story for the Kremlin totalitarians. That's Castro's neck, not theirs.

The question then is this: Which will attract the people of the world: the image of Kennedy as Mars hurling Jovian thunderbolts, or of Khrushchev as the Jovial Peacelover?

But this is only the immediate side of things. Having established himself as a Peacelover, Khrushchev still has to make his next move.

Will it be a squeeze on the U.S.'s Turkish bases? Kennedy has put into Khrushchev's bank a small fortune in political capital. Khrushchev has only to decide how to spend it. It is the simplest thing in the world to write an editorial in an *American* newspaper explaining why the U.S. cannot tolerate Cuba but Moscow must tolerate U.S. nuclear bases on its own border: all you have to do is ignore elementary logic and common sense and not many will notice the difference. It is a little harder to explain it to anyone else in the world, which is filled with deplorably un-American

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types. I have a substantial and entertaining collection of clippings bearing elucidations by certified thinkers on the basic difference between the Cuban and Turkish bases, but the varieties are few.

The very first was Kennedy's own, when he said in his blockade announcement: "Our own strategic weapons have never been transferred to another nation *under the cloak of secrecy*." (Emphasis added.) Unfortunately, Kennedy did not mean that the Russians move would have been all right if done openly, so this masterpiece of smugness does not help much.[2]

It has been asked: Wouldn't it be considered provocative if the U.S. were to establish *new* military bases in, say, Finland? To be sure, I would so consider it, myself, but this is of no consequence: would the supporters of Kennedy's current Realpolitik denounce it? It is very easy to claim this when there is, in fact, little possibility of eventuation; but the U.S. bases in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Turkey, Libya, Morocco, Italy, Spain, France, England, Germany, Holland, Iceland and Greenland were all once new, each in their turn. We did not hear them denounced as provocations by the people now defending the Kennedy blockade, as each of them in turn changed the then status quo. It is much easier to reject bases that do not exist.

More and more, however, formulations on the "basic difference" between the Cuban and Turkish bases come down to the rationale enunciated in the *Wall Street Journal*'s editorial effort on the subject (October 26): our bases are there to defend the "free world," theirs are there to destroy the said free world.

The whole point is that the U.S. *has to demonstrate* to a somewhat skeptical world that all it is doing is defending the "free world," and it cannot prove this by assuming it.

This is an argument which can literally justify anything, *and is so used*. When Russia crushed Hungary, this proved it was Bad. But when we invade Cuba, this is justified because we are Good. If Russia starts a nuclear war, this will be an historic war crime against humanity, of which only barbaric totalitarians are capable. But if the U.S. starts a nuclear war (as Kennedy says we may), then this will be to save the free world, because we are Good.

Let this smug, Pecksniffian doctrine really permeate the U.S. and those fingers in Washington will be twice as itchy to press the button. This is one of the most frightening developments of all—this blind, stupid self-righteousness oblivious to political reality.[3]

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2. This also raises a question pointed up only (as far as I have seen) by the best reporter in Washington, I. F. Stone, in his *Weekly:* Why did the Russians make not the slightest attempt to camouflage the missile bases? I have not seen any explanation of this by any government spokesman or apologist. The reasons that occur to one are all entirely incompatible with the government's official case.

3. Oblivious also to any question of legal rights of nations. Thus, Canada's Prime Minister Diefenbaker found himself telling his parliament that arguments about the legality of the blockade were "largely sterile and irrelevant." When Khrushchev talks like this about

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The other political bank in which Kennedy has deposited political capital for Khrushchev is—the Berlin issue. Berlin is not 90 miles off the coast of the Communist world but right in the middle of its territory. There is conjecture about a possible new blockade of Berlin if the Russians want to get tough again. The last time, the blockade was beaten by an air lift. But surely the thought has occurred to our planners in Washington:

Now that Kennedy has told the world he was ready to sink Russian ships on the high seas in order to isolate an enemy base outside the U.S., what happens if Khrushchev announces (in a TV broadcast) that the East Germans will shoot down any American plane flying over their own territory against their wishes?

What do we do next to get tough: invade East Germany?

The degree to which the U.S. position is fantastically untenable has been nowhere more sharply pointed up than by Walter Lippmann, in his column of October 23. The Turkish base, he argues, is a liability now:

> These things need to be understood by our people as we find ourselves in a military crisis over Cuba. Until our people do understand them, they will be thinking and feeling and voting in a world that no longer exists. In the world that now exists the United States is not omnipotent. It cannot, therefore, enforce the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere and the Truman Doctrine in the Eastern Hemisphere.

The appeasers, of course, will be happy to tell us that West Berlin must be surrendered to the Russians in order to keep them peaceful. But, precisely because we must reject such appeasement, Kennedy's Cuban policy is a first-class boon to Khrushchev's designs on Berlin, and above all to his ability to make political warfare out of the Berlin position. By backing down on Cuba, he has built up a credit for himself. When and if he, in turn, gets tough on Berlin, the propaganda belts will whirr: "How can you accuse this eminent Peacelover of pushing war to the brink? Look how nice he was on Cuba—how understanding, how forbearing; how much he gave and gave. Now what is the U.S. going to do on this —not give an inch after all that? Do you want everything your own way? etc., etc.

4. *A New Foreign Policy?*

IT IS NOT CLEAR whether the Kennedy administration is shaping up a new foreign-policy pattern or merely falling into it.

The *New York Times'* James Reston observes:

> The new Kennedy style of diplomacy is now operating in the Cuban crisis. It is highly personal and national. It is power diplomacy in the

Western treaty rights to Berlin, these pious statesmen know how to fulminate. Incidentally, Diefenbäker was backed up, of course, by opposition leader Pearson—a fact noteworthy only because the latter is a Nobel Peace Prize winner.

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> old classic European sense that prevailed before the great men worried much about consulting with allies or parliaments or international organizations. [Oct. 26.]

"Power diplomacy in the old classic European sense" is what led to two world wars. But Kennedy is classic not only in the European sense. The classic formula of old-fashioned American imperialism (the kind that used to send the marines into Nicaragua) was TR's "talk softly and carry a big stick." This is so notorious to students of history, like Kennedy, that it is positively startling to read that the President actually said in an October 13 election speech that "this is the time for a man who talks softly but who will also carry a big stick." Does he really think this is the time to go back to thinking in terms of charging up San Juan Hill?

The form in which Kennedy has rediscovered this vintage model of foreign policy is one of the simplest: hit first and let the other fellow decide what to do. Another of the Chicago professors of political science who gave his thoughts on the subject saw no danger arising from the blockade for the following reason:

> 'Khrushchev may be a bold gambler, but he isn't crazy,' stated [Prof. Morton] Kaplan. If we sink a ship, there isn't anything Russia can do, he said.

If we sink a ship, there isn't anything Russia can do. I suggest that the reader turn this over in his mind, savor to the full this proof that there is "no danger," in order to enter into the kind of thinking which Kennedy now represents. There isn't anything Russia can do, our professor of political science means, except retaliate with other steps that would lead right to nuclear war.

Now this works both ways. Let us suppose that the Communists shoot down that plane over their territory going to Berlin; is there anything Kennedy can do? except start the escalation to nuclear war?

If this sort of thing is so safe, then it is very tempting; and if it has led to a Famous Victory once, why deprive ourselves of its beneficent effects? If we move in and knock down that distasteful Berlin Wall, "there isn't anything Russia can do." If the Russians move in and flatten that Turkish base, "there isn't anything Kennedy can do." Or does it work on only one side?

Kennedy's admirers are applauding his new stance of "go-it-

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alone," especially on the right. (For example, William H. Chamberlin in the *Wall Street Journal.*) This is talk that was considered only a few short years ago to be Hooverite neanderthalism. It was virtually the sole property of the horse-and-buggy Republican Right, fought even by Eisenhower. Now it is the latest model Stanley Steamer on the New Frontier.

That the new Kennedy stance *is* the hand-me-down of the Republican Right was acted out in the election campaign. Who was yelling for this kind of policy when Kennedy turned around and gave it to them? If the tough line on Cuba was such an effective antidote to the GOP's plan to make Cuba the main election issue, it was so because Kennedy stole *their* line.

It has been said that Kennedy had to yield before right-wing pressure. To be sure, the right-wing pressure was there. But Khrushchev also has a more adventuristic and aggressive wing behind his back, it is said. So there is justification for him to get tough too . . .

Where all this leads is right to the brink.

The N. Y. *Herald-Tribune* editorially chortled over exactly this the day after Kennedy's blockade announcement:

> . . . the moves already under way go to the brink of war. . . . One thing was remarkable about President Kennedy's response to the Soviet-Cuba threat. This was that he seemed to be going back to the Eisenhower administration's policy of 'massive retaliation.' . . . when the chips were down they went back to John Foster Dulles' theory of preventing war by threatening massive retaliation with nuclear weapons.

But while this eminent Republican organ is justified in claiming the copyright, there is still an important difference between the much-maligned J. F. Dulles and the much-hailed J. F. Kennedy; viz., Dulles invented the term and talked about it, but he never did it. *Kennedy is the first world leader to actually use the ultimatum of nuclear war as an instrument of national policy,* that is, to push the world to the literal brink of nuclear war. He is already sure of going down in history.

5. *What Else Could He Have Done?*

THIS QUESTION IS FORMULATED most often as a rhetorical justification for the President's action, as if the answer were self-evident. But there has been no crisis since the beginning of the Cold War where the alternatives were so plain and simple.

I leave aside here the alternative, suggested at the time all over the world, of taking the case to the United Nations instead of unilaterally threatening nuclear war, not because this is unimportant but because it is procedural in character. Let us discuss political alternatives.

Kennedy could have prevented any establishment of Russian

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missile bases in Cuba to begin with, without military recourse at all; or, failing that, definitively expose the Castro regime before its own friends and before all uncommitted forces.

The Cubans had made a solemn proposal before the United Nations in response to the Congressional Joint Resolution on Cuba: "Were the United States able to give Cuba effective guarantees and satisfactory proof concerning the integrity of Cuban territory, and were it to cease its subversive and counter-revolutionary activities against our people, then Cuba would not have to strengthen its defenses. Cuba would not even need an army . . ."

This was said in advance. Anyone who wishes to may express doubt that Castro would carry out his end of this undertaking, but the point is that this was a decisive challenge to the United States. If Castro was bluffing, it would have been easy to call the bluff. All that Kennedy had to do was guarantee that he would not commit that which would be a war crime in any case, i.e., another invasion. What stopped him from giving such assurances?

As is well known, he not only refused to give such assurances but on the contrary allowed signs of quite different intentions. With incredible *gaucherie* or arrogance (I am not sure which), he even blurted out at a press conference that he did not favor an invasion *at this time.*

"What else could he have done?" Why, in the first place, promise not to commit the crime of invasion; hammer this home with suitable practical steps in Florida and elsewhere; dismantle what everybody knew were standby preparations and formations for invasion; publicly repudiate the invasion talk of the government-supported Cuban émigré phalanxes gathered in Miami like vultures; apply the law to catch and punish the émigré pirates using American facilities as a sanctuary from which to raid Cuba, and urge both Puerto Rico and Guatemala to do likewise; and several other things which the Invasion Planning Committee in Washington would have no difficulty in thinking of if it really wanted to convince Cuba and the world that any perspective of invasion or other military intervention was off. And then it would be up to Castro.

It is not a question merely of some empty promise not to invade. That is for diplomats, international lawyers and Stevensons. We are talking about a *political offensive.* The point of a political offensive is not merely to make the record, but to make an impact on the thinking and feeling of masses all over the world.

But this is pipedreaming as far as the Kennedy government is concerned. Such a political offensive on behalf of a *democratic anti-imperialist foreign policy* is alien to it. To this day Kennedy has refused to give any real commitment against an invasion even though Khrushchev formally based his agreement to dismantle on

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such commitment. Indeed, if and when Kennedy is ever compelled, despite squirming and twisting that Gromyko could be proud of, to give a real commitment against invasion, this will mean that Moscow has won a triumph.

"What else could he have done?" A different United States could have pursued a democratic anti-imperialist foreign policy. It can still do so. The means are right before it. There never was a better time to drive a wedge between the Cuban people (and even the Castro regime) and Moscow than now. The U. S. simply has to make clear that no matter what it thinks of the Castro regime, it is ceasing all arm-twisting and coercion in relation to Cuba. Then all it has to do is implement this position with deeds: like stopping all émigré raids, espionage and sabotage activities in Cuba,[4] ending its economic blockade and commercial strong-arm methods; desisting from further illegal air flights over Cuba or incursions into its waters; and, crowning measure, *proving* beyond all possibility of doubt that it has no remnant of intention to invade by withdrawing from its armed base on Cuban soil, Guantanamo, to which it has no right in the first place, and which is notoriously of no military importance in any case.

Now if Castro is a Communist, as we are told every day, and if the Cuban regime is a mere satellite of Moscow now, as the American Party Line has it, then these measures will not drive a wedge between Castro and Moscow, but *all the more they will drive a gulf between Castro and the Cuban people.* They will blow to smithereens any ability by Castro to "subvert" other Latin American countries with "lies about Yankee imperialism."

On the other hand, what does the U. S. lose by all this *if* it is not really interested in crushing the little country?

The reality of U. S. imperialism is concretized precisely by the fact that all this, too, is pipedreaming as far as Washington is concerned. It is socially incapable of a democratic foreign policy.

Now the proposals listed above are, as the acute reader has noted, exactly the five proposals made by Castro himself in his speech of October 28. He made them knowing full well whom he was dealing with. But if a different United States were actually to implement them, this would be a bombshell right under Castro's seat.

And now we learn that a new blockade is being planned out by the strategists in Washington. We have mentioned that the U. S. camp is faced with the problem of how to react if Khrushchev chooses to harass it with a new Berlin blockade; that is, if he does

4. A distinction should be made between democratic underground activities in Cuba against the Castro regime and the sort of destructive sabotage, which can only alienate the Cuban people and be an appendage of U. S. intervention in Cuba. Anyone who talks about supporting a democratic underground is obligated to repudiate this kind of action very clearly.

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to an enclave within Communist territory what the U. S. has done to an independent country outside its territory. Reports the *New York Times* from Washington in words that should send a chill through the country:

> There is agreement in principle [in NATO] that . . . [a Berlin blockade] should be met with strong Western actions up to and including an outright sea blockade of the whole Soviet bloc. . . .
>
> This would mean setting up naval pickets, similar to those around Cuba, to cut the principal sea routes to the Soviet Union and the East European Communist states. . . . not even neutral shipping would be permitted to cross the lines." [But "selected cargoes" may be passed through.] [Nov. 16.]

Will the eminent professors assure us that if we sink a few Russian ships, "there isn't anything Russia can do"?

It must also be remembered that this situation is most likely to eventuate, if it does eventuate, out of Khrushchev's threat to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, and turn over control of Western access to Berlin to the East German government, which the Western camp refuses to recognize. The same dispatch relates what the planners' thinking is if East German guards are substituted for Russians in controlling overland traffic to Berlin. This, it says, "might bring the following response": the East German guards would be "seized bodily and delivered to the Russians as 'impostors.'" This in East Germany territory itself! "Another move might be to make an armed probe down the autobahn . . ." i. e., invade in force.

One of the most fantastic sides to U. S. foreign policy, even in this fantastic world, is the fact that it is the U. S. which *insists* that the Russian occupation remain astride East Germany. In a country whose people tried to drive the Russians out with unexampled courage in 1953, American armed forces are going to turn East German guards over to *their Russian masters* for daring to assert their independent authority. This is the dreamlike consequence of U. S. refusal to recognize or deal with East Germany independently, as it refuses also to recognize the existence of Communist China in order to build up the hand of the butcher Chiang Kai-shek. On this basis, no political offensive against the Communist world is possible.

This is the common denominator of U. S. foreign policy. Con-



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sidering the U. S. as the bastion of beleaguered "free enterprise," i. e., capitalism, it knows only the military approach. But we are living in a world whose overwhelming majority, in all continents except North America, thinks of itself today as being for some kind of "socialism," at any rate hostile to the old system. All the new political ideas burgeoning in the world, agitating millions, permeating new countries and old in all kinds of ways, including distorted ways—all these ideas are alien to this "bastion of capitalism" mentality. Political ideas themselves become suspect, therefore, because anyone capable of getting ideas is likely to get the wrong ones. But you know where you are with guns, and only the most reactionary neanderthals in the world are politically reliable.

But if the American Party Line mind is incapable of a democratic *political offensive* against the Communist power, there is a considerable strain of its critics who are equally incapable of thinking in terms of any offensive against the Communist power. Desiring peace, and separating the fight for peace from the social struggle at large, they are driven to interpret the Cold War as an unfortunate misunderstanding among misguided men, who are to be brought together by appeasing their groundless fears. Objectively, they may even find themselves standing for capitulation to the Kremlin, as they react in justified horror against the heavy-handed militarism of Washington.

These are not the alternatives between which we must choose. If they were, we would be lost. We do not have to choose either Kennedy's threats of nuclear war and military-oriented imperialistic policy, or an appeaser's program of keeping Moscow happy. There is a third way, pointed against both war camps, which proposes a democratic foreign policy, hence an anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic foreign policy, based on a political offensive against the new exploitative system of Communist totalitarianism as well as the old exploitative system of capitalism.

HAL DRAPER, *former Editor of* The New International *and* Labor Action *is a member of the Editorial Board of* NEW POLITICS.

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Robert J. Alexander

Why President Kennedy Was Right in the Cuban Crisis

I SUPPORTED President Kennedy's actions in the crisis arising from the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. I did so because of the over-all view which I have of world affairs. In what follows, I shall try to indicate what this view is, and why it leads to the conclusions which it does. Finally, I shall try to indicate what seem to be some of the likely results of the Cuban crisis, in this country, in the Soviet Bloc, in Latin America, and in Cuba itself; and what future United States policy should be.

FOR FIFTEEN YEARS OR MORE most international events have been either influenced or determined by the deadlock between the United States and nations associated with it and the Soviet Union and countries subjected to or allied with it. This deadlock has brought civil war to some countries such as Greece, Korea and Vietnam and attempted insurrections in others. It has meant intense political battling between the two blocs in the United Nations and in all other international organizations. It has meant growing economic competition between them, particularly in the non-committed parts of the world.

Since 1949, the rivalry between the Soviet bloc and its opponents has been characterized by what is commonly referred to as the Balance of Terror. Although the United States had a monopoly of the atomic bomb from the end of World War II until 1949, and did not use it in the Cold War, after 1949, both countries had this terrible instrument of destruction and its even more potent successors. The situation has existed in which either side was in a position to retaliate to an attack with a nuclear force that would be more or less completely devastating to its rival.

Certainly no sane man on either side of the Cold War is happy about this potential threat to the whole human race. However, it

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is not as easily resolved as some of our pacifist friends seem to think. This is particularly the case if one feels that the Cold War involves something more than a mere struggle between super-armed blocs of states.

I, for one, believe that such is the case. In the Cold War, I am frankly on the side of the United States and feel that it would be an unmitigated disaster if the Communists were to dominate the globe. The greatest accomplishments of the human race during the last five hundred years—the growing acceptance of the theory and practice of equality before the law and of the system of democratic government—would be destroyed.

Whatever the changes now under way in the Soviet Union, the Communist system remains one in which class differences are more sharp and intense than in any other Western society since the Middle Ages. Freedom of speech, thought, press and organization are at the mercy of a secret police system which may have been mitigated since 1953 but still holds a key position in Soviet society. Were the Communists to triumph on a world-wide basis, it seems highly unlikely that recent liberalizing tendencies in the Soviet Union would continue.

It is because of these basic facts about the Cold War that the all too general tendency of many socialists and pacifists to glibly equate the Soviet Union and the United States in this struggle as if there were no discernible difference between them, seems so strange to me. The same facts constitute one major reason why I feel that any solution to the Cold War which involves a unilateral surrender by the United States is utterly unacceptable.

The differences between the two sides in the Cold War may not seem sufficient reason to many people to justify any continuance of the so-called Balance of Terror. However, there are other factors arguing against any unilateral upsetting the balance to the disfavor of the United States.

There is no assurance that if the leaders of the Soviet Union were certain that they would not be subject to retaliatory attacks from the United States, they would not use nuclear warfare anyway. It would be a cheaper way to "victory" than the blood and treasure involved in taking over this country by the methods of "traditional" warfare.

Even if Soviet victory in the Cold War were to be so complete as to eliminate all military opposition from this country and its allies, there would be little assurance that this would end the threat of nuclear warfare. The split developing within the Communist camp might well result in a nuclear conflict when the Chinese gain their own atomic and hydrogen bombs.

The only conceivable way in which we can get out of the stale-

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mate of the Balance of Terror with any real assurance that mankind can be protected against the menace of nuclear destruction is by negotiation. However, it is in the nature of the situation that negotiation will be effective only when there is approximate equality between the two sides.

The great stupidity of the eight-year Republican Era was that the Eisenhower Administration tended to look upon the Balance of Terror as the *only* answer to the present situation. It failed to understand that the Balance of Terror is, by itself, no solution but only makes a solution possible.

President Kennedy and his administration have a much more realistic understanding than their predecessors of the nature of the modern world. They have evidenced far greater appreciation of the importance of helping the underdeveloped nations, which are more or less uncommitted in the Cold War, to build up their economies and modernize their societies. They have also shown a much greater awareness of the need for aligning the United States with the aspirations for freedom and self-government of this same key third of the world's population; an attitude shown by the commitment of the United States to support democratic governments in Latin America, and the frequent association of the United States with the colonies and the former colonies in the United Nations and elsewhere.

Finally, the Kennedy Administration has shown a much greater willingness to engage in negotiation as a way out of the Balance of Terror. The President stated this willingness in his inaugural address and has borne it out in conversations with Khrushchev, Mikoyan and other Soviet leaders.

THIS VIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE of world affairs forms the background for supporting President Kennedy's actions in the crisis over missile bases in Cuba. In that crisis, it was Khrushchev who was the aggressor, not the United States. Apparently as a result of a visit by Raul Castro to Moscow in the Summer of 1962, the decision was taken by Soviet leaders to install missile bases in Cuba. The work of setting them up was carried out with the greatest rapidity, and with as much secrecy as this urgency permitted.

The successful installation of these bases would have basically upset the balance which had existed for a decade or more. It seems likely that they would have reduced very significantly the ability of the United States to retaliate against any nuclear attack upon this country. One estimate I have seen is that there would have been as much as a 50% reduction in United States retaliatory power, a truly significant shift in the forces of the Balance of Terror.

One can only speculate on how Khrushchev would have used

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this new situation. However, I see no reason to believe that it would have been for anything except blackmail, to get the United States to turn over West Berlin to Communist control or for some other equally unpalatable purpose. It certainly does not seem likely that he would have been more willing to enter into real compromises on basic issues between the Soviet Union and the United States if he had succeeded in basically altering the Balance of Terror in his favor.

In responding to the issue raised by the missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy acted with great statesmanship on at least two counts. First, having made up his mind that the United States could not adopt a do-nothing policy, he chose the alternative which was least likely to be provocative. Second, he centered attention on the real issue at stake, instead of being sidetracked by problems of secondary importance.

The President was faced with three courses of action. He could have ordered a general invasion of Cuba; he could have bombed the missile bases in Cuba; or he could have sought to prevent the completion of the job of installing missiles, while threatening further action if the Russians did not withdraw the missiles already installed.

The first of these alternatives would have been the grossest violation of a whole series of international commitments made by the United States; it would have involved intervention in Cuban internal affairs insofar as it was designed to overthrow the Castro government. The second alternative would have been only slightly less an act of war than full-scale invasion though it would not have involved a direct challenge to the power of Castro.

The third alternative, the blockade or "quarantine" as it was euphemistically called, was by all odds the move to be preferred. It concentrated the United States action on the essential issue, gave a warning to Khrushchev at the smallest possible risk of actual clash with the Soviet military.

In his presentation of the question at issue, too, President Kennedy showed admirable good sense. He refused to allow himself to be diverted by those in this country who insisted on using the incident as a basis for settling United States' differences with Castro. Rather, he virtually ignored the Castro regime in announcing the missile crisis and in seeking its resolution. Instead, he underscored the real problem which had brought the world to the brink of war, that is, the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Thus, the United States was not converted in the eyes of the Latin Americans and the people of the uncommitted countries generally into a huge Goliath brandishing nuclear war over the tiny Cuban David. The showdown was between two giants, thereby eliminating many side

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issues which would otherwise have made the position of the United States a good deal more difficult in the court of world public opinion.



THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT that the crisis over Cuban missile bases has profoundly influenced the course of events in almost every part of the world. In the United States its first impact was shown in the national elections, a week after Khruschev had agreed to withdraw the missiles. These elections demonstrated that the advocates of the extreme "hard line" had suffered a severe setback. Those who had been insisting on an all-out invasion of Cuba, and, on a world scale, a rigid policy of "standing up" to the Russians fared badly in the elections. Furthermore, the violence of their attacks has notably decreased.

Some may argue that the extreme "hard liners" have reduced their onslaught on the President because he has in essence adopted their program. This does not seem to me to be the case; Kennedy's program is not that of the hard-liners, but an alternative. In essence, Kennedy showed that although he will not draw back from making absolutely clear to the Soviet leaders the limits beyond which they may not go, he also would not recklessly rely only on force or the threat of force.

The impact of this crisis on the United States is shown in another way. The fact that there was an exceedingly wide degree of support within this country for the President's actions during and immediately after the crisis means that he is in a great deal stronger position to enter into any negotiations designed to seek a way out of the Balance of Terror than he was before the crisis. Cries of "appeasement" directed toward Kennedy will sound a good deal more hollow now than would have been the case before October 1962.

THE EFFECT OF THE CUBAN CRISIS on the Communist bloc is perhaps more difficult to assess at this point. However, it would certainly seem likely that the disintegration of the bloc as a single monolithic whole has been intensified by the Cuban affair. The hard-line Chinese Communists have already accused the U.S.S.R. of betraying the whole Communist movement, insisting that the U. S. is a

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"paper tiger" which will retreat ignominously if the Soviet Union and other Communist countries threaten it enough. To the degree that the Kennedy policy has further widened the split in international Communism it has served a useful purpose for the non-Communist world.

The one possible dangerous aftermath of the Cuban crisis is that it might weaken the position of Khrushchev vis-a-vis a tougher element in the Kremlin. Or it might oblige Khrushchev himself to take a tough line on other issues still pending between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is still too early to know whether such a reaction will take place within the U.S.S.R. However, at the present moment, six weeks after the beginning of the crisis over Cuban bases, there is little indication that it will occur. If anything, the Soviet attitude toward the United States today seems more conciliatory than before October 1962.

PERHAPS THE MOST SPECTACULAR immediate effects of the Cuban bases crisis were in Latin America. First of all, there was the deep disillusionment of Latin Americans in Castro and his regime; secondly, the alliance between the "Jacobin Left" and the Communists has been weakened.

I was among those who were surprised at the unanimity with which the governments of Latin America indicated their support of the United States position. In the Organization of American States, all countries represented (all Latin American countries except Cuba, plus the United States) supported a resolution endorsing the blockade.

This move had the backing not only of governments which for some time had been opposed to the Castro regime, but also of such countries as Mexico and Brazil, which had followed a different policy. Mexico, in particular, had been resolutely opposed to any kind of intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba. Significantly enough, there was very little protest in Mexico against the government's position on the Cuban crisis.

There are undoubtedly various reasons for this unanimous position in the O.A.S. One was the fact that President Kennedy made it absolutely clear that the issue in the crisis was between the United States and the Soviet Union, not between the U. S. and Cuba.

Another reason for Latin American attitudes was fear of the results of having nuclear bases in Latin America for the first time. These bases made it certain that several Latin American countries would automatically be among the first targets in any nuclear war, a prospect which hitherto had not existed. Furthermore, the nuclear weapons were of sufficient range to hit almost all of the Latin American countries.

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The element of fear may be dramatized by an incident which occurred to me during the second week of the crisis. In discussing the situation with a group of Bolivian journalists, most of whom were, at best, skeptical about the United States, we speculated on the reasons for Mexico's attitude. I suggested that perhaps it was due, in part, to the fact that even the shorter range missiles could hit Mexico City; and immediately one Bolivian replied that the longer range one could hit Lima, Peru; whereupon the third, who was generally not overfriendly to this country, added, "Yes, and if they could hit Lima, they could hit us."

There was also a very widespread feeling that Castro had betrayed Latin America by allowing the installation of nuclear bases of a non-American power within its borders. This attitude was reflected in the bitter attack on the Castro regime made during the crisis by Governor Leonel Brizola of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. Brizola had been a strong admirer of Castro, one of the closest collaborators of the Brazilian Communists and one of the main antagonists of the United States in Brazil. In his attack on Castro, Brizola accused him of having become a tool of the Soviet Union, adding that those who opposed domination of their countries by one Great Power were certainly opposed to their subordination to the other World Power.

The Cuban crisis has also tended to create difficulties between the Communists and the groups of the "Jacobin Left" which developed in the wake of the Castro Revolution in various Latin American countries. Previously, the two groups worked together. However, the "Jacobin Left" is much more prone to revolutionary adventures than are the orthodox Communists. The difference has emerged clearly during the Cuban crisis.

A number of parties and groups of the "Jacobin Left" in Latin American countries have objected to Khrushchev's agreement to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba. There is the case of Salvador Allende, Socialist leader of Chile, and recent ardent admirer of all things Soviet, who made eminently clear his view that the Castro regime had been "betrayed" by the Soviet decision. The Chilean Communists, as might have been expected (and like orthodox Communists throughout the hemisphere), endorsed Khrushchev's action.

The Cuban crisis seems likely to intensify a more or less natural tendency of the "Jacobin Left" to gravitate towar dthe Chinese wing in the international Communist movement. For it, too, regards the agreement of the Soviet Union to remove the missiles as "surrender."

A SUPREME EGOIST, FIDEL CASTRO UNDOUBTEDLY suffered a severe personal blow when Khrushchev agreed to withdraw Soviet missiles. This was done without even the courtesy of consulting Fidel, which

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demonstrated decisively that the Soviet leader did not regard Castro as being of first-rate importance, certainly not important enough to be worth risking a third world war over.

The loss of unqualified Soviet backing by Castro will undoubtedly have serious political repercussions in the regime. For example, the October crisis aggravated differences which had existed at least since last March between the Fidelistas in the government and the members of the old Communist Party (the Partido Socialista Popular P.S.P). The sequel to the bases crisis will widen this divergence.

The difficulties between the Fidelistas and the P.S.P. Communists began last March when Fidel suddenly delivered a serious of violent speeches against the P.S.P. leaders. He accused them of trying to do exactly what they *were* trying to do: take over the key centers of power in the regime. In the preceding months, they had assumed control of the chief planning post, the presidency of the exceedingly powerful National Institute of Agrarian Reform, the labor movement, and the University of Havana. To many it looked as if power had finally passed from Fidel's hands into those of the old-style Communists.

However, such was not the case. Castro proved, in March and subsequent months, that he was still boss. He installed a Fidelista majority in the new united party, the Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (O.R.I.) and replaced P.S.P.ers with Fidelistas in provincial and local units of the O.R.I.

The Soviet leaders waited two weeks before openly taking a stand on this dispute. Finally, they supported Castro against the old P.S.P. At the same time, they replaced their ambassador who had been there since the two countries had renewed diplomatic relations early in 1960. He and Anibal Escalante, number two man of the P.S.P., were the two principal casualties of this quarrel. Escalante went to Czechoslovakia, where he remains.

During the crisis, the continuing conflict between Fidelistas and old-line Communists was demonstrated. The day after Khrushchev's announcement of his willingness to withdraw the missiles, *Hoy*, the Communist periodical, and Blas Roca, ex-Secretary General of the P.S.P., strongly endorsed the Soviet position while Castro made clear his disagreement with it. Significantly enough, Blas Roca has not returned from a recent trip to Europe.

Whether or not this breach between the two elements which make up the Castro regime will lead to an open struggle for power, there can be little doubt that it seriously weakens the stability of Castro's totalitarian system.

Other related questions remain unsettled. For one thing, Russia now faces the question of whether to continue its extensive

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economic, political and moral help to Castro. The possibility of capitalizing upon such aid for military purposes must now be definitely written off.

It is difficult to make predictions on such matters, but it seems to me unlikely that the Soviet leaders will choose a course of massive aid to Cuba. Castro is a highly unreliable ally; he is certainly not a puppet. It is dubious that he will ever allow the P.S.P. Communists to take full power in his regime, converting it to a government completely subservient to the Soviet Union. Also, the economic cost of trying to convert the Castro regime into a showpiece will be exceedingly great. The Soviet Union, for two years, has had half of its tanker fleet tied up in taking oil to Cuba; any full-scale effort to develop Cuba's economy would demand even greater sacrifices. Furthermore, much of Cuba's present industrial equipment is next to worthless, since it is of United States origin, and replacement parts for it are unavailable. The Soviet Union would therefore have to replace much of existing Cuban industrial equipment, as well as providing new equipment, if they are to back a large-scale industrialization effort on the island.

This would have to be a completely political investment for the Soviet Union and there is little that the island is likely to produce in the foreseeable future which can be of any great use to the U.S.S.R. Certainly the imports of sugar from Cuba during the last three years have not been of any great economic use to the Soviet Union, which produces enough sugar for its own needs.

Castro's own policies may be decisive in persuading the Soviet Union not to continue large-scale support to the Cuban regime. He has shown no particular inclination to go along with Khrushchev's agreement to allow the Soviet missile bases to be inspected by United Nations' observers and he is insisting on extensive concessions by the United States which the Soviet Union will not seriously support.

There is also always the possibility that Castro will decide to throw in his lot with Mao in the international Communist struggle. The only voices of unqualified approval which he heard during the crisis of October were those emanating from Peking. There can be little doubt that he was impressed by this fact. Also, there have always been some individuals in his entourage who have been more friendly disposed to the Chinese than toward the Russians.

There were elements in the Cuban opposition to Castro who hoped for an all-out United States invasion which would oust the Castro regime. These people obviously are disappointed. However, the general discrediting of the Castro regime, and of Fidel personally, should certainly strengthen those opposition forces in Cuba which are opposed to the dictatorship. Furthermore, if the quarrel

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between the Fidelistas and the PSP comes to blow, it should profit the opposition. On balance, then, the possibility of the Castro regime being succeeded by a more democratic government would seem to have been enhanced.

SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN from the denouement of the October crisis. First is the desirability of taking advantage of the apparently more fluid status of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States to enter into negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to make whatever mutually satisfactory agreements are possible on such questions as disarmament, Berlin and other problems.

The second conclusion which I feel derives from the October crisis is that compromises with the Castro regime are out of order. The Cuban dictatorship is so insecure, mainly as a result of recent events, that overtures by the United States would only serve to rescue him from a situation which he may well find impossible to resolve by himself. On the other hand, it might well be a worthwhile idea for President Kennedy to announce the willingness of this country to turn over the Guantanamo base to the first Cuban regime which emerges as the result of democratic elections by the citizens of the republic. It might also be worthwhile to indicate that the United States, in dealing with a democratic Cuban regime, would not magnify the problem of seized U. S. investments in that country to insuperable proportions.

Meanwhile, the United States, as part of its general attitude of favoring principally those regimes in Latin America which are democratic and working toward necessary basic social and economic reform, should continue its opposition to the Castro regime and its support of those elements in the Cuban opposition seeking to establish a progressive and democratic government.

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Boris Goldenberg

Notes on the Cuban Revolution

AFTER THREE YEARS of the revolution, Cuba, today, can be characterized as "socialist-totalitarian." Within this category it belongs to that sub-group of countries—including Russia, China, Yugoslavia, perhaps North Vietnam—where totalitarianism was not imposed from the outside. On the contrary, totalitarianism was the aftermath of internal revolutionary upheavals. In these countries the revolutionary forces have tried to superimpose a "socialist" system on a backward nation, thereby contradicting, in the name of "Marxism," a fundamental conception of the mature Marx. In none of these countries had capitalism reached the point in its development where it proved to be a fetter on the growth of the productive forces; in none of them did the objective preconditions for socialism—an advanced working class and an advanced economy—exist. And in none did the revolution climax a vast spontaneous upsurge. In each of them the revolution was imposed, not from the outside, but from above by a minority within the country; and each revolution sought to create the economic and social prerequisites for "socialism" by increasing investment and restraining consumption, sacrificing the present to the future. This "socialist" bent of the revolution obviously ran counter to the interests of the upper and middle classes. But it also destroyed the hopes of many property conscious peasants; it undercut the illusions of a rural proletariat which hoped for real cooperatives, not Cuban *sovkhozes;* it inspired the opposition of the majority of industrial workers, who could hardly be enthused by a system which imposed longer working hours, removed fringe-benefits and substituted stricter discipline for the loss of the right to strike.

Clearly, efforts which promote widespread resentment among the people cannot be carried out within the framework of a democratic system which recognizes the sovereignty of the people. Thus, in underdeveloped countries, Marxism becomes a cloak for totali-

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tarian regimes attempting to industrialize their economies, and degenerates into a highly simplified ideology designed to exploit people's emotions and deflect resentment.

IT HAS BEEN ARGUED that there have been not one but two Cuban revolutions: the initial *democratic* revolution which was then betrayed by the second *Communist* revolution. This view, however, presents more than one difficulty. In the first place one might well consider the first stage—the struggle against Batista—not as a revolution in its full social sense but as a successful rebellion led by a small minority and supported by a more or less passive majority against a tyranny which collapsed under mounting difficulties. Secondly, it can be legitimately posited that the democratic aim of the rebellion against Batista did imply more fundamental, revolutionary changes. For example, the Constitution of 1940, to which the leaders of the rebellion were committed, spoke not only of representative democracy but promised an end to latifundia and work to all Cubans. However, to achieve the latter social-economic objectives, it proved necessary to initiate profound structural transformations that could not be attained within the framework of a representative democracy.

Indeed, the 26th of July Movement which (even though it never had a clear program) led the anti-Batista rebellion was, in a sense, "socialist" and social-revolutionary. Its original hostility toward the Communists was not because they were too radical, but too conservative and opportunistic (witness the Communist collaboration with Batista), totalitarian and closely identified with Russia.

Thirdly, one cannot overlook the fact, and what it suggests, that all revolutions are processes which habitually "betray" their original programs. Cromwell did not think of establishing a Commonwealth; the American rebels did not originally aim at building a new, independent state; Robespierre, in 1789–90, was for maintaining the monarchy. Finally, there were not two but at least three stages in the Cuban revolution: the democratic, the humanist (or redistributive—when living standards were raised), and the Communist.

It seems more accurate, therefore, to consider the Cuban revolution as a process—a permanent revolution which moved from a democratic to a Communist position with parallel shifts in interest from domestic concerns to international involvements, particularly in Latin America.

(At this point it need be noted that the growing enmity of the United States to the Cuban regime, contrary to the popular myth, played only a minor part in this transformation. The antagonism was largely provoked and exacerbated by Castro himself, who

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needed to create a violent anti-Yanquism for internal and external —mainly Latin American—reasons.)

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD in terms of Marxist categories. It was not the revolution of a particular social class—neither bourgeois nor peasant nor working class. It did not grow out of the wishes of a desperately poor people and was not born of intense nationalism. The Cuba of 1958 was no longer the Cuba of 1930–33. It had advanced and developed, although progress was slow and a large part of the population lived miserably. The abolition of the Platt Amendment, the granting of protective tariffs which permitted a considerable growth of industries, the increasing percentage of national wealth (including sugar and bank-enterprises) in Cuban hands had produced a growing bourgeoisie. It also served to decrease "anti-imperialism," which was never strong among the industrial workers who profited from the higher wages paid by American enterprises and was hardly existent among the peasants. There had taken place considerable—but insufficient—diversification of agriculture with many products formerly imported now being produced in Cuba. While the majority of people were very poor, they lived better than most Latin Americans. Anibal Escalante, the Communist leader, declared that if poverty is the motor of revolution, then the revolution would not have started in Cuba but in Haiti, Brazil or Chile. And it would be false to claim that this progress was limited to an upper middle class minority:

> Cuban distributive policy since 1933, with its higher salaries, eight-hour day, paid vacations, social security, etc., had produced a more just division of national income. . . . Previously this income went into the hands of a few; now it goes to many.

This may give too rosy a picture of Cuban reality in 1958—but this was the opinion of the leaders of the 26th of July Movement in 1959—as approved by Castro himself (*Political, Economic, and Social Thought of Fidel Castro,* English edition, Havana, 1959, p. 153.)

The revolution was not a peasant revolution, and Castro's guerrillas were not a peasant army. For one thing, it was not an "army," but a small group, counting less than 200 members in the

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summer of 1958, one and a half years after the beginning of the armed struggle; secondly, most of its leaders were of urban origin. The peasants who helped it and fought in its ranks wanted something quite different from the "agrarian reform" which was to come. Guevara said it quite clearly:

> . . . they came from that part of this [peasant] social class which shows its love for the possession of land most aggressively, which expresses most perfectly the spirit catalogued as petty bourgeois; the campesino fights because he wants land for himself, for his children; he wants to manage it, sell it, and make himself rich. (See *Monthly Review*, New York, July-August 1961, p. 59.)

It was certainly not a proletarian revolution: during the struggle against Batista, the industrial workers were the least active of all classes and after the revolution offered the most resistance to "socialism," as can be seen by innumerable facts and numerous complaints of the revolutionary leaders.

Social classes (and professions) are rooted in the "social division of labor." But those social strata which had most to gain from a radical revolution and were most prepared to help it were those who stood outside the "economy," the rootless ones: the unemployed and underemployed who, in Cuba as in other Latin American countries, form a considerable part of the population including the majority of students and young intellectuals. Standing outside the economic structure, they cannot produce a class consciousness or an organization of their own, while the lack of fixed employment makes them available for terroristic and revolutionary activities.

COMPARED WITH THE OTHER above mentioned Communist revolutions (Russia, China, etc.), Cuba shows certain peculiarities:

1. It was made and took its final form not under the leadership of an organized party with a clear ideology, but under that of a charismatic caudillo, filled with radical impatience.

2. It went through a first period of "redistribution" in which the living standards of the majority were considerably raised.

3. Its development toward "socialism" was quicker than anywhere else; in fact the main transformation was accomplished by the autumn of 1960.

The rapid turn toward "socialism" was made possible by the absence of any brakes on the radicalism of the caudillo: there were no organized forces able to check on him, and the only legal existing party was the Communist Party, which was his ally. Even if other forces had existed, they could not have opposed the first deep changes which were acclaimed by the masses.

The "redistribution" policy was possible because Cuba was rel-

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atively richer than any of the other countries in which Communist revolutions occurred—and its economy was not destroyed by war or civil war. Indeed its underdevelopment was the result of the underdeployment of *existing* productive factors: land, labor, capital.

The fact that Cuba was more highly developed, that its economy was intact, that it had unused productive factors, were *favorable* for a socialist development. Two other assets need also be mentioned: Cuban agriculture was easier to socialize than that of countries of small proprietors, and there existed the Eastern Communist bloc, which could help economically and politically. But there were also, on the debit side, highly unfavorable factors: the country was small and poor in energy and in certain raw materials. Being highly developed, it was closely bound to the world market and much less able to live on its own than Russia, China, even Yugoslavia could, without its people dying of hunger. Also on the debit side, Cuba was particularly bound to the United States—as market and purveyor of industrial goods and capital, simply because of its geographical location. Last, but not least, must be mentioned the character of the Cuban population, resulting partly from traditional factors, partly from its relatively advanced development: egoism, individualism, "family-ism," lack of collectivistic traditions and discipline, the expectancy, even among the poorer classes, of a certain amount of comfort, the "economist" attitude of the industrial workers, accustomed to getting benefits without increase of work. Democracy would have brought all these tendencies to the fore, making impossible rapid economic progress. Thus, the necessity of "reeducation" to mold the people for a long period of sacrifices which must be longer than originally thought, because so many resources were wasted during the "humanist" phase. Hence, again, the necessity of totalitarianism.

THAT THERE ARE INSIDE CUBA many people who are disillusioned with Castro can not be doubted. But given a totalitarian state *nobody* can know how many. It is possible that Castro still has the majority of the population behind him. One has only to consider the following reasons for this statement, a) even if a very large portion of the population live worse than before 1959, certainly worse than during the "humanist" phase of 1959–60, many people lived close to minimal subsistence levels before the revolution and their living standard, almost by definition, cannot have declined; b) the worsening of the economic conditions can be ascribed to "Yanqui Imperialism"; c) most people see as an alternative to Communism not a democratic state, but Batista or an American occupation and may prefer Castro; d) a huge new "class" has come to power and has attained status—and this class is potentially open

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for newcomers from above; e) the youth seems to be in its big majority behind the regime, and those between 10 and 24 years of age form a third of the entire population—if we exclude younger children—comprising some 40 per cent of the whole "politically active" population. Imagine that a fifth of them and two-thirds of the older ones would be against Castro—he would still have a numerical majority; f) totalitarian regimes can create at least passive sympathies: people tend to succumb to constant propaganda and to comply, first on the surface, then internally—in order to survive psychologically. On December 1, 1961, Fidel explained that while "we will lack many material things there is one thing which we dispose of in abundance and which we can give the masses . . . the deep, scientific ideology of Marxism-Leninism." This sounds odd—but it would be wrong to ridicule it. Many a Cuban is today proud to belong to a nation which seems to be on the center of the world stage; g) many poor people are happy about the possibility of entering the once restricted clubs, playgrounds, cabarets of the former rich or even to live in their houses while others hope that their turn may come soon. And many are pleased about the possibility of a voyage to Eastern bloc countries or getting scholarships for themselves or their children permitting them to live at the expense of the state (there are 80 thousand in this situation!) and to enter universities and all kinds of schools, or to wear uniforms and to learn a sometimes boring, sometimes exhilarating, ideology which tells them that they are among the elect. Given this state of mind and the existence of a rather efficient repressive machine, the possibilities of an anti-Castro revolution seem to be poor in the present state of affairs.

EUGENE STALEY, ECONOMIST AND MEMBER of the Mission of the International Bank which went to Cuba in 1949–50, wrote later:

> Cuba, though far enough along to be in our "intermediate" rather than "underdeveloped" group, though it has ample resources and opportunities, is caught in a mesh of vicious circles. It could cut its way out if somehow improvement could be brought about in the organizational factors—government, business-leadership, labor-leadership, and if there could be a stronger sense of social cohesiveness and civic responsibility." (*The Future of Underdeveloped Countries,* New York and London, 1954, pp. 210–11.)

I believe that after the defeat of Batista, Cuba could have "cut its way out" without a totalitarian revolution, although not without many struggles. But seen objectively, this "cutting through" is the mission of Castro's communism. Considered outside the context of the Cold War, totalitarianism could be termed "progressive": it abolishes old institutions acting as fetters, gives the people a sense of mission and cohesion, forces workers and peasants to work

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more and the people to forego present benefits in order to invest more for economic growth. But, obviously, this can only be done if all the slogans as "government of the workers," "bread and freedom," "democracy" are entirely reinterpreted as in Orwell's *1984*. Indeed, when Hegel's world-reason is cunning, it speaks Orwellian language: in the name of bread, bread is rationed, in the name of freedom, individual freedom is abolished, in the name of betterment of the workers, they are forced to work more, and national independence is interpreted as close dependence on the Eastern bloc.... Even so, the result of the experiment is doubtful: nowhere has Communism been able to solve the agrarian problem, nowhere has it shown "humanism," and a new repressive state-apparatus may prove as oppressive and wasteful as the old one had been.

Still, it would be an illusion to think that a U. S.-led invasion would bring democracy into Cuba. Not only would it be costly and destructive and reinforce "anti-Yanquism" all over Latin America (even if done in collaboration with Latin American governments); it would also be influenced by the dispossessed North American and Cuban capitalist interests and made in collaboration with Cuban emigrés, the majority of whom want simply to return to the status quo ante and to take their revenge. Even if victorious, such an invasion would lead to the growth of a reactionary policy and to another dictatorship.



CUBA'S DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE cannot be taken out of the context of the Cold War. But there is danger in simplifying the problematical.

In spite of its dependence on Moscow, revolutionary Cuba is not a satellite—if by satellite we understand a country which has to follow the line decided upon by the Russians. All Communist leaders who won power by their own means—Mao, Tito, etc.—have shown by their behavior what this fact implies. In Cuba's case, possibilities and realities of *political* independence are even greater. Here it is Castro who is still very much in charge—and he is the only one who appeals to the Cuban and Latin American masses. By origin a radical nationalist, by temperament undisciplined and vain, in many respects incalculable, he has never been an "or-

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ganized" Communist and his "Marxism" is of a peculiar sort. (It is not unthinkable that he could suddenly turn against the Russians—and denounce them as traitors to "Marxism-Leninism"—even if this had catastrophic results for the economy of the country.) He can profit from the prevailing tendencies toward "polycentrism," and inside the present Communist movement his personal sympathies are certainly more with China (and, paradoxical as it may seem, probably also with Togliatti) than with "Victorian" Russia. Cuba is outside the immediate power sphere of Russia and gives Russia many political headaches as well as proving an economic burden. But the Russians cannot drop Castro unless they are prepared to jeopardize their ambitions in Latin America. Moreover, the Russians must, in a certain sense, favor Castro's show of independence toward themselves. Nothing has been worse for Castro's (and the Communists') influence in Latin America than the avowed existence of Russian-controlled missile bases in Cuba—and he can regain what he has lost only by showing how little he is a satellite.

Castro cannot lead Cuba back to capitalism and he cannot abandon his revolutionary policies which include his efforts to aid kindred movements in those Latin American countries whose peoples are receptive to Castroite propaganda. Thus, for many Latin Americans, for most of their governments, and certainly for the United States, co-existence with Castro's Cuba is virtually impossible.

The inner dialects of Communist polycentrism, inextricably mixed with the dynamics of the Cold War and the crises of Latin America, make more precise predictions about the outcome of the Cuban problem hazardous.

BORIS GOLDENBERG *was born in Russia in 1905, educated in Germany where he was active in the socialist movement. Arrested in Berlin in 1933, he escaped to France and was forced to flee from Paris when the Nazis invaded in 1940. He lived in Cuba from 1941 until 1960. He now resides in England. He is the editor of an anthology of Marx's writings (published in Germany) and has written a book on Cuba that will be published in the Spring.*

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David Dellinger

The Revolution Not Seen

As one who spent three years of his life in prison, I find it extremely difficult to communicate to most people my conviction that as a rule convicts are at least as deserving of friendship and respect as are law-abiding citizens. Bankers, for instance, have no moral justification for keeping bankrobbers in jail, but only the legal right in a society which rewards some kinds of theft and punishes others. I discovered early that one can win sympathy and financial or legal aid for a prisoner who did not actually break the law but not for one who disobeyed the ground rules of a capitalism which, in other contexts, most people are quite ready to concede is grossly inhuman, inegalitarian, and dominated by fraud. Oddly enough, it is generally those who find it "necessary" to be unethically and even cruelly "realistic" in their own vocations who are the last to empathize with the law-breaker, while it is non-acquistive, scrupulously honest, joyfully poor people (of whom Dorothy Day and Karl Meyer are relatively well known examples) who do not self-righteously set themselves apart from the convict and the ex-convict, the "bum" and the "hood."

I have never advocated armed bankrobbery and there are cruelties and injustices in the Cuban revolution which I abhor and will always condemn—the executions; the implacable hatred of refugees, *gusanos,* and all those who failed to grow with the Revolution and turned against it; the thin, shrill tone of the monolithic press which abounds in black-and-white descriptions of the Paradise that is to be found in Soviet countries and the Hell that abounds under capitalism. But it continues to amaze me that so many North American socialists and liberals who manage to make a personally profitable marriage of convenience with United States militarism and capitalism unleash such righteous fury against the only country in the hemisphere which has seriously set about the dual task of freeing its people from the death-grip of United States imperialism and humanizing its society in the interests of all its former victims—except, unfortuately, those who use violence

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against it (but who of the critics is in a position to cast the first stone, on that account?).

Friends who have told me that Kennedy did a "magnificent" and "totally justified" job of threatening the Russians (and, of course, the rest of us) with nuclear annihilation if they did not remove their missiles and bombers from Cuba fail to see that little Cuba, already invaded once (since the Revolution, that is) and perpetually subjected to sabotage and vicious economic warfare (as early as 1960, an American diplomat in Havana boasted to me of the food shortages being caused by United States actions) was attempting to employ the same "magnificent" method of deterrence. I believe that a revolution is gradually brutalized and corrupted from within by adhering to this inhumane method of using the lives of innocent (insofar as anyone is innocent these days) men, women and children as hostages. And I also believe that what remaining sensibilities there are in the people of the United States will be squeezed out of them by their use of such calloused methods.

But how does it happen that those who believe that deterrence can be justified and who presumably aspire to a classless society, applaud a Kennedy who threatens world-wide nuclear annihilation in defense of America's dominant exploitation of Latin America but condemn tiny, besieged Cuba for trying to use the method of deterrence in self-defense against its former master? Incidentally, despite the self-congratulations of most Americans, history has yet to decide which side used deterrence more successfully, the United States, which got the missiles and bombers back out of Cuba, or the Soviet Union, which succeeded in preventing an apparently imminent invasion and set up a climate of world opinion which will make it extremely difficult for the United States to renege on its promise not to invade; a promise which it began to hedge on almost as soon as it was made.

The rich, of course, always think that the poor are not ready for freedom and equality, and if one has a narrow enough viewpoint there is always ample evidence to support them.

Joseph Mitchell, City Manager of Newburgh N. Y., has even found that large numbers of the indigent are not civilized enough, morally, to be kept on relief. Senator Ellender has found the Africans incapable of self-government. And too many white liberals long for all Negroes to be faultlessly clean, thrifty, industrious, polite, and uninterested sexually in white women, in order to prove themselves worthy of (partial) integration. When will we learn that all people, including Negroes and colonial peoples, have certain inalienable rights and that no one, least of all their present or former exploiters, is justified in deciding the rate at which they become worthy of having these rights.

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WHY DO SOME NEGROES MAKE THINGS difficult for those who would like to "help" them, by being so loud and pushy; and why must Castro rant and rave against the United States? Why must he be so insolent as to purchase oil (without which no modern economy can survive and which the United States and the international oil cartel were withholding from him) from Communist Russia? Why could not Cuba have an antiseptically pure revolution in which no one would get hurt—not even the American corporations which have raped and pillaged Cuba for sixty years, not even the well-meaning Cuban doctors who would have been glad to stay and help heal the sick if they could have continued to be paid in the manner to which they were accustomed, and especially not the liberal democrats who would have supported a timid, respectable "revolution" that did not betray them by going beyond the parliamentary capitalism of the United States and its loyal socialist opposition?

The history of Soviet crimes and their servile justification by non-Russian Communists is a sobering one and warns against uncritical support of any revolution. But does this mean that we must deny the right of Cuba and other colonial people to fashion their own kind of revolution at their own pace? Does this mean that when internal injustices and repressions occur within the framework of the Cuban revolution, at a time when it is fighting for its life against Rightists intervention, we must uncritically accept all the gossip and scandal dredged up by counterrevolutionaries, ignore the tremendous humanitarian achievements of the revolution and line up behind Varona ("the need for agricultural reform in Cuba was a myth"), the C. I. A. (which has actually carried out in Cuba the kind of terroristic campaign of blowing up water mains, setting fire to department stores etc. which the F. B. I. has accused three seized Cubans of plotting to carry out in the United States) and the United Fruit Company ("when a democratic government is established in Cuba we expect to have a responsible relationship to it")? When Castro himself attacked the Moscow-controlled Cuban Communists for attempting to take over the revolution and threw them out of office, the American "anti-Communist left" made virtually no mention of this and continued to belabor Cuba with an ardor it has never summoned, for instance, against the suspension of elementary civil liberties, the wholesale arrest of political opponents, and the holding of fraudulent elections, (or the overturning of the results) in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Argentina.

The Cuban revolution can survive without the support of American intellectuals. It is less certain whether or not it can outlast the assaults of the C. I. A., the Pentagon, and the State Department, which are made bolder by the intellectual justifica-

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tions of those who would rather bemoan the motes in Cuba's eyes than to tackle the beams that blind the United States from seeing its actual role in the hemisphere. (As one Latin American remarked, the United States' vaunted standard of living is based on the fact that it has a whole continent working for it. One result of this "benevolent" exploitation is that, according to United Nations statistics, 44% of the children born in Latin America die before the age of five.) Even if the Cuban regime survives geopolitically, it may not survive as a recognizable revolution because of the regimentation and the corruption of the spirit attendant upon living so long under daily assault from the North and the constant threat of worse aggressions to come. Too many of the American critics seem to have been participating in a self-fulfilling prophecy in which they have prematurely accused the Revolution of succumbing to certain influences (Communism, for instance) and then supported American policies (economic embargo, for example) which made the charges more likely to become true. They seem to have been victims of a strange psychology in which, having abandoned their own youthful revolutionary dreams and made their peace, albeit in many cases an uneasy one, with American society, they have almost feared that Cuba might succeed in doing what historical circumstances or timid hearts or the allurements of status in the rich and powerful Empire Country prevented them from accomplishing in the United States.



WHATEVER CUBA'S LOSS MAY BE from this ostracism by those who should have joined hands with it in its revolutionary experiments the United States's loss has been greater. America's radicals and pseudo-radicals have spent too much time attacking or defending secondary aspects of Cuba's politics and not enough weighing and evaluating its specific social and economic programs and transposing them for American conditions. What do we think, for instance, of the early across-the-board reduction of rents by 40%, the later procedures for tranferring ownership of houses and apartments to those who actually live in them, the provision for lifetime income for landlords, the amount being adequate for life and comfort but insulting to those accustomed to lives of luxury from unearned income? How do these things relate to our public housing programs which tear down city slums and rebuild with

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apartments too expensive for the former slum dwellers to move into? To unions in the United States which invest huge sums in housing projects which their members cannot afford to live in?

What about the limitations of land ownership in Cuba to 990 acres and the experiment with various forms of agriculture: small holdings (66 acres was declared a "vital minimum" for a peasant family of five and provided "free of charge to tenant farmers, subtenant farmers, sharecroppers or squatters."), cooperative and state farms? What lessons, positive and negative, can be applied to the United States, with its trend to mammoth corporation farms, its inhuman "factories in the fields," the rapid disappearance of the family farm, the plight of the sharecroppers (excluded even from minimum wage protection)? Instead of writing simplistically, depending on one's ideology, about Cuba's shortage of milk for adults, on the one hand, or her guarantee of a quart of milk a day for all children, on the other (before the revolution, only 11.1% of rural Cubans drank milk at all), why don't we compare Cuba's handling of food distribution with that of the United States, with its warehouses stuffed with surplus foods bought to keep the prices up but, for the most part, not available to those who lack the money for an adequate diet? Could we drive further the thin wedge of the public school hot-lunch program and provide free access to the necessities of an adequate diet for all the population, much as we provide free libraries and parks?

We hear many complaints (some of them accurate) about Communist takeovers in Cuban Unions and the government, but little discussion of the fact that union officials and members of the government receive incomes roughly equal to those of the workers and do not consider it disgraceful to share in physical as well as mental work. ("Che" Guevara, for example, works a day a week in a factory.) There is a whole side of the Cuban Revolution which never seemed to interest American radicals very much—the actual breaking down of class lines, the great reduction of conspicuous consumption and other anti-social symbols of status. By not concerning themselves with these matters and concentrating almost exclusively on the revolution's flaws, both real and imagined, many writers and reformers may have been able both to improve their own status and to preserve their liberal conscience. But they have not helped American liberals or radicals face up to their responsibilities for introducing into American life the concepts and practices of a humanist society which will avoid the evils of both Communist totalitarianism and cancerous capitalism.

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Roy Finch

The Two Faces of Cuba



In discussions of Cuba illusion competes with illusion, myth with myth, half-truth with half-truth. But involved in all this there are also basic differences of values, which lead us to see quite different things when looking at one and the same situation. The Cuban picture sometimes seems to resemble one of those Gestalt figures which, when we look at it one time, appears to be a rabbit facing in one direction, and then a second later the same figure appears to be a duck facing in the opposite direction. Which is it—rabbit or duck? The point is that it is both.

And the point about Cuba is that it also is facing in two directions. Toward an equalitarian society of equal opportunity, and this is the face forward. And toward a totalitarian society of repression and uniformity, and this is the face backwards. As in the Gestalt figure, some people only see the rabbit and some only the duck. Only as the figure itself changes will everyone see which animal predominates.

This two-sidedness of the Cuban situation becomes apparent as we look at specific facts. A corrupt dictatorship of the wealthy (Batista) replaced by an honest dictatorship of the poor (Castro). Facing forwards. The right to organize and strike replaced by a government-run labor movement. Facing backwards. Universal schooling and the extension of literacy. Facing forwards. Indoctrination by teachers and textbooks ("F is for Fidel, R is for Raul . . .") Facing backwards. University education available to the poor. Facing forwards. University education rigidly controlled by one point of view. Facing backwards. Abolition of corrupt elections. Facing forwards. Substitution of a maximum leader who, with a small group, makes all decisions. Facing backwards.

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WAS THIS TWO-SIDED DEVELOPMENT INEVITABLE? For some it may appear to be. But we are under no compulsion to believe that it was, and, in fact, after Stalin, we are foolish to believe it. To maintain that liberty is the price of social progress is to surrender to the totalitarian thesis and to give up hope of a post-Marxist revolution. Cuba is facing in two directions now only because too many have believed that both these faces are looking in the same direction. Those who dismiss or fail to see the loss of liberty in a growing totalitarian situation are the victims either of a dogma which accepts this as necessary or of a willful refusal to look facts in the face.

Liberals and radicals are especially prone to three illusions about Cuba which distort our understanding: (1) that Castro and his companions are basically democrats underneath, who only wait for the opportunity to adopt a democratic philosophy; (2) that the United States is solely responsible for pushing Cuba into the Communist camp; and (3) that it would have been impossible for Castro to remain neutral or to follow any middle course between North American capitalism and East European statism.

These three beliefs actually detract from Castro and the Cuban revolution in their own terms. They represent a Yankee-eye view of the situation which fails to give Castro enough credit. They under-emphasize the conscious decisions made by Castro and his associates and over-emphasize the influence of United States policies. The typical liberal guilt syndrome which blames everything on ourselves is visible here.

United States policy should not be given this much credit, or discredit. For a variety of reasons, including extreme nationalism, anti-Yankeeism, and the belief that industrialization could be brought about more rapidly along statist lines, Castro and the group around him which finally won out chose the path toward state control and rejected the earlier idea of a democratic revolution. There is no doubt that in doing this they were influenced by United States policies, but they were also influenced by their own *expectations* as to what they thought those policies *would* be. They probably anticipated hostility considerably greater than it might have been had the revolution, however radical it became, also maintained an essentially democratic character.

There are many indications that North American interests would have been able to write off the loss of investments in Cuba (in any case, very small—tiny percentages of the capital of the companies involved). But when Cuba as a member of the Communist bloc, threatened Latin America with the American investments *there,* this could not be written off. Cuba as a radical society was one thing; Cuba as an outpost of the Communist bloc was another.

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Yet United States business interests must have heaved a sigh of relief when Cuba went over openly to Communism. As a radical democratic society, on which it would not have been plausible to pin the Communist label (though certainly the attempt would have been made), Cuba would have posed, in many ways, a far greater threat. Not only would it have had the support of liberals and radicals in both Latin and North America, but it would have retained the greater support of its own nationals and avoided the effective handle for opposition. By adopting the Communist philosophy Cuba gave support to the belief, so convenient to both sides in the Cold War, that there are only two alternatives open.

IT IS EVIDENT NOW that in the original 26th of July movement there were two groups—those who wanted a revolution with an essentially democratic philosophy along the lines of the Mexican revolution, and those who favored the method of authoritarian state control. The second group won out, Castro was converted to it, and most of the representatives of the first group either fled the country or are now in jail.

Why did this happen? Not alone because of United States opposition, but also because of the absence of any strong radical democratic philosophy and also because of the belief that the most effective way to industrialize was along the lines of Communist state control. (This belief had been expressed in a book by Ché Guevara based on his studies of Eastern European countries.) To the group that finally won out the top priorities seemed to be, not democratic liberties, but economic advance and industrialization. No doubt the painful memories of the pseudo-democracy of Batista, the remoteness of the Soviet Union, the impatience and romantic extremism of Castro and psychological factors generated by the revolution itself also played a part.

To argue, however, that to get substantial help from the Soviet Union required taking Cuba completely into the Soviet bloc is not plausible. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are conditioned now to giving help to neutrals, as witness the cases of Nasser and Nehru. The policy of neutrals playing both sides in the Cold War off against each other is well-established. Would the United States have been able to live with a neutral Cuba? Probably



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better than with a Communist one. Would it have traded with a neutral Cuba on the same basis as the Soviet Union? It is at least possible.

Given a real desire to be neutral and give positive evidence of this, there is no doubt that Cuba's course would, nevertheless, have been extremely difficult. But probably no more difficult than now. The course chosen, on the other hand, has resulted in Cuba's becoming a Cold War pawn in a fashion which must be humiliating to Cubans. In addition it has alienated a great deal of support for Cuba. And, finally, it has condemned the Cuban people to many years of tension and economic hardship. Only a rigid and uncreative structuring of social alternatives would claim that all this was inevitable and the only possible outcome. We have had enough of this kind of "necessitarianism," which can be used to justify anything. (Remember the type of argument which said that Stalin's crimes were "necessary"?)

Quite inconsistently, those who argue that what happened in Cuba was inevitable and that the Cuban revolution could not have taken any other course than the one it did, frequently also argue that United States policy was *not* inevitable and that United States policy *might* have taken some other course. In other words, the criterion of necessity is applied to Cuba, while the criterion of free moral choice is applied to the United States. Whether this is on the basis that large nations have more freedom of choice than small ones (a dubious hypothesis) is not clear.

What is clear is that the United States does share a good deal of the blame for the outcome of the Cuban revolution, particularly for not encouraging democratic forces and for not supporting the revolution strongly enough when it was still going in a democratic direction. To the extent that it slammed the door on Cuba before Cuba was irrevocably committed to an anti-democratic course, this country shares the blame for this outcome. On the other hand, it is sentimental to believe that, after a certain point, United States friendliness and offers of assistance would have changed the basic decisions of the Castro government. To maintain otherwise is to believe that Castro is open to the highest bidder and is as fickle in his political philosophy as a chameleon.

It seems clear also, from the misguided and indefensible invasion attempt, that the United States over-estimated its own ability to bring Castro down. More seriously, this represented the United States claim to the right to interfere in Latin America wherever and whenever it chose. It should have been a basic principle of policy that only the Cuban people have the right to change their government. Cuban rebels could rightly claim no more and no less support than Castro himself received from private North American sources. Instead the United States government, through the

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CIA, interfered on a sizable scale. There is little doubt that this did much to cement support behind Castro and to consolidate his position.

LIBERALS AND RADICALS CONTRIBUTED to muddying the waters by failing to recognize the signs of the anti-democratic face which the revolution was revealing—such as the persecution of the Cuban anarchists and the purging of oppositionist elements from the labor movement. Even pacifists and libertarians contrived to overlook the increasing number of political prisoners in Cuban jails, many of them sent there without trials and held incommunicado for many months. (One American libertarian tried to justify the imprisonment of David Salvador, the Cuban labor leader, apparently little disturbed by the fact that this took place without trial.) The lack of habeas corpus in Cuba was described as "temporary," though this is the kind of "temporariness" which may go on for decades.

The Castro experience reveals that many liberals and radicals are not immune to the "cult of the leader" and that, if the leader is "progressive" enough, they will troop along behind, or join the enthusiastic crowds. (One wonders how they would react to a United States Castro—perhaps a slightly more progressive Huey Long.) The irony of oppositionists in the United States failing to support the cause of independent opposition in Cuba reveals the weakness of American radicals and their inability to stand by a philosophy of principled democratic radicalism.

In this respect we might learn something from the underground in the Soviet Union. In a book called *The Bluebottle,* smuggled out of the Soviet Union and just published in England, the author Ivan Valeriy (the pseudonym of a Soviet writer) states: "Wherever there is one-party rule and all other parties are outlawed, tyranny is unavoidable." This conclusion is no academic reaction (as the rest of the book makes clear), but the painfully-learned lesson of the last forty years in Russia. Whoever "Ivan Valeriy" is, he would have his doubts about the one-party system upon which Cuba is embarked.

American radicals who feel sympathy for the Cuban revolution do it or themselves no service by failing to attack as sharply as possible the totalitarian aspects of the Cuban regime. Along that road lie fear and suspicion, the secret police, thought-control, censorship and inquisitions, and all the rest of the apparatus of the all-powerful state. That Castro has not engaged in wholesale liquidations and by the standards of twentieth-century dictators has been comparatively mild is something to be grateful for. But, having embarked on the suppression of criticism, the regime has removed

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the chief safeguard against the worst abuses. There is nothing in the prevailing philosophy to prevent the familiar totalitarian deterioration, the feed-back by which repression and forbidden opposition mutually reinforce each other, until the whole apparatus of state terror is in operation.

WHAT SHOULD BE OUR ATTITUDE toward Cuba now? It seems clear that we should support that part of the Cuban opposition which wishes to retain the positive features of the Cuban revolution, but also wants to put them in a democratic framework. To argue (as some have) that the Cuban people are "not ready" for democracy is an arrogant counsel. The Cubans are a liberty-loving people, and their liberties should not be written-off. To argue also that a democratic revolutionary Cuba is impossible, that any change would be a change back to Batista, is equally arrogant. Americans, too, may have learned something from the Cuban revolution. We may hope that, above all, they have learned that, under no circumstances, should the United States invade or dictate to Cuba.

Of the existing opposition groups the point of view of Manuel Ray is closest to that of democratic revolutionism. Like Castro Ray is dedicated to a "Cuba for the Cubans" and to improving the lot of the people of Cuba. But, unlike Castro, Ray is a man who loves freedom—even if it means curtailing his own power. And, unlike Castro, Ray would never accept the mantle of a dictator.

Of the two faces of Cuba, one is the ugly face of the all-powerful state. The other is the face of hope and progress.

ROY FINCH *teaches philosophy at Sarah Lawrence College. He was one of the founders of* Liberation *magazine and served as one of its editors for five years. He resigned from* Liberation *in 1961 in opposition to the magazine's support of the Castro regime.*

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Samuel Shapiro

Extract From a Cuban Diary

LOOKING BACK AT THE CRISIS-FILLED WEEK of October 22—and how lucky we are to be alive and looking!—we can see that this was probably the most perilous time in the history of the United States, indeed of all mankind. As Khrushchev is reported to have said in one of his letters to President Kennedy, events seemed to be getting out of hand; a miscalculation, an accident, a bit of misplaced truculence could have swept the world into the inferno of a nuclear war. Had war come, the holocaust would have been so great as to make the issue of war guilt meaningless; Khrushchev's reckless invasion of the Caribbean with bombers and missiles, and Kennedy's adoption of the Dulles strategy of "brinkmanship" and "massive retaliation" could be given about equal blame for bringing on the catastrophe.

As events proved, the President was right about the Russian reaction to his challenge—this time. He won the most stunning diplomatic victory in our history, helped his party immensely in the important mid-term elections, and provided reams of new material for the war-games players at the RAND Corporation. One must at least be grateful for the President's refusal to yield to the War Hawks who recommended an immediate invasion of Cuba, and for his iron control over the reconnaisance planes and naval units in the Caribbean. But the long-range results of the confrontation of wills remains to be seen. How many victories of this kind can we afford to win? It took the threat of nuclear war to get those missiles and bombers out of Cuba; was there no alternative policy, pursued earlier, which would have avoided their being sent to the island in the first place? The Eisenhower Administration, at least, was cautiously friendly to the Castro regime during much of 1959; but as far as the public record goes, Kennedy has never made the slightest effort to reach a *modus vivendi* with Cuba's defiant rev-

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olutionary leader. Our policy of implacable hostility to Castro has not yielded any very tangible results, but we are apparently determined to stick to it; the last word is still Adlai Stevenson's recent remark that "the maintenance of a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere is not negotiable."

With the world's attention focused so desperately on Washington, Moscow, and the Caribbean Sea, the continuing institutional development of the Cuban Revolution seemed of relatively little importance. Yet the inner strength of the Castro regime, and the amount of support it can count on from the Cuban people are significant factors in the current situation. If the revolution were as ill-armed and poorly organized as Guatemala's was in 1954, Castro would have fallen from power after the landings at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. If he were really supported by less than 10 percent of the Cuban people, as many of the refugee groups in Miami claim, his government and economy, cut off from direct Soviet intervention, would collapse. What is most disturbing about the Cuban situation today, what is in the long run more dangerous than the now-removed Soviet missiles and bombers, is the fact that Castro has won a majority of the Cuban people to support his style of totalitarian dictatorship.

Nobody knows just how many people in Cuba today support Fidel, or just how firm their backing is. American poll-takers are not welcome on the island; if they were, they could probably not get truthful answers out of a populace that has seen what happens to malcontents and "counter-revolutionaries." Even a valid opinion poll would be meaningless, because opinion in Cuba today is not formed out of conflicting news media but deliberately shaped by massive campaigns in the schools, in the streets, by newspapers, and over radio and television. Nevertheless, for whatever it is worth, the impartial foreign observer is speedily convinced that the official American picture of a nation in chains is false. Here, for example, is a comment by a recent visitor, a Canadian-born correspondent for NBC:

> Support for the regime, whether through conviction or fear, is far more in evidence than opposition. Policemen on duty read Marxist-Leninist textbooks. A middle-aged hotel chambermaid works 10 hours, changes into *miliciana* fatigues and spends four more hours with a rifle guarding the hotel basement. Late at night, squads of young *milicianas* march smartly through the streets, chanting the step, to put in two hours drill by street light near the monument to the battleship *Maine*. Others stand guard all night at buildings that might be targets for sabotage. (Robert MacNeil, "Over Havana Uncertainty Broods," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, December 2, 1962).

On my own recent visit to Cuba in August, shortly before the Soviet arms build-up became publicly known, I saw the same signs

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of impressive popular support for *fidelismo*. In travelling through three provinces I saw many signs of mismanagement, food shortages, and growing discontent. I met a number of people in Havana and out in the country who were bitter opponents of the regime, many of them willing to say so, at length, publicly. I interviewed people in the long lines outside the Foreign Ministry building, waiting for their exit permits, and after my return I talked to refugees in Miami. I find the police-state apparatus abhorrent, and only partially justified as a defense against American pressures; I have been taken into custody twice (briefly) for remarks critical of the Castro regime on my last two visits to Cuba. Nevertheless, my own experience leads me to believe that in spite of shortages, rationing, the menace of invasion, and the contrary evidence of the refugee exodus, Fidel still has the backing of a substantial majority of the Cuban people.

I must add the immediate qualification that I hold this belief on the not-very-adequate basis of three short visits to Cuba at widely separated intervals, plus reading of whatever information about the island's affairs I have been able to get my hands on. I could certainly be wrong. And even if I am right, I do not approve of every government that has popular support. Hitler had a majority of the German people behind *him* throughout most of his career; so does Ross Barnett in Mississippi; so does every leader of a lynch mob. Castro *could* turn out to be a despot with no redeeming benevolence (as most Americans are already convinced he is). As the island's economic situation grows precarious—the late invasion scare was a terrific drain on manpower and production—the government will have to suspend its ambitious plans for schools, hotels, and low-cost housing, add new articles to the list of rationed goods (as shoes, clothing, and hardware were added in December), and crack down harder on discontent and dissent.

Nevertheless, the institutional basis for Cuba's future continues to be put together. Barring an invasion, or a complete economic collapse (neither at all likely), Cuba is going to be ruled in an orthodox Communist fashion, with a few Caribbean variants. The pattern is worth study, though the obstacles to complete understanding of what is taking place are many. Because no solid appraisal of what the regime is planning to do is possible, I have chosen to leave my description of political activity in Cuba today in diary form. The following is what I saw, and what people said to me; let the reader form his own conclusions from the evidence presented.

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August 9, 1962:

THE FLIGHT FROM MIAMI to Havana is greatly changed from what it was like two years ago. Cuban Airlines has abandoned the route because so many of its planes were seized for Castro's debts in this country; it flies now only to Mexico City and (once a week) to Prague. There are only two other passengers on the big 100 seat plane: a Cuban woman flying in to see her mother before a major operation, and a Canadian businessman who has been selling baby chickens and turkeys to the Cuban government. He lives in Windsor, Ontario, not far from my own home north of Detroit; I tell him about my 1960 visit to the State Turkey Farm in Pinar del Rio province, which was then run by John Mitchell, an American. Despite Washington's protests and pressures, Canada has quietly continued to do business (on a cash-in-advance basis) with Cuba; the *Montreal Star* has even argued that "what is needed in many of the American republics today . . . is a touch of Castro-style reform and Castro-style enthusiasm—without Castro-style politics."

The Canadian exporter has been coming down every six weeks for the past year and a half, staying a week each time. He has no political opinions and has found his business relations with the Cuban government satisfactory enough. The mild Cuban climate, he says, is perfect for poultry; while the farms are not up to U. S.-Canadian standards of efficiency, they are successful enough, and with experience will do even better:

> They've always been straightforward with me; they have no experts of their own and they've generally been glad to adopt my suggestions. I think you Americans have got too excited about Castro—sort of lost your heads. I don't know of any Canadian businessman who has lost money in Cuba, though we do more trading than before. [Canadian exports to Cuba more than doubled, from $14 to $32 million, between 1960 and 1961. This is only a trifle, of course, when compared with U.S. exports of $700 million in 1957 and $300 million as late as 1960.] Food situation? Not so bad, really. The choice of what you can get is limited, but you won't go hungry.

All the same, most of the empty seats on the plane are taken up with parcels mailed to Cubans by relatives in the United States. So many of these private shipments of food, clothing, and medicine were coming in, the stewardess tells me, that the Cubans placed an

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embargo on them for a week, to enable them to distribute what had already arrived.

HAVANA FROM THE AIR—so familiar to me now, and so close to the United States, yet so isolated by political events that the city might as well be located on an island somewhere in the Caspian. The administration building at Rancho Boyeros airport is empty; I gather from the small flurry I cause that the arrival of even one American is unusual. The other two passengers go through without trouble, but I have got to hand in my return ticket and promise to report to the Foreign Ministry and the Department of the Interior to get accredited. Taxi ride downtown, in an aged Chevrolet. The driver says, surprisingly, that business isn't so bad; the free-spending American tourists are gone, but Cubans now have so much money and so little else to spend it on that he gets lots of fares. His greatest problem, of course, is spare parts.

The Havana Hilton (Havana Libre) hotel looks much the same as ever from a distance, but conditions there would give the former owners apoplexy. The automatic door-treadle doesn't work; the bellboys are unshaven and in dirty uniforms; it's raining, and the big glass-bubble roof is leaking. There are no rooms available because twelve hundred delegates of the First National Congress of secondary school students have taken over most of the space. I put my luggage in storage, and go up to what was once the main ballroom to see what the students are up to.

I introduce myself as a visiting professor and am given a blue delegate's badge, a folder of meal tickets, and an armful of books, pamphlets, and posters. The Congress has broken up into a dozen subcommittees, and I choose one at random and go over to sit down at the fringe of it. The speaker, a teenager just back from the USSR, is describing life at the Moscow University for Friendship of the Peoples "Patricio Lumumba." A summary of his report is read and accepted; then the chairman, a uniformed, teen-age mulatto girl, moves briskly on to the next item on the agenda, the revolution and the libraries. She points out that the National Library (a new building on the edge of the Plaza Civica) has excellent facilities and is now open to secondary students, but that they don't use it. "As leaders, we should encourage *massive* use of the libraries." Delegates from the provinces complain that there are not enough books available to them. It is suggested that privately-owned books should be donated to the State, as "an act of collectivity." It is not wrong to own books, but scarce ones or expensive ones should be placed at the service of others.

A delegate from Cienfuegos asks about counter-revolutionary literature: Should one read Plato or Kant? A lively discussion follows. (I think of the junior high school students I taught in New York City's Harlem for eight years, and smile.) One delegate, later

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introduced to me as a leader of the Union of Young Communists (UJC), gives the official line:

> We are not afraid of Kant. He was a part of intellectual history, and we may use him as Marx and Engels used Hegel. We can, as young Communists, read anything. It is important for us to know all philosophers, so that we can clear up the minds of the confused, so that we can combat the false ideas of the ill-intentioned.

A resolution to this effect is put to a vote and passed, as are all the resolutions, unanimously. The meeting goes on to vote in favor of small libraries for each classroom (with "socialist emulation" among them), for curriculum control by student leaders, and for special aid to badly-prepared students.

One could easily sneer at or satirize this sort of meeting; a rewrite man for *Time* would have a field day making fun of such serious young people. (Among other amenities, the government has provided all these twelve-to-seventeen-year-olds with unlimited quantities of free cigarettes.) But I find their orderly and sensible conduct (without any adults to supervise) quite impressive—and a little frightening. Few American students of the same age could measure up to this standard of patriotism, earnestness, and dedication. *Fidelismo* and Marxism are making enormous strides among Cuba's young people, and the Kennedy Administration's policy of embargo, blockade, and invasion has only helped the process along.

ONE MUST ALSO GIVE the revolutionary regime credit for its success in eliminating racial prejudice in Cuba. While the island was never as bad as Alabama and Mississippi, there was a color line which kept Negroes out of most upper class jobs. But these students are working and living together, so far as I could see, without a bit of color consciousness. I talk with a UJC delegate from Oriente Province, a Negro, who describes his slum home near Cuba's Catholic shrine, the Church of Our Lady of Charity of Copper, in Santiago.

> The rich bourgeoisie went to pray there and never worried about the filth in which we lived. My parents couldn't even afford to get married because the priest charged so much; when I was a kid I used to beg from the ladies coming away from Mass.
>
> Now I go to a new technical institute six kilometers outside Santa Clara; we have a new sports stadium, two swimming pools. I'm taking a five year technical course—half of it theory, half of it practice. We are learning from the schools in Czechoslovakia and East Germany how to combine learning with production; all our factories will have schools attached to them, and our schools will be like small factories. We already do all the cleaning up and painting ourselves.
>
> The UJC and the UES (Union of Secondary Students)? Well, every student who is Cuban belongs to the UES. We have a lot of foreign students here, too, on scholarships—mostly from Latin America, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay. And from other continents, too: there's a boy from Kenya, and I saw an article in *Bohemia* about seventy-one Algerians who are here in Cuba. There are 250,000 in the UES—about a third of

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them with scholarships to live at school, so that our families don't have to provide food or clothing.

Then the UJC [which was changed over from the Association of Young Rebels in March] is made up of the vanguard. You become a Young Communist by sacrifice, by study, by socialist emulation. Marxism-Leninism? Well, no, I haven't read the Communist Manifesto, no, nor any of the works of Carlos Marx. I'm really so busy with study, and meetings, and militia duty, that I haven't been able to indoctrinate myself as I should. But we are distributing Blas Roca's *Fundamentals of Socialism in Cuba* to every UES member, and I will lead a study group in reading it when I go back to Santa Clara.

We go upstairs for lunch. Enlarged photographs displayed on the mezzanine lobby: "Che" Guevara touring a Moscow chair factory; Khrushchev and Raúl Castro visiting a *kolkhoz;* Fidel hugging Nikita in New York in 1960. Reproductions and translations of newspaper front pages from Moscow, Peking, Warsaw, East Berlin, Bucharest, etc., etc.:

SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA

THE SOCIALIST CAMP WILL NEVER ABANDON OUR CUBAN BROTHERS

UNION AGAINST AMERICAN IMPERIALIST CAPITALISM

None of the elevators work; we walk up three flights of the dirty stairs that always hide behind the facade even of luxury hotels.

The carpets in the dining room are dirty and worn through to the floor in places. Three waiters, unshaved, shirts unbuttoned, with cigar stumps in their mouths, are serving twelve hundred students—slamming down plates of cold macaroni where wealthy Cubans and tourists once ate crab imperial and filet mignon. The young people at my table, most of them children of *guajiros* (farm workers) from the interior, are still dazzled by the incredible changes of the past three and a half years. A thirteen-year-old girl from Holgúin explains:

> They were all thieves, all gangsters here before. It is as well that the *gusanos* [counter-revolutionaries; literally, "worms"] have run off to Miami; they were parasites, and could not contribute to the building of a socialist Cuba. [To a question about food]: Yes, we are short, because of the increased purchasing power of the people—there are some scarcities. But we will have plenty of pork in 1963, and all the beef we need in 1965; we are going to put into practice the miraculous Soviet agricultural discoveries [!]. We already have plenty of Chinese medicines; you won't see them in the stores, bcause they're not for sale, but they are given out free in the hospitals.

Table talk is all at this unrelentingly serious level. The children discuss militia duty, gravely compare the merits of different kinds of rifles (those made in the Dominican Republic and sold to Batista are unanimously called worthless and even dangerous to use). I am shown a worn clipping with the story of a thirteen-year-old who is said to have shot down a B-26 during last April's invasion, using a Czechoslovak *cuatro-bocas* (four-barrelled) anti-aircraft gun.

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A talk with an older woman (in her early twenties) who is still taking high school courses: she went into exile during Batista's reign, and lost several years. She lived in Mexico City most of that time. She tells the story (which I don't know whether to believe or not) of President Lopez Mateos' secretary, Virgilio Aguirre. He was a "progressive" (a term of high praise, but indicating that the person on whom it is bestowed is not a Communist), and so were his three sons, all lawyers, all influential in the governing Party of the Revolutionary Institutions (PRI). He was the "brains" behind President Lopez Mateos, and a tremendous figure, who had plans to nationalize all industry in Mexico. So they invited him to an official dinner, and poisoned him.

> The Yankees are running Mexico now [she says], as they do all the rest of the so-called "free world." When President Kennedy came to Mexico City, they emptied hotels for forty blocks around the place where he stayed; the American police and the FBI took over the center of the capital. A lot of us Cubans, and plenty of Mexicans, too, were thrown into jail until "Yoneff" (John F.—Cuban newspapers often refer to the President this way) was safely in his airplane again.

She has a scholarship to study typing and Spanish, hopes to enter the university and become a diplomat. Under the new program of intensive study, you can finish much more rapidly.

I call the Ministry of Foreign Relations and find that, despite the revolution, they still retain the long Latin lunch hour; they will not be open until 3:30.

IN THE HAVANA LIBRE'S BOOKSTORE (all new publications): *Moby Dick;* Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program;* Mao Tse-tung, *One Spark Can Burn Up an Entire Countryside, On Art and Literature;* V. I. Lenin, *On Religion, Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, On Youth;* L. Evenko, *Planning in the USSR;* Trofim Lysenko, *Nutrition of Plants Through the Soil* [God help Cuban agriculture if they start following the rules laid down by Joseph Stalin's pet 'plant-breeder'!]

Talk with a UES girl about her experiences as an Alphabetizer in Las Villas province. [1959 was the "Year of Liberation" in Cuba; 1960 the "Year of the Agrarian Reform"; 1961 the "Year of Alphabetization"; and 1962 the "Year of Planning." I was a guest at the banquet for 40,000 teachers at Camp Colombia on December 31, 1960, when Fidel launched this massive drive to eliminate illiteracy on the island.] She and another girl, without supervisors or chaperones, went into the Escambray mountains on horseback and later on foot, and found a dozen *guajiros* and their families who needed instruction. The men were woodcutters who eked out a miserable existence producing and selling charcoal, and so could study only at night. The girls organized them into two groups—"Socialist emulation" again!—and gave them rudimentary instruction in the

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alphabet. The program ended after six months, and the girl admitted that there would probably be no further instruction or follow-up in such a remote area; but the campaign as a whole was certainly a success, and there has been nothing like it anywhere else in Latin America.



At the Ministry of Foreign Relations: Here, as everywhere in Cuba, armed militia men and women guard the entrances. I have a pleasant, relaxed talk with Humberto García, one of the officials who handles press relations. He fills out a form, gives me a press pass and offers to arrange interviews, conducted tours, etc. I explain that I speak Spanish very well, and have visited Cuba twice before, and we agree that I might as well go about on my own. The only restriction, he explains, is that I develop and submit to his office any photographs I want to take; and I point out that I haven't brought a camera.

While he is typing up my credentials he gives me a copy of the new UJC magazine, *Mella*—named after one of the founders of the Cuban Communist Party who was assassinated in Mexico in the 1930's on orders from Gerardo Machado. I note that several of the cartoons and articles deal with absenteeism in farms and factories, and ask if this is a serious problem.

> Yes, we have still the problem of old habits [he says] left over from the time when the workers considered the foreman and the factory manager an enemy. We have to orient the people better, bring socialist discipline to them, raise their understanding. I don't think that absenteeism is worse; you must remember that in the old days there was just no sense in working hard; you didn't get ahead that way. But now that we have the immense job of building a new economy, and are faced with your government's blockade, we can't afford old habits; we have got to change old attitudes and increase production. [I mention how impressed I was with the seriousness of the UES delegates.] Yes, they are really working hard, building a new Cuba. We older men [Sr. Garcia is about forty] can learn a lot from the UES and the UJC—they are the ones who are building a new Cuba.

Back at the Havana Libre; in another meeting room on the first floor is the first National Council of the Gastronomical Workers Union (STG) (which takes in bellboys, hotel desk clerks, etc., as well as cooks and waiters). This was one of the strongest and best paid unions back in the days of the American tourists; the Havana

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Libre itself was built with loans from its retirement fund, and its director, Eusebio Mujal, had close ties with the Batista regime (he is presently adviser on Latin American affairs to the AFL-CIO). Like all Cuban unions, the STG is now an arm of the government, dominated by the "old militants" (pre-1959 Communists). There is a single slate of candidates for office, most of them presumably members of the old Cuban Communist party (PSP). A speaker (and posters on all the walls and columns) urges greater production, better service, cleanliness, and an end to absenteeism—exhortations which are badly needed, from what I have seen. The delegates clap Soviet-style, in unison, and at increasing speed, in the manner described in transcriptions from *Pravda* as "stormy applause."

Another speaker urges self-criticism, greater ideological sophistication: "We must distinguish, comrades, between active counterrevolutionaries, and those workers whose ideas are confused, whose doubts we must endeavor to clear up." Visitors from Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, are introduced; it is worth noting that they (and Cuban officials in general) make no distinction between Latin America's few remaining *caudillos* (Stroessner, Ydígoras, the Somoza brothers), and such democratic reformers as Betancourt, Lleras Camargo, and Muñoz Marín. If anything, greater venom is reserved for liberal reformers, or "social fascists"; this is an old Communist habit.

A bellboy in the hotel lobby asks if I am a Czech. No. Russian? No. Polish? No. He is surprised to see a new American face (there are a number of permanent residents in the hotel), offers me four dollars for a package of American cigarettes (I haven't brought any). Also in the lobby I talk with a judge of the Havana Municipal Court, who is waiting to see his daughter, a UES delegate; she's been attending committee meetings all morning and afternoon. Havana is a lot livelier and more cosmopolitan than one would imagine from reading the American papers. In the post office just outside the hotel (where I go to send a telegram to my wife assuring her that I am neither starving nor in jail), I meet a Czechoslovak violincellist, an East German machinist, and a Spanish chess master, here to train the Cuba team for international competition.

Sign in the post office:

DON'T TEAR TELEGRAM PAPER: REMEMBER THAT WASTE IS A CAPITALIST VICE

And in the cigar store:

TIPS WEAKEN THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORKER. THANKS TO OUR SOCIALIST REVOLUTION WE EARN GOOD SALARIES AND THEREFORE DO NOT ACCEPT TIPS

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BACK IN THE GRAND BALLROOM of the hotel, with the UES. They are, thank heavens, acting like Cubans and adolescents for a change, swirling around the floor to a *pachanga* beat. But the song is a patriotic one:

Yo no quiero whiskey	*I don't want any whiskey*
Yo no quiero té	*I don't want any tea*
Yo me voy pa' Oriente	*I'm going to Oriente*
A recoger café.	*To harvest the coffee.*

There's a shortage of labor for the coffee crop, as there was for the sugar harvest this year. One hundred thousand students (as well as volunteer workers from factories and offices) are to go down to Oriente (the easternmost of Cuba's six provinces) for the harvest next month. It is voluntary labor; all they get is transportation and food. Nobody looking at these cheering, cha-cha-cha-ing young people can doubt that they are eager to do their bit for the revolution. But it can't be a very efficient way of getting in a crop, and I shouldn't think such enthusiasm would last forever.

The main speaker for the evening is to be Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a leading Communist for a quarter of a century (he was Minister without Portfolio under Batista from 1940 to 1944), now head of the protean National Institute of the Agrarian Reform (INRA); but he's late, of course. The time is filled in with songs and speeches. An Argentine girl has brought one million (Argentine) pesos to build a school in Cuba. She speaks of police brutality in Buenos Aires, of the recent *cuartelazo* (barracks revolt) against President Frondizi: "the workers of Argentina are with their Cuban brothers." Various poems written for the occasion are read; more songs, and more dancing. Then an ovation for Rodriguez, who has arrived at last.

Rodriguez is fifty, and has been active in politics for the past three decades; he was briefly Mayor of Cienfuegos back in 1933. He joined Fidel in the Sierra in the fall of 1958, and made the pact between the PSP and the 26th of July Movement. Since then he has come up steadily, and as INRA chief holds one of the key posts in the revolutionary movement. (His predecessor, geography professor and speleologist Antonio Nuñez Jiménez, is now head of the National Academy of Sciences, which has taken over the unused Capitol building for offices and a museum.) Carlos Rafael (all the UES delegates call him by his first name) is a first-rate speaker, and has excellent rapport with his audience. He praises the work of the Congress, reminds the delegates that their work is modeled on the shining Soviet example. Without the help of the socialist camp, he says, "Cuba could never have achieved her liberation, could never have carried through her Revolution." (This is certainly true, and the bleak result of the Dulles-Eisenhower-Kennedy policy of hostility to the Castro regime.)

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He speaks of the Playa Girón invasion, of "the insolence of the Yankee base at Caimanera (Guantanamo)," of the spy planes that daily fly over Cuban territory (this last accusation is also true; even the *Wall Street Journal* admits it). He praises the revolutionary boarding schools, the work of the UJC as a vanguard of Cuban youth, calls for a mass movement of students to harvest the coffee crop (and is interrupted for ten minutes by students who form a Conga line and snake dance all around the big hall). After quiet is restored, he mentions Fidel *(stormy applause)*, Yuri Gagarin *(stormy applause)*, our beloved Vladimir Ilyich" *(tumultuous ovation and more snake-dancing)*. A few venomous words for the traitorous puppet governments in Venezuela, Peru, Puerto Rico, and for the "worms" who have fled to Miami.

Then a sober explanation of agriculture's importance to the Cuban economy; sugar, the source of foreign exchange, and other crops serving as the base of light industry. "We call on the revolutionary youth of Cuba to come out, to work on weekends and during the vacation, to cut cane, to harvest coffee, to perfect themselves in the science of sciences, Marxism-Leninism" *(stormy applause)*. Although he pleaded other engagements (and he must, indeed, be tremendously busy), he has spoken for an hour and a half. As he turns from the microphone, a pistol stuck in his belt falls out; everybody laughs and applauds. As he comes down off the platform, I am introduced to him as a fellow professor (he has taught economics at the University of Havana); we shake hands and I say something inconsequential. How far Cuba's Communists, who were once almost as powerless and inconsequential as their North American counterparts, have come in three and a half years!

THERE ARE STILL no rooms at the Havana Libre. I take a taxi to the older part of town, to the Sevilla Biltmore (now Sevilla Libre). It has rather more character than the newer hotels in the Vedado district; a vast patio, high ceilings, Spanish tile. It's been a long, long day, but I'm too excited to fall asleep at once. In Cuba one often has the feeling Goethe spoke of at Valmy:

> *Here and now begins a new epoch of world history, and you, gentlemen can say that you "were there."*

Perhaps it's true; perhaps they really are riding the train of history, as Fidel says. Still, one had better reserve judgment; the super-

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heated atmosphere of a Communist Youth Rally is no place to take final measure of what the regime means to the seven million other Cubans.

Before falling asleep I read through the current issue of *Bohemia:*

Ad: "Every Worker Must Open a Savings Account." (An effort to check inflationary pressures; with wages up and more money in circulation than before before, there is little available in the shops. So far the government has managed to keep the lid on; every day's paper reports fines and jail sentences against storekeepers and hoarders for 'crimes against the popular economy.')

Article: "The Past Shall Not Return!" Gruesome photographs of victims of the dictatorship, sprawled in the streets, strung from trees, or simply living in wretched city slums or rural *bohios.* For contrast, wealthy, jewel-bedecked dowagers; grinning *latifundistas*; a machine gun set up on the steps of the university; and Batista, surrounded by adoring non-coms after his *coup d'état* of March 10, 1952. No matter what mistakes Castro may have made, he has in his favor the powerful argument that he freed Cuba from a corrupt and brutal tyranny; as he puts it, "It is better to stand in line for food than to stand in line at the morgue to identify your dead sons."

An article about the teacher-training school at Minas del Frio, in the Sierra Maestra.

A poem about Pablo Picasso's *Guernica* mural; pointing out that Hiroshima was worse.

A historical piece, justly debunking Elbert Hubbard's trashy bit of pseudo-history, "The Message to Garcia."

An article by the caretaker of the Hemingway home and museum at San Francisco de Paulo; he claims to know secrets which not even "Papa's" wives were let in on. Hemingway lived in Cuba for longer than anywhere else, and knew it a lot better than Spain, France, or Italy. Yet we have only two lesser books about it, *To Have and to Have Not* and *The Old Man of the Sea*; what a novel he could have written about the Cuban revolution!

A column of superb political abuse by Mario Kuchilán, the best-known of the pre-Castro columnists still in Cuba (he worked for Sergio Carbo's *Prensa Libre,* and was once beaten nearly to death by Batista's thugs). He blasts away in the style of a Westbrook Pegler, scoring a number of hits on Jamaica's Prime Minister Sir Alexander Bustamante, the "gusanos" in Miami, Billy Graham, Cardinal Spellman, John F. Kennedy, and other targets.

An article "[George] Washington Is With Us," claiming that the Father of His Country was the Fidel Castro of his day. Well —hardly.

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Part of Fidel's speech to the Directors of the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction: "Marxism is the only true science of politics and the revolution . . . the only true interpretation of the development of human history."

A list of a dozen U. S. violations of Cuban air space and territorial waters during two weeks in June and July. Kennedy would no doubt admit these and plead self-defense. But by that standard Cuba would have an even greater right to send reconnaissance planes and ships over Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Louisiana, and South Florida—all places connected with the Playa Girón invasion.

Six pages of photographs of Fidel in the Sierra on the 26th of July—the seventh anniversary of his desperate attack on the Moncada barracks. He looms out of the pictures, a living, breathing, very human piece of history. He is as attentive to details as ever; one caption describes his asking the swineherd at the Camillo Cienfuegos School City why some of the pigs were so thin (he was told it was they had just been weaned). He has lost a little weight himself recently, to judge by the pictures. Fidel's farewell speech to three hundred Russian technicians, returning to the USSR after a year's work in Cuba.

A warning to "the traitors who still remain among us" that the Neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) are passing to the offensive, "widening their functions, and growing in efficiency"; the regime is "abandoning its complacency and mildness."

A list of nightclub attractions; Cuba may be the only government in the world with a department in charge of cabarets and bars.

An article about Father Salomón Bolo Hidalgo, a Peruvian priest who has defended *Fidelismo*.

(On the back cover): a montage of Cape Canaveral, sharecroppers' children, a Ku Klux Klan meeting, and a mushroom-shaped cloud. Caption: "You can't fool all the people all the time!"

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Antonio de la Carrera

Castro's Counter Revolution



On July 26, 1953, a young Cuban, Abel Santamaria, was murdered by Batista's henchmen after the storming of the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. In the subsequent trial, the prosecution stated that a book by Lenin had been found in his possession. This was said to prove Santamaria a Communist. Castro jeered at the charge, retorting that the revolutionaries were not "ignoramuses," that they were well informed in political matters and it was nonsense to confuse reading with political affiliation.

Today, efforts are being made by official analysts of the revolution to rewrite Cuban history. The fact that Abel Santamaria had a book by Lenin in his possession is now said to have been an indication of his political inclinations.

The Santamaria affair, is typical of the new official history in Cuba which presents the revolution as a Communist oriented process from the very start. This is the Big Lie about the Cuban revolution; fabricated first by its right wing detractors, now by its apologists. (Indeed, this is but one of a number of views shared by right-wing Miami exiles and Castro apologists.)

Most of those who have written about the Cuban revolution give the impression that its history began on January 1, 1959. Little or nothing is said about the preceding period. Yet, a Cuban revolution akin to the revolutionary changes in Latin America took place in Cuba in the late twenties and early thirties.

On August 12, 1933, the dictator Gerardo Machado was overthrown by a military coup engineered by the United States represented by Ambassador Benjamin Sumner Welles. The coup succeeded despite the efforts of the Communist Party, which, under the direction of Communist labor leader, Juan Arévalo, made a shady deal with the Machado dictatorship. However, some Communists,

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notably Ruben Martínez Villena, did play a prominent role in the general strike which was instrumental in ousting Machado.

Three weeks later—September 4, 1933—the military coup against Machado succumbed to a truly popular revolutionary movement. This time the Communist Party was absent, but less than a month later the Communists made a bid for power that upset the stability of the new revolutionary government. Antonio Guiteras, the Minister of the Interior of the Revolutionary government, faced the Communist challenge and repelled it. Guiteras was responsible for the majority of revolutionary measures that characterized this turbulent period and later became the symbol of the Cuban nationalist revolution. Murdered by Batista's forces in 1936, his name and ideals were the inspiration of the generation that came to adulthood with the revolution. It is highly significant that Column 9 of the Rebel Army, fighting in Sierra Maestra, bore the name of Antonio Guiteras, and just as significant, that the commander of the column was Major Huber Matos, now serving a twenty year sentence for opposing Communist influence in the Rebel Army.

The revolutionary government which came to power in September 1933, fervently anti-imperialist and nationalist, remained a fact of life confronting the freshman administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt for four months. However, his Administration refused to recognize the Cuban revolution and in January 1934 an American inspired coup brought Batista to power.

Although Batista overwhelmed the revolutionary government, neither the impact nor the laws of the revolution could be reversed. Many of the revolution's principles were eventually codified in the Constitution of 1940, viewed at the time as the culmination of the revolutionary process.

In 1944, Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, who had been the revolutionary President in 1933, was elected to the same office. It was the first instance in Latin America of a revolutionary leader being elected President as a candidate of the opposition.

This constitutional revolution aroused great hopes. But they were shortlived. Dr. Grau led one of the most corrupt governments in the history of Cuba. His successor, Carlos Prío Socarrás, one of the student leaders of 1930, was similarly corrupt. Their rule discredited the revolutionary generation and civilian rule, and was responsible for the passive reaction to Batista's military coup of March 10, 1952.

It should be clear, though, that while immense fortunes were amassed at the expense of the Cuban people during this period, social progress was continuous and the Cuban Federation of Labor became the strongest and best organized trade union movement in the Western Hemisphere.

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AT THIS TIME, A GROUP led by Eduardo Chibás* defected from the Cuban Revolutionary Party (the Party of Presidents Grau and Prío) and organized the Cuban People's Party, known as the "Ortodoxo" Party for its devotion to the original principles of the revolution: political liberty, economic sovereignty and social justice. Fidel Castro belonged to the youth section of this Party and it was as an Ortodoxo candidate for Congress that he was supposed to make his political debut in the elections of June 1, 1952, which never took place. (The Ortodoxo Party was believed to stand a better than fair chance of winning the Presidential elections.) The Ortodoxo youth section was ardently anti-Communist. Fidel's group was feared and despised by those who had more political sophistication. (It is no secret that Chibás considered Castro a gangster and warned everyone against giving him too much leeway.)

Throughout this process the Communist Party, known as the Partido Socialista Popular (P. S. P.) since 1942, was alienated from the Cuban revolution. It had joined Batista in 1938 and in 1944 the P. S. P. backed Batista's candidate for President, Carlos Saladrigas. After the defeat of Saladrigas, the P. S. P. found itself without the spoils of power and thoroughly discredited. By 1952, the Party was considered such a liability that none of the Presidential candidates accepted Communist support.

After March 10, 1952, the political climate in Cuba changed. A system imposed by force could not be dislodged by politics. Boldness and determination were called for. Castro and his group had those qualities; the leaders of the Ortodoxo Party, with Chibás gone, did not.

In the Summer of 1955, the 26th of July Movement was organized. It was a fusion of two underground movements—Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario organized by Ortodoxo Party member, Professor Rafael García Bárcena, and the so-called "moncadistas" led by Fidel Castro. Describing the 26th of July Movement, Castro said that it was "the revolutionary apparatus of Chibasismo."** In other words, Castro's revolution, when the 26th of July Movement was born, had direct links with the Cuban revolution of the thirties.

ALL THE REWRITING IN THE WORLD and all the wishful thinking of so many candid souls cannot change the hard facts about the development of the Cuban revolution. To use Castro's metaphor, a revolution "as Cuban as the royal palms," became as arid as the Russian steppes. The metallic noise of the clash of machetes brandished by Cuban "guajiros" in the first mass rallies in support of the revolution, has been replaced by the rhythmic, canned-like clapping of the Communists.

* Chibas, under enormous pressures, shot himself in August 1951.
** Message to the Congress of the Ortodoxo Party's members, August 16, 1955—Luis Conte Aguero, *The Two Faces of Fidel.*

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The early dynamism of the Cuban revolution bringing new forms and ideas with each passing day ended when Castro made his fatal decision to embrace Soviet Russia; a decision which had nothing to do with U. S. policy toward the revolution, though made easier to realize by the sterility of American policies, the attitude of the American press and the utterances of many of its politicans, together with the involvement of a certain U. S. agency in the absurd, Trujillo backed conspiracy of July 1959. Those policies were used as a smokescreen by Fidel Castro to justify his course, but it is high time that supposedly responsible American and British journalists and university professors stop blaming Castro's embrace of Communism on the refusal of U. S. companies to refine Russian oil or on the embargo on purchases of Cuban sugar!

It is equally naive to believe that conditions in Cuba made it necessary to embrace Communism. The Communist Party in Cuba, as we have seen, was completely discredited and the Russian example was never looked upon as desirable by the Cuban intelligentsia, much less by Cuban labor. It is true that there was in Cuba, particulary among those who had retained the principles of the Cuban revolution through the betrayals of 1934 and 1944, a contempt for electoral processes and the desire to carry through the basic reforms as soon as possible. There is no question that in 1959, a large majority saw the structural advantages of a popular dictatorship to complete the revolutionary task in Cuba. Theodore Draper is correct in saying that the first stage of the revolution was non-democratic but definitely non-Communist.

It is difficult for so many American scholars to believe that the decision to turn Cuba into a Communist country obeyed no social law but was the caprice of one individual, Fidel, urged on by two others, his brother Raúl and Ché Guevara, who were assisted by the lavish praise of the U. S. S. R. for the "máximo líder" on the one hand, and the hesitant attitude of the U. S. government and the violent antagonism of most of the American press, on the other.

After 1960, the course of the Cuban revolution began to conform to its Soviet blueprint. Freedom was stifled in a few months, and the feeling of exultation that was characteristic of the early days of the revolution died. In a very short space of time, the great wonder of the Cuban experiment became the eroded dogmas of Soviet Communism. Armed might had to be substituted for the moral shield of popular support. The voluntary militia of the first year became, in fact, a compulsory service. The secret police became a Ministry whose tentacles reached into every corner of the nation via committees of informers. The housing program was shelved and in the Spring of 1962, Castro advised newlyweds to live with

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relatives. In the Summer, the order to devote cement production to the construction of missile sites and Russian manned bases put an end to all pretense in this respect. The educational program was replaced by a superficial literacy campaign that paralyzed schooling in Cuba for more than seven months. Indoctrination became the rule. In every field, crash programs offered the opportunity to get a diploma in ten easy lessons.

As is usual in a process of this type, the working class and the peasants were the primary victims. The labor section of the 26th of July Movement won the elections to the Labor Congress of November 1959, hands down, on an anti-Communist platform. Those who saw the initial sessions of the Congress witnessed the extraordinary fervor that anti-Communism aroused in the mass of delegates. It took the personal action of both Castro brothers to subdue the enthusiasm and later to deliver the free workers' movement to Communist control.

This was the work of one man with absolute power. One whose word was law; who still held the confidence of the great mass of the Cuban people. A man-god, an indisputable "caudillo." Americans may not comprehend "caudillismo," the Spanish version of the cult of the leader. The Germans who lived through the Nazi nightmare may be much closer to understanding. Erich Fromm's *Escape From Freedom* provides insights into the psychological forces at work.

The Labor Congress was a major turning point. It confirmed what Matos' arrest had announced less than a month before. David Salvador, leader of the labor section of the 26th of July Movement since August 1957, and Secretary General of the Cuban Workers Federation (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba Revolucionaria—C. T. C. R.) since January 1, 1959, at first acceded to Castro's urgings because he believed in The Leader's good intentions. The majority sullenly turned back; some began to conspire against the regime. A few, among them the leader of the anti-Communists, Octavio Louit, were blackmailed or bribed into abject surrender by the Communists. In March 1960, Salvador resigned and in June he was underground. In May 1960, Lázaro Peña, the old Communist leader who founded the C. T. C. in 1938 as a result of the pact with Batista, became the leader of the workers' organization.

That Communism was not popular with the workers is proved by the fact that Peña led the C. T. C. for a year and a half as "Founder of the C.T.C.," not as Secretary General. Overt control was taken in November 1961. In the interim, Jesús Soto acted as a stooge for the Communists in his capacity of Secretary of Organization.

When control of the C. T. C. was given to the Communists, there had been no clash between government policies and the

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C. T. C. Plans for the development of the country had not been affected by labor policies. On the other hand, it was to be expected that the elected leaders of the workers would be in a better position to push through governmental policies.

Soon the workers were to find out what Communist control of their movement meant. In January 1960, a general census of workers was hastily carried out. Although nothing was done with it, the main purpose of the census was obtained: the workers were thoroughly intimidated. In the Labor Congress of 1961, Lázaro Peña summarized in a speech the results of the Communist control of labor:*

> Our first task as workers is to participate with all our means and all our strength in the increase of production, to fulfill and surpass all the given norms.

This was spelled out when, in the same speech, he urged workers (and they "unanimously" agreed) to:

(1) make the 4% "voluntary" deduction for industrialization a permanent reduction of their salaries, waiving the right to consider the deduction as an investment.

(2) elimination of the right to nine days of sick leave each year.

(3) relinquish the customary Christmas bonus, beginning in 1962.

(4) give up the right to share profits in the industries where this practice was in force.

(5) surrender the right to work less than eight hours a day, a contractual right won by some unions in large industries.

In July 1962, "comisiones de estaca" (strong-arm units) were organized in every union and public denunciations of opponents of the regime in the unions, followed by collective firings of the accused, became an officially endorsed practice.

In August 1962, a decree forbade the change of work or location by the workers and made absenteeism a major crime. In September 1962, work norms were set up for Cuban workers and tables to compute local norms were established. The job of destroying freedom of labor was complete. It took the Communists one year and ten months.

THE CUBAN PEASANT FARED NO BETTER; from the so-called cooperatives where he was nothing but an employee of the state with the hope of eventually sharing in the profits, he became a worker on a state farm with no form of payment other than his salary.

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* See *Revolucion*, November 27, 1961. A summary of Pena's speech can be read in the *Newsletter of the Labor Committee to Release Imprisoned Trade Unionists and Democratic Socialists*, February 28, 1962.

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

The private farmers, including tenants and sharecroppers, were made owners of their land in the first year of the revolution only to be bankrupted later by the policies of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (I. N. R. A.) which is the sole purchaser of agricultural commodities. As a result, agricultural production fell to an unprecedented low level and rationing of foodstuffs became necessary. These were the same farmers who, in 1959, increased agricultural production to an all-time high.

Fidel Castro himself summarized his sentiments about private ownership of agricultural land in his speech on August 18, 1962:

> A lot has been said and that was our slogan . . . about the Agrarian Reform as a distribution of land . . . fortunately our revolution was very wise . . . the distribution of the big landed estates most probably would have bankrupted our revolution. What should we do? Hand out small strips of land? No, because that strip of land will be converted into a larger one, then the herd multiplies and the farmer no longer has three, he has ten, he has twenty, he has fifty and then a worker becomes a latifundista [large landholder], because all the grazing land has to produce grass for his herd, his private herd.

In the Summer of 1961, the single party made its ugly appearance at first surreptitiously, later openly. An announcement was made about the creation of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (O. R. I.), and it was explained that the O. R. I. was the nucleus of a future party in which all organizations backing the revolution were to be fused. Many who went along justified the single party as a genuine consolidation of movements necessary to "institutionalize the revolution," denying the prominent role of Communists in the new organization. The truth was served to them by Fidel in person when, in his speech of March 26, 1962, he accused Aníbal Escalante of turning the O. R. I. into an amplified version of the old P. S. P. Exactly the same charge that the opponents of the Castro regime had been making all along.

The 26th of July Movement disappeared in fact as well as in symbols. On July 26, 1962, the anniversary of the attack on Moncada was celebrated in Santiago de Cuba. At the rally, Castro became indignant when some in the crowd displayed a 26th of July flag. Equally important has been the disappearance of the battle hymn of the 26th of July and its substitution by the Internationale. This

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was, of course, to be expected. First, because the Internationale is the official anthem of the Communist Party and, second, because the 26th of July hymn urges:

> to cleanse with fire
> that will consume this infernal plague
> of unwanted rulers;
> of insatiable tyrants
> who have plunged Cuba in evil.

IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, what seemed to be a definite move toward a neutralist position (Raúl Roa in his first address to the United Nations as Foreign Minister of Cuba in the early Fall of 1959, criticized both rival power blocs), was succeeded by meek subordination to the Communist line and to the interests of the Soviet Union. Down the drain went a Cuban plan to be host to a world conference of non-aligned nations in September, 1960. Although Cuba went to a similar meeting in Belgrade in September 1961, the Cuban delegation simply became the chief exponents of the Soviet position. Cuba was one of the few countries that refused to condemn the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests in the atmosphere, which took place during the first days of the meeting. Dependence on Soviet trade and aid soon become too great to permit the country the slightest deviation from the Communist line.

The present period in which the Soviet Union not only places land-to-land missiles in Cuban soil, but also controls the Air Force, the anti-aircraft defense, the Navy and part of the army did not come about suddenly. The signs of Soviet control and direction of Cuban affairs were present at a time when many supposedly responsible people were writing extensively about the Castro regime, explaining that it was not Communist and, of course, not at all under Soviet control. Warren Miller sarcastically stated in his book *90 Miles From Home* that all he had seen in Cuba in 1961 was an infiltration of Protestants in the Government. This is the same author who said that there was as much reason to believe that the O. R. I. would become a Communist party as that it could be a women's party, a student's party etc. . . .

If in international affairs, the subjection of Cuba to the Soviet line left the regime no room to maneuver or to play one bloc against the other, as Nasser does and Nehru used to do, in the Latin American sphere the change was marked by a turnabout of incredible proportions. Castro, purportedly an offspring of the Latin American revolution, initially behaved as expected. Agitation began in Cuba against the three Caribbean dictatorships of Trujillo, Duvalier and Somoza. An expedition against Trujillo left Cuba in

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June 14, 1959 under the command of a Rebel Army major. A similar movement was planned against the Somozas and a training camp was opened in Pinar del Rió province. Expeditions without official backing left for Panama and Haiti. Cuba was a hotbed of democratic revolutions in 1959.

The picture changed completely in the summer of 1960. Right after the meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers in Costa Rica in August 1960, a secret deal was struck between Trujillo and Castro, leaders of the two countries whose activities had made the conference necessary. The first visible sign of the deal was the return to Castro of the commercial planes in which Batista and his friends had left Cuba on January, 1959; then came the cessation of the mutual attacks on the official broadcasting station in both countries. Trujillo's radio soon began a systematic attack on the United States. The Dominican dictator was depicted as the first "Socialist" of the Western Hemisphere. Castro arrested and later shot two outstanding enemies of Trujillo, the American Rebel Army officer William Morgan who had deceived Trujillo in 1959 and Eufemio Fernández who had organized several movements against Trujillo. In a speech on January 6, 1961, Ernesto Guevara referred to Trujillo as "now our friend."*

The Nicaraguan revolutionary Chester Lacayo who had been in Cuba in 1959, training Nicaraguan exiles and who was told to leave when he refused to cooperate with the Communists, was dragged out of an international airplane and sentenced to fifteen years in jail for conspiring "with Christian Herter to embarass the Cuban government." The Dominican revolutionary, Miguel Angel Ramírez spent six months in jail and was finally expelled from Cuba. The targets of Castro's attacks were no longer the dictators but the Governments led by progressive rulers such as Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela and Arturo Frondizi in Argentina, and liberal leaders such as José Figueres of Costa Rica and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre of Peru. In this field Castro's record has gone to the extreme of urging an armed coup after civilians took over in the Dominican Republic following the assassination of Trujillo; of backing the armed attempts by Navy units in Carúpano and Puerto Cabello in Venezuela; and of pressing a military takeover in Peru that would prevent (as it did!) the assumption of power by the dean of Latin American revolutionaries, Haya de la Torre. Recently it has been noted that Castro never attacks the Haitian dictator François Duvalier who has well-known Communists in his cabinet, such as Paul Blanchet, Minister of Information, Hervé

* See the magazine *Obra Revolucionaria*, 1961, No. 2; also pp. 87–88 of Theodore Draper's book, *Castro's Revolution, Myth and Realities*.

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Boyer, Minister of Finance and Clovis Dessinor, Minister of Commerce.

ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE, the first signs of the Communist takeover were noticed in the labor movement as we have seen. Then came the turn of the hard working town mayors of the 26th of July Movement. They were systematically replaced by Communists or by people willing to toe the Party line, some of whom had been collaborators of the Batista regime. The decentralization policies of the first year, features inherited from the 1933 revolution, were abandoned. Thus, astonished Cubans saw the virtual disappearance of the Instituto de Ahorro y Viviendas (I. N. A. V.) and the complete elimination of the Banco de Seguros Sociales (Cuba's Social Security) and the Waterworks Commission (C. O. N. A. C. A.), three of the original creations of the revolution during the first year. The same happened to former autonomous institutions such as the Comisión de Fomento Nacional and the Banco de Fomento Agrícola e Industrial which were revolutionary institutions dedicated to the development of the country. The strictest centralization was imposed.

It should be repeated here that there were no popular pressures in favor of the change, nor any actual need other than the desire to turn Cuba into a Communist country.

OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM and to the old Communists was so widespread that the takeover, at first, was more in fact than in appearance. In the Summer of 1960, a non-Communist Fidelista could brush aside charges that the Government was Communist by asking: "Where are the Communists? I don't see Blas Roca, Marinello, Carlos Rafael or Lázaro Peña anywhere!" Those moved to the fore were the strictly fellow-travelling types—Núñez Jiménez, Marta Frayde, Osmany Cienfuegos, Oscar Pino Santos, José Antonio Portuondo. A year later the transformation was complete, symbolized by the fact that at the May 1, 1961 Labor parade, word was passed in administration circles to wear a red flag in the lapel. From that moment on, red flags became customary in government office and buildings.

This turn in the revolution was imposed on the Cuban people through deceit and subterfuge and, once the government felt secure, by a show of force. Soon the Cubans were to show what they thought of the state as boss. Those who write about Cuba tend to overlook the role of the Cuban farmer in the shortages plaguing the Cuban economy.

Pro-Castro writers very nonchalantly describe how voluntary workers have been necessary to replace sugar cane cutters engaged in "permanent" work in the cooperatives or how the drought re-

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duced sugar cane production nearly two million tons in a year. Only the most blatant bad faith can explain such departure from truth. In the first place, dryness is necessary for sugar cane. The 1962 drought could not affect sugar cane that was fully grown by January. The Fall of 1961 was rich in hurricanes and storms so it could not be said that there was a drought at a time when it could really affect the sugar cane. What the May-June drought did affect was the planting of other agricultural products. Consequently, there must have been additional idle hands who simply refused to cut sugar cane. Many were too busy burning sugar cane at night to be able to work in the morning. The Cuban press reported the situation in words quite different from those of the foreign pro-Castro apologists. Alfredo Núnez Pascual, editor of *El Mundo,* a leading Havana daily, said the following in an editorial on March 30, 1962:

> It is incredible that while volunteer battalions are mobilized by the thousands to go where the cane is cut and to remain there, *the farm worker usually employed in that job,* in which he has great experience and as a consequence produces a great deal more, *is cutting only from Monday to Thursday. . . .*

An earlier *El Mundo* editorial (March 9, 1962) admitted that the "delay in the harvest and the reduced volume of the daily production... cannot be completely attributed to the reduction in the yield [in sugar content] of the sugar cane, *due to the drought or to other natural phenomena*" and exhorted the "mass organizations" to "convince [the workers] that we have to comply with our trade argeements with the Socialist countries... and that it would be a shame that we, not due to lack of ability, but for faulty organization and lack of conscience of our agricultural needs, would fail to fulfill such agreements."

According to the Communist organ *Hoy,* from March 16 to 18, the astounding number of 28,550 men stopped cutting sugar cane in the entire territory.

The sugar situation has been duplicated everywhere in the Cuban countryside. Not only were sugar cane cutters unavailable to harvest the sugar, but in the late summer a call was issued for coffee pickers, also a specialized job. A great campaign was started to find people willing to go to Oriente province, where most of the coffee is harvested, to pick coffee. Inexperienced pickers may harvest some coffee, but next year the damaged trees will yield little. Meanwhile, the usual coffee pickers are not working in cooperatives, as many would like the world to believe, but staying away from all work for the Communist state; hiding in the bushes to raise a chicken or two to sell to the well accredited "gusanos" (worms, a Communist-coined derogatory reference to oppositionists which is as foreign to the Cuban vernacular as the beret is to Cuban dress).

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What is true of the countryside is true also of the cities. Cubans do not work full of gaiety for a society which they hate, but as sluggishly and sloppily as they can. And no method can make Cubans work when they don't want to. Against this background, neither foreign technicians nor advisors, neither threats nor streamlining of the economy can work. No matter what Castro's apologists may say, no one can prove that production in Cuba has increased in any sector of Cuban life after 1960. The American embargo can explain only a fraction of the troubles, primarily in the industrial sector. Major responsibility rests with the resistance of the Cuban people and the shoddiness and insufficiency of Soviet-made equipment and goods.

The resistance is spontaneous. It is not due to underground orders or foreign suggestions. It is the only way that the working class of Cuba, deprived of its natural leaders, can show its opposition. Many have been shot to death while burning sugar cane, although they do not appear in the statistics presented in official communiques.

THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, apologists for the Castro regime have denied every accusation and believed every claim. The spell was broken December 1, 1961, when Fidel Castro decided to shed all pretense and declared himself to be a Marxist-Leninist and said that he would be one "always." The cat was out of the bag, as the Americans say, and many deserted Castro. Others remained faithful, either because they were fellow travellers or Communists all along, or simply because they idealized their creation more than the human being around whom the legend was constructed.

The Castro apologists found a stumbling block in the state of Cuba's economy, but to illustrate how they try to surmount that block, there is the example of Samuel Shapiro's article in *The Nation,* September 22, 1962. "Castro," says Shapiro, "has undertaken a difficult series of economic tasks with what is, on the whole, a reasonable amount of success." Although he neglects to describe which are the "economic tasks" undertaken (unless it is to maintain the country barely above the starvation level), he goes on to explain that "if Cuba survives the current crisis, her long-range economic prospects are rather good" and then proceeds to explain the quantity and quality of the island's resources.

Thus Castro's apologists abroad reassure everyone with a vision of a better future "within two or three years" in the same way that Castro reassures the Cuban people. But Shapiro deserves our thanks for mentioning a fact which was generally ignored: that the industrial plants promised to Cuba by the Soviets in the Summer of 1960 "are not worth thinking about seriously at this time" and that the trumpeted industrialization of Cuba has been

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limited in three years to "a powerhouse in Matanzas," "a gas-generating plant in Marianao," "an assembly plant for automotive batteries and a factory turning out hoes, rakes, machetes and other agricultural implements." This is all that Castro has to show for the industrialization program whose execution was used to justify the violent assault on civil liberties and human rights that began early in 1960 and that did away with a free press, a free trade union organization, free radio programs and has ended with the elimination of the freedom to change jobs or residence. Of course, Mr. Shapiro does not say, probably because he does not know, that the powerhouse in Matanzas was begun in 1957 (although an addition to the plant may be all that is new), the gas plant was to begin construction in January 1959, and that for years there had been in Cuba assembly plants for automotive batteries (Laso and Los Angeles were the best known).

MANY SPECULATIONS ABOUT CUBA and Castro were resolved when the United States imposed a quarantine on arms shipments to Cuba. These developments reflect a situation over which the Cuban people neither have responsibility nor exercise any control. Thus, independent Cubans feel that they can neither endorse nor repudiate the quarantine as the measure was not taken with the idea of liberating Cuba but of protecting the United States against a real and present danger. However it should be noted that independent Cubans view armed action with grave concern and a Cuba under a foreign army of occupation as a grim prospect.

Castro's refusal to consider inspection unless his five conditions are met and his threat to shoot down U. S. planes surveilling the island are attributable, in part, to hurt pride. But it is more than that. It is also politically motivated, as Tad Szulc describes in an excellent report from Guantanamo's U. S. Naval Base published in The *New York Times,* November 11, 1962. Szulc writes:

> The chief ingredient of Dr. Castro's strategy is his aggressiveness. Not only is it part of his character as a man, but, in political terms, it is vital if he is to weather the aftermath of the missiles affair. Applying the principle of the bicycle rider who must fall if he reduces too much his speed and momentum, Dr. Castro had to maintain the posture of defiance and the impression, at least at home, that he is the man in the diplomatic saddle, making the demands and setting the conditions for settlement.

The need for such an attitude reveals the weakness of a regime no longer based on popular support. Castro's personal role in the system has placed Cuba in an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, he cannot relieve tension, but must increase it; on the other, these tensions call forth continuing pressures on his regime. Had Castro allowed on-site verification of the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba, the United States would have had to honor

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its pledge not to invade Cuba, in more ways than one. And many of Castro's trumpeted five points would have had to be considered by the United Nations as the basis for implementing this pledge.

That could have been a first step for a "final settlement" of the Cuban question. Russia, placed in an uncomfortable position, would have had to make additional efforts to recoup its prestige in Cuba, by coming through with the promised factories; the United States would seem too harsh if it continued its policy of increased economic attrition against Cuba. An accomodation with Castro would have been closer than many may suspect now. Political realists, both in and out of the Kennedy administration, would argue, as *Newsweek* reported, that the best way out would be to have Castro turn into a Tito.

That possibility has been damaged, probably beyond repair, by Castro's ego and the tempo he imposed on the Cuban revolution. His dictum: "never a step back, not even to gain speed" has forced him to close the door to what may have been his last chance. The U. S. has found the excuse it needed to maintain the pressure. If it can get the bombers out it can make a token protest about the lack of verification. There will not be too much emphasis on the implementation of verification because as long as this is not fulfilled, President Kennedy will not feel obliged to formalize his no-invasion pledge or to relieve economic pressures on Castro.

The driving force of the dictator's megalomania had worked wonders for Castro, but his image as the constant winner has caught up with him. He cannot win any more, but he is going to try. The "bicycle rider" is finding it harder and harder to turn the wheels of his vehicle. He could stop and rest, but he cannot do that because his power is geared to his ability to move. What he may not know is that he stopped moving forward the very day he abandoned the revolution "as Cuban as the palms" and embraced Communism.

ANTONIO DE LA CARRERA, *was a member of the Cuban Peoples Party (Ortodoxo) and, after 1952, active in anti-Batista underground. He was forced to seek asylum in Venezuela and the United States in 1958, where he represented the 26th of July Movement and headed the committee of three which took over the Cuban Consulate on January 2, 1959. Returned to Cuba as secretary to President Urrutia. With the arrest of Huber Matos in October 1959, he broke with the regime. Exiled in February 1961. Lives in New York, coordinating the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE) led by Raul Chibas and Manuel Ray.*

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Michael Shute

A New Stage in Government-Labor Relations



JUST THREE MONTHS after his inaugural, President Kennedy stated:

> We are breaking new ground. Other Presidents have, of course, attempted at different stages to intervene in the wage-price matter with general exhortations . . . These exhortations have not had a very great effect, but with your help I intend to get a look at this situation before there is a crisis. I do not want the White House to have to come in at the last minute.

In this somewhat less than candid remark, President Kennedy previewed a level of government intervention in labor disputes significantly different from any previous Administration, one which posed a special threat to the independence and viability of the trade-union movement. True to its promise, the Administration has vigorously pursued a policy of wage restraints and opposition to labor's demands for a shorter work week, by intervening, not with "general exhortations," but directly and "before there is a crisis."

While the President could outline the New Frontier's labor policy, it devolved upon his first Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, to fill in the details and oversee their execution. The choice of Goldberg for the job was a particularly shrewd one, for who could better serve to discipline the labor movement than one of its well known friends. Also, Goldberg was a highly energetic and competent man, with a comprehensive knowledge of collective bargaining and of the unions, which made him a superb technical executor of the Administration's policy as well as a contributor to it in his own right. What is more, Goldberg had already performed a useful service to Kennedy in 1960 by soothing labor irritation over the nomination of Lyndon Johnson for the Vice-Presidency.

Goldberg's reputation as a friend of labor was well founded. In 1955, he was one of the chief architects of labor unity and later drafted the ethics code of the united labor movement. In 1959, serving as chief counsel to the United Steel Workers, he issued a brilliant legal challenge to the injunction against the striking steel workers, and his address to the Supreme Court challenging the injunction was moving and cogent.

Thus, when Goldberg was appointed to his Cabinet position, it seemed to the public that labor's confidence in President Kennedy had been re-

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warded. Before long, however, a sense of disquiet was observable in labor circles, then discontent, and by the time the Secretary of Labor was elevated to the Supreme Court, there was a coldness bordering on open hostility between Goldberg and the labor movement. But if Goldberg had lost favor among labor leaders, he found new friends among strange sources. During a recent trucking strike, the *New York Daily Mirror* mourned Goldberg's absence: "It is a pity," the Hearst editorialist wrote, "that Arthur Goldberg has gone to the Supreme Court. His idea that the public has a right to be represented in labor negotiations is sound." Even Barry Goldwater applauded Goldberg as the only Cabinet member who was doing a good job.

Why Goldberg lost friends in the labor movement and gained them among conservatives is worth some examination for what it reveals of the labor policies of the Kennedy Administration, policies which can hardly be reversed by Goldberg's successor, Willard Wirtz.

GOLDBERG SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH three ground rules of labor relations: 1) that the United States, while not engaged in a hot war, must put itself on a war footing and place itself at the service of the war effort; 2) following from this, that it is the "public's" responsibility to ensure the proper coordination of resources, that the government is not a mediator between the parochial interests of management and labor, but a participant in collective bargaining in its own right; and 3) therefore, economic settlements can no longer be entrusted to a power struggle between labor and management, to an atmosphere where a settlement is forced by a strike, but must be decided by those competent to determine the national interest, i. e., the Administration, with its definition of what the national interest is.

Under questioning by the Congressional Committee on his confirmation, Goldberg remarked that the "Cold War" presents a "desperate" need to "restore the sense of mutual purpose" which existed between management, labor and the government during World War II. This reference to World War II must have bothered Meany and other labor leaders who were possibly haunted by the ghost of the no-strike pledge. Imposed now, even unofficially, the no-strike "expedient" might become a permanent fixture.

A concerned Meany, at a February, 1961, meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, pressed Goldberg to define the precise role of the new President's Advisory Committee on Labor Management Policy, composed of union, management and "public" representatives. Meany was particularly curious about the function of the "public." The *New York Times* summarized the encounter:

> Mr. Goldberg, the committee chairman, agreed with Mr. Meany that the panel was not designed to function on the lines of the War Labor Board, in which the public members acted as the balance of power between labor and management in settling disputes.
>
> However, he disagreed with a suggestion by Mr. Meany that the public representatives limit themselves to supplying information and helping labor and management to reach agreement.
>
> Mr. Goldberg said the President's idea was to have all the committee members, including those selected from unions and industry, serve as 'public members' in a very real sense.

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> The President does not conceive of the public members as honest brokers operating between labor and management, Mr. Goldberg said. Rather, he conceives of all the members as discharging a public function in studying and recommending policies on which there will, hopefully, be a consensus.

Earlier that month, in an interview with A. H. Raskin, the labor expert for the *New York Times,* Goldberg commented on the importance of the new committee's role in seeking bargaining strategy on an economy-wide level.

These conceptions do not repeat the old-hat schemes of compulsory arbitration. It is habitual for the press, after a strike has been concluded, to assert that the final terms could have been formulated by simple reason, without a costly work stoppage. This implies the forced intervention of government as a *dis*interested friend of the court. But, distasteful as this implication may be, it differs from the Goldberg proposal that government intervene as an *interested* party, not only in a given dispute, but on a broader level, concerned with the formulation of the economic strategies, goals and values for labor itself. (We shall see how this works when we discuss the steel settlement.) His answer to Meany about the resemblance of the new Committee to the War Labor Board is an evasion only in part. In fact, it indicates clearly that while in the War Labor Board the "public" acted as the "balance of power," in the new setup both labor and management would be expected to *integrate* their own commitments within these of the proverbial "national interest." ("All the members" will discharge "a public function.")

THE GOVERNMENT HAS ONE established way to assert *its* decision-making power over labor relations: removing the basic trade-union weapon, the strike. Raskin reported that Goldberg wished to "take the crisis out of" labor disputes, to "substitute year-round discussions in a more deliberative setting." In Goldberg's own words, the President's Committee might formulate measures to take collective bargaining "away from the pressures and deadlines and cross-currents."

The crises, the cross-currents, the deadlines, are labor's means of achieving its collective bargaining objectives. The failure of reason to prevail is not the result of misunderstanding. Strikes and lockouts occur through perfect understanding by each side of the economic incompatibility of the other side's demands. To take the strike from labor is to deny the basic right of the union membership to protect itself—to generate pressure on management to settle. (Management is also limited by this version of compulsory arbitration. Crises and cross-currents enable it to pressure the union with stockpiles and the threat of an unsuccessful strike. The big winner in the Goldberg scheme is the garrison state. As we shall see, however, management suffers far less than labor.)

Although Kennedy has used Taft-Hartley against labor, that law does not suit his purposes. For one thing, it is an *ad-hoc* tool, and cannot shape a general perspective. It involves force, and creates hostility in the labor movement. As such it hinders Kennedy in relying on one of his strongest assets in corraling labor: the political bond between the unions and the Democratic Party, with the result that they hesitate to take his Administration to task.

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After Kennedy had invoked Taft-Hartley in July, 1961, to halt the maritime strike, Goldberg commented on the unworkability of the law. He wanted to replace the injunction with an *automatic* cooling-off period, a built in strike breaker which would at the same time reduce the effectiveness of the strike threat and not subject the President to political pressure from labor, since the choice would not be his. He also asked for a law empowering the government to seize a plant if the cooling-off period did not provide satisfaction. "The government," Goldberg said, "has to have broader powers. There is no substitute for authority."

Any attempt to legislate Goldberg's proposals would have met a storm of resistance from labor and business. In lieu of legislation, the Administration proceeded along the lines of least resistance—the personal and consistent intervention of Goldberg. Goldberg or his representatives have been omnipresent in a multitude of disputes across the country—from the New York Metropolitan Opera to the Imperial Valley lettuce fields of California.

The procedures in these disputes have been consistent with the three goals already mentioned. They tried: 1) to establish Goldberg or his representative as a, or *the,* major figure in negotiations and to set a precedent for that participation as a *regular* and *normal* occurrence, rather than an *emergency* recourse, and 2) to mute labor-management conflict by placing settlement terms in the government's hands.

Goldberg settled the January, 1961 New York harbor strike with an agreement from labor to return to work and await a White House report. He used this expedient again with the airline strike three months later and returned to it repeatedly. The ploy is to pre-empt union and industry functions. It often serves as a welcome out for the union leadership, which does not want *either* a falling out with the Administration *or* the responsibility of reporting unacceptable terms to its membership.

GOLDBERG WAS BINDING ARBITRATOR in last year's negotiations between the New York Metropolitan Opera and the American Federation of Musicians. He apparently chose this dispute, not of earth-shaking importance for the nation's economy, as a laboratory for an unusual experiment. In his award, which generally favored management, Goldberg bestowed less of a pay raise for day rehearsals than had been offered by management. This seriously offends the spirit of arbitration, which has always meant the selection of a workable meeting ground between the employer's offer and the union's demand. It has never been the arbitrator's function to introduce a self-defined independent focus for mediation. For Goldberg to have done so represents an outrageous usurpation. The handwriting was on the wall.

The grand stroke was in steel. To eliminate the "crises" and "cross-currents," negotiations began in February, 1962, although the contract did

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not expire until June 30. The starting date was three months earlier than in 1959, and the earliest in the history of the industry. On March 2, David McDonald, president of the union, and Conrad Cooper, industry negotiator, called a recess until May 1. Goldberg and Kennedy successfully pressured both sides to reopen discussion immediately. Not content with private assurances, Kennedy publicly proclaimed his thanks for the resumption.

Contrast this quick and determined intervention with the record of previous Administrations. Only infrequently did Truman involve his Administration in collective bargaining. In 1959, the steel strike lasted 116 days before Eisenhower used the injunction. Then most of the 80-day injunction period passed before Nixon stepped in to help write the agreement. (In February, 1962, while Goldberg busied himself with steel, Walter Heller, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, conferred with officers of the Communication Workers, prior even to the drafting of union demands to present to the telephone management.)

From the beginning, the Administration issued pronunciamentos directing Cooper and McDonald to limit union gains to the three percent annual average productivity gain of the economy. This standard had been set by the Council of Economic Advisors in January, 1962, ostensibly to avoid inflation. The contract was drawn up and negotiated in large part by Goldberg. This was emphasized by the almost unprecedented step of announcing the contract in Washington, D. C., rather than in Pittsburgh, home of the industry. It was perhaps, a way of making clear just who had done what.

The contract gave the workers a thirty-two-hour work week guarantee (for those not laid off). They won added vacation time and other fringe benefits. They lost, however, in three major respects, aside from the lack of a wage boost, which is hardly trifling. The job begun by the companies in 1959, of eliminating the cost of living allowance, was completed under Goldberg's tutelage. Except for campaign rhetoric, the workers now have no assurance of keeping pace with rising prices. Secondly, the shorter work-week issue was not even raised. In the year prior to the contract negotiations, employment in the steel and iron industry fell by over 48,000—over 8 percent of the total employment. For the steel union, under Goldberg's thumb, not to open the fight for reduced hours, is a serious defeat. Lastly, settlement of some of the toughest work rule problems was referred to a Human Relations Research Committee, an application of the Goldberg technique of bleeding the collective bargaining process. The most serious attempt of the companies to mangle union rights has come in the areas of work rules, speedup, etc. This referral is ominous when one recalls that the New Frontier has placed top priority on production for the Cold War, which suggests speedup.

EVEN IN THE 1960 CAMPAIGN, speaking to union conventions which lauded him, Kennedy attacked the demand for shorter hours. He argued that a shorter work week would prevent America from fully utilizing its resources in the Cold War. Nevertheless, his fight against shorter hours occurs in the absence of any other White House proposals for seriously cutting unemployment. In fact, Kennedy has publicly declared an acceptance of a permanent unemployment rate of four percent. (Other economists—

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liberal and conservative—estimate it at 5½ percent and rising, in the absence of radical measures such as shorter hours.)

The main Administration rationale for its opposition to a wage boost and shorter hours is that inflation would follow. This is based on the contentions that wage-price increases inflate the economy and that a wage boost must be accompanied by a price increase.

Daniel Bell, in the March, 1960, issue of *Commentary* (right after the 1959 steel settlement), argued effectively that it is not union-wage pressure which most affects the "total stock of dollars in circulation," but government spending. The $50 billion defense budget provides an insight into what really creates inflation and what priorities Kennedy has set up when he suppresses wages and increases arms appropriations.

"While the business community," Bell wrote, "contradicts the basic precepts of economic theory in ascribing inflation to union-wage pressure, conservative economists who know better have kept shamefully quiet."

Does a wage increase really cause a price increase? Bell notes that heavy industries have traditionally used wage boosts to raise prices disproportionately. He also points to the non-union white-collar workers, who are salaried, and now make up a large percentage of the employees of heavy industry. In 1957, non-union members got an average of 37 percent higher raises than union members. The Kefauver committee observed: "This may be excellent personnel policy, but there is some question as to the propriety of charging the cost of such a policy to the union agreement."

Kennedy, of course, is concerned that the companies cooperate in the war effort. He attempts therefore, like FDR in World War II, to guarantee them a satisfactory rate of profit. In addition, he shares their concern for the acceleration of investment and modernization. But here we come to the matter of values and economic power. The determination by a company that it "needs" a given amount of money to invest is what Bell calls a "hidden tax mechanism": management raises large sums of money subject only to its own control. Workers and consumers both make involuntary investments in U. S. Steel without even the compensatory return of a stockholder.

Operating on the assumption that a wage increase necessitates a price increase, the Administration guarantees the corporative claim to determine, on the basis of its own needs, the allocation of resources of millions of people. Goldberg's intervention on this basis is a means of affecting, not the union's reaction to a rationally conceived plan, but its values. In effect, Goldberg told the union to restrain wages in order to prevent a price increase and prevent the onus of inflation from deflecting union labor. What if he had posed the alternative of, on the one hand a shorter work week with guarantees against unemployment, or, on the other, the installation of new machines with a higher concentration of capital and a greater productivity rate? Or still another possibility presents itself: of cutting profits, investing in new machines and reducing hours at the same time.

Who is to be sacrificed? The issue is not some immutable law of economics. Do the steel workers have a right to fight to have corporative profit pay the bill instead of the union? Goldberg thinks not.

Then, of course, Roger Blough, chairman of the U. S. Steel Corpo-

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ration, stepped in and decided to turn a victory into a rout by raising prices. The Kennedy Administration, however, did not restrain the union in order to enhance company profit per se, but to create a stable basis for war mobilization, and it was not going to let Blough intrude on the general interests of the system. In addition, Kennedy's ability to "convince" the unions depended on stopping Blough. Conversely, as the shrewd *U. S. News and World Report* put it: "If Jack Kennedy wins a victory on steel prices, it will mean even stronger government pressure against wage increases."

This observation cropped up more and more in labor circles. Shortly after the steel settlement, Walter Reuther, perhaps the most Kennedyized of all the top labor officialdom, took a public sideswipe at the wages-must-equal-productivity formula. The Administration invited him to lunch one day and after digesting his full commitment to Kennedy, he issued an abject apology for the formula he had just rejected.



THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER Goldberg coup. The International Association of Machinists and the United Automobile Workers, representing defense workers, had formed what seemed to be a solid front of resistance to the Goldberg policy. They argued that unusual restrictions on union rights in defense installations had left their workers 11 to 14 cents behind prevailing wage rates. Goldberg successfully denied their claim that this entitled them to freedom from wage restraint.

It had become obvious that the new order underwrote corporative profits and the existent relationship of industrial wealth. Labor saw also that a permanent number of unemployed was guaranteed merely by virtue of closing the door to any full-employment proposals. Even prior to steel, Meany was upset. On February 23, Goldberg told the Chicago Executives' Club that "everyone expects the government to assert and define the national interest" in collective bargaining. Meany responded on February 26: "The role of government is to offer its mediation and conciliation, to do what it can to help the parties reach an agreement, but to assert a national policy, within which negotiation must proceed, is to interfere with free collective bargaining."

After steel, labor could not fail to protest. July, 1962, marked the 56th straight month in which the unemployment rate was five percent or over. In addition to Goldberg's intervention, the failure of the Administration domestically, from taxes to civil rights, made silence intolerable. Was *Goldberg* anti-union? Under the pressure of criticism Goldberg began to relax his grip and go to lengths verbally to assure labor that he was fully aware of the legitimate self-interests of the employees.

By July (as the 1962 elections drew near), Goldberg—the 1959–60 labor hero—was placed in the odd position of having to deny that he and

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the Administration were pursuing an anti-labor policy. Any such notion, he said to a convention of the Hatters and Millinery Workers, was "a lot of nonsense." Goldberg warned that business and labor have to stop "following their party lines."

Also, in its normal day-to-day business, the Labor Department under Goldberg was apparently not as clean as it could have been. Goldberg effectively disappeared when the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) was attempting to prevent the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association (ALSSA) from achieving independent status. For two years, ALSSA, an extremely militant union, has been appealing to the Department of Labor to restrain the pilots, who function as management representatives and deny the stewardesses any real membership or democratic rights in ALPA.

Goldberg has pledged to enforce the Landrum-Griffin Act "without reservations as long as it is on the books," and he did investigate the bakers' and teamsters' unions. But the Department failed even to investigate the ALSSA complaint, much less take action against ALPA, which has a long record of racism and strikebreaking. *In January of 1961, the Chicago office of Goldberg's former law firm had been retained by ALPA, and for several months the name of the Secretary of Labor continued to appear on legal arguments supporting the ALPA position.* In the Spring of 1961, ALPA's President boasted in an internal union memo that "Goldberg's firm is currently representing us" and implied that ALPA had more than due influence in the government. In August of 1961, confronted publicly with the connection, Goldberg's former firm severed its ties with ALPA.

WHY DID GOLDBERG win favor among the right wing? Simply because his intervention was so clearly antagonistic to labor's rights and program. (The government's assumption of the strike costs of United Aircraft, for instance, a policy which Goldberg defended, was unabashed strikebreaking.)

The New Deal, in saving capitalism from internal ruin, found it necessary to concentrate on limiting corporate privilege. The New Frontier, defending the system from external threat, finds that its central task is the channeling of popular movements, such as labor, into the Cold War arsenal. Apparently, from the objective logic of the Goldberg program, the day to day activity of the unions should be at the service of the Gold War mobilization, just as, in a sense, labor's political activity has been at the service of the Democratic Party in recent years. Indeed, the Goldbergian logic seems to argue that the interests and desires of the union membership be only a secondary factor in determining union policy.

Goldbergism—minus Goldberg—will continue under Kennedy regardless of who is Secretary of Labor. Goldberg, with a special flair, carried out a basic policy of a Democratic Administration. His departure signifies a letup only in the dramatic character of the pressure upon labor—not in the pressure itself.

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Zygmunt Zaremba

Communism in the Era of "Enlightened Absolutism"

THE FRENCH HISTORIAN Charles Seignobos described the turning point in Europe in the second half of the 18th century in the following words:

> A few sovereigns began to accept a new conception of the role of chief of state . . . They declared themselves to be the servants of the state, obliged to promote the public welfare by improving the life conditions of their people . . . They refused to persecute the dissidents . . . They desired to contribute to the happiness of the people, but did not want to leave their subjects any part in the government, any political freedom. Their way of governing was called enlightened despotism.

Isn't there an obvious analogy in the changes which took place two centuries later in the Soviet Union and the "People's Democracies"? Do not the present Communist rulers want to work for the welfare of the masses? Have they not abated the persecution of "dissidents" while denying their subjects elementary political rights? Indeed, the present phase of development within Communist governments in the U.S.S.R. and in Central and Eastern Europe qualifies them as "enlightened despotisms."

The transition from Stalinist tyranny to currying of public favor, mitigation of terror, a certain tolerance for the private life of the citizen and a greater concern with satisfying the needs of the masses, had definite causes which came to the fore in the riots at Vorkuta and in the revolutionary demonstrations at Berlin and Poznan, culminating in the 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary. Here, two series of events manifested themselves with utmost clarity, striking at the very foundations of the Communist system. On the one hand an economy which boasted it had reached unheard of achievements turned out to be utterly inefficient in the field of consumer goods. On the other hand, the figure of the omniscient dictator disappeared from the scene, with confusion among the Communist leadership. All this contributed to the consequent awakening of critical thought and the toppling of conformism.

The period of post-war reconstruction had ended. The economic

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apparatus assumed unprecedented proportions, but it was all directed toward further increasing the number of industrial enterprises and the war machine. All the promises of better living conditions remained hollow. If, however, during the period of reconstruction in the "People's Democracies" and to a certain extent in the Soviet Union, people were willing to tighten their belts in order to rebuild their devastated countries, five or six years of such a reconstruction process exhausted their patience and spirit of sacrifice. The well developed production apparatus, on the other hand, could not thrive on only military orders and, naturally enough, even in the economic leadership, tendencies appeared which looked toward the internal consumer.

The conformist façade of official optimism collapsed. The economists undermined the Stalinist principle of preponderance of the production of means of production. Literature and art began to find their own ways of combatting false legends; Pasternak revealed the tragedy of revolutionary chaos in which the best men perish and those who survive are warriors who often lose their sense of good and evil. Wazyk in his "Poem for Adults" ripped away the myth of industrialization, showing a life woven of misery and dirt. Dudintsev rebelled against the widespread bureaucratic corruption, shouting that a man lives "not by bread alone." The propaganda slogans on which the dictatorship had been based were corroded, and there was no way of restoring their strength. Unable to turn back the pages of history, the dictatorship had to start a new one based on a compromise with reality. The absolute ruler descends from the walled heights of the Kremlin, yields to "collective leadership" (with the collective selected strictly according to his will), demonstrates his care for the fate of his subjects, decreases the pressure on the peasants, reforms the economy, loosens control of the citizen's personal life, is even ready to grant Pasternak the right to have his own opinions, promises mountains and marvels in twenty years, provided nobody interferes with his governmental methods.

The rulers of the "People's Democracies" must follow suit, some of them reluctantly, others, like Gomulka, even outstripping their master in "liberalism."

IN THESE COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, there are other elements which confer a specific character and tempo on the change toward "enlightened despotism." First, there is a wide feeling of national humiliation because national life has been subordinated to the will of the Kremlin. In some countries the grievance is mitigated by old philorussian traditions (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia), in others, such as Poland and Hungary, bitterness is deepened by the recollection of old and more recent injuries inflicted by Russia. In the Soviet Union the government can play upon the patriotic feelings of the Great Russians by presenting a picture of national power which Russia did not know under the Czars, while in the countries of the Soviet protectorate any reference to patriotism can arouse only an ironic smile.

The second important element which made conditions in the countries subjected to Russia differ from those in the Soviet Union is the existence of a working class formed and matured in long, hard struggles against capitalist exploitation and national wrongs. This working class

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is conscious of the distance which separates socialism as conceived during its struggles against capitalism from the system established by the Communist dictatorship which parades under the name of socialism.

Finally, the third major element: during decades of dictatorship a new ruling class was formed in the U.S.S.R. It is a social force well aware of its importance; it transformed the Party into an instrument of its power. In countries where the dictatorship was imposed from abroad, the ruling bureaucracy is still far from a closely-knit class. It is influenced by diverse currents within its environment, and the Party which is its supervisory power does not always inspire respect. While in the U.S.S.R. the ruling class has a fixed social basis with a strong organizational structure, the trump card of the rulers of the "People's Democracies" is the sponsorship and power of the Soviet Union. The Communist parties are only a decoration which can be destroyed—as happened in 1956—by any burst of wrath on the part of the masses. (In Czechoslovakia alone, where the Communist Party struck deep roots in the labor movement before the war, and where traditional pan-Slavism mitigated the reaction of the masses against subordination to the Soviet Union, the Communist power may boast of having some confidence among a fraction of the population. Quite different, of course, are the conditions in Yugoslavia where—analogous to Russia—the Party cadres were swelled with partisans, and the severance of ties with the Kremlin led to a separate development).

II

THE RESOLUTION OF LAST YEAR'S Conference of Twelve Communist Parties was official recognition of the necessity of adjusting Communism to new conditions. The composition of this Conference was itself a significant turning point: To define the new line only those parties which actually hold power were invited, thereby dispensing with the purely ornamental concept of the Communist movement's universality. This exclusion of Communist parties from capitalist countries reflected the Kremlin's realistic view that the order of the day contained not revolutionary outbursts in capitalist countries, but an internal threat to the Communist system.

The slogan of the day was adjustment to new conditions. This was said without mincing matters in that part of the Declaration which dealt with criticisms of the "dogmatists." The main charge against them was their inability to understand and adjust to the changes that have taken place in the Communist countries and in the outside world. The Khrushchev team had already declared itself competent to carry out this operation with the necessary skill. They had released hundreds of thousands of inmates from the concentration camps, and claimed that henceforth legality would prevail and the internal life of the Party would be democratized. Thus the ruling class received freedom of personal life and greater participation in shaping the fate of the nation. The social basis of Communist power was strengthened, and the ties connecting the ruling class with the Party and its top team were tightened.

At the same time, ideological emphasis was transferred from the revolutionary apostolate to the state problems of the Soviet Union and imperial problems of the "socialist system." Behind the screen of the old pseudo-revolutionary phraseology, the new aims of Communism found

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a completely new formulation: the Marxist thesis that the history of *all* societies is the history of class struggle was replaced by the creed that "in our epoch the rivalry of two systems determines the development of the world." The concept of class struggle is good only "for export," not for the countries where class antagonisms were abolished by decree and where the Communist Party claims to represent the whole nation. The interests of the state and the "socialist" empire should link the entire Communist movement.

At this Conference one more important conclusion was drawn from the post-war experience: the Communist parties proved unable to carry out the social revolution. With their phraseology and adventurous behavior they frequently disturbed the policy of the Communist states; they therefore had to disguise their aspirations toward dictatorship and to play the role of defenders of democracy, the very democracy which for 40 years was the subject of their fiercest attacks and cheapest gibes. At the same time, as a testimony that the lesson of Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary was not forgotten, the leadership proclaimed that from now on the Soviet Union would not interfere with the internal affairs of the "People's Democracies."

This method of actual or apparent adjustment of Communism to existing conditions undoubtedly produced far reaching consequences. Legality cannot be applied only to a selected group of citizens; therefore the terrible fear and tormenting uncertainty about tomorrow's fate was diminished for all the citizens of countries under Soviet rule. The proclamation of the separate countries' right to a certain autonomy in their internal policy, although it was weakened by acceptance of the principle of strict bloc solidarity and the commanding role of the U.S.S.R, sanctioned Poland's elimination of too obvious signs of dependence and enabled it to maintain a tolerable retreat from compulsory rural collectivization. These are concessions which are of great importance for the future. However, they do not solve the growing contradictions in the internal and external relations of countries under Communist rule.

Certainly, in a country where the new ruling class has a strong stand, the class Party may be transformed into a general-national party. The bourgeoisie, after all, uses this method with success, although it does not possess such powerful means of maintaining its domination. Things look different, however, in countries where the new class did not reach the stage it did in the U.S.S.R. Thus "the great leap" in China cannot do without the cult of the leader and without putting people in barracks and labor camps in order to extort their strength. There, unmasking the Stalinist legend is a heresy threatening the whole system with collapse: decentralization leads directly to the decomposition of the multi-lingual and multi-tribal state.

Now what can be said about the vassalized countries on the western borders of the Soviet state? There, the Communist bureaucracy is only a thin top layer of a ruling elite which is receptive to the influences of its hostile environment. There, the main element stabilizing the ruling power is the international situation and the population's realization that it finds itself in a tragic confrontation with the power of the Soviet Union. A revolutionary mobilization of the masses was necessary to break with Stalinism in Poland and to transform this country into the "best barrack

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in the camp," as the saying runs in Warsaw. But even here the "revisionist" Gomulka seeks the support of the Stalinists, the last Mohicans of Communist orthodoxy. In other countries destalinization is retarded by all means at the disposal of the ruling power.

These contradictions appear not only in imperial relations, but also in the Soviet Union itself. Moves toward decentralization, material concessions in behalf of the population and increases in personal freedom arouse antagonisms within the ruling class. Conservatism always finds an echo among the numerous groups of people who wield power. What was the formation of the "anti-Party group," if not the expression of this desire to abandon the Party's readjustment to new conditions!

III

KHRUSHCHEV'S POLICY WAS AIMED at disarming the opposition, which exerted its pressure from below. Thus the reforms were combined with a declaration of war on "revisionism," encompassing under this name all the aspirations to *fundamental* change which appeared in Party circles. "The Party itself corrects its mistakes," became the slogan of this period.

Partial decentralization of the economy through the creation of local economic councils with a certain measure of autonomy emphatically does not mean accepting the principle of priority for the needs of the people over the needs of the state. The strengthening of the military potential with its ultra-modern sputnik track continues to be the basis of the economic plans. Genuine control of the economic leadership is just as nonexistent as before, for the control of a bureaucracy by a bureaucracy is a mockery.

The bureaucracy remains the all-powerful master of the entire state organization, and the decentralization widened the autonomous field of the ruling class even more, by allowing it sole power in determining labor conditions, salaries and wages of the urban population, as well as the earnings of the peasants. All the phenomena of bureaucracy which poison the life of the Communist countries remain in force: wastefulness embellished by paper triumphs is paramount; lack of competence is paired with stagnation in labor efficiency; time and again "bottlenecks" appear, caused by lack of coordination: the market suffers periodically from the lack of bare necessities. This list of phenomena resulting from central planning and the frantic ambition to direct all the details of production and distribution could be multiplied ad infinitum. And there is no way of eliminating this calamity without eliminating the system which gives total power over every aspect of the lives of the population into the hands of one ruling class. But this class grew up and exists thanks to this system; it must, therefore, defend it to the last. This defines the limitations of Khrushchev's reformism, which is the emanation of the ruling class. All the sources from which the opposition originates *remain in force* ipso facto.

The leadership of the Communist movement announced an ideological and organizational victory over the "revisionists." The method of "democratic centralism" again led millions of members onto the road of rigorous obedience. Even the publicists of the West are inclined to recognize the end of "revisionism." Indeed, as in every period of reaction after periods of enthusiastic exaltation and glowing visions of forthcom-

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ing changes, there was a cooling off, an apathy; the advocates of new things to come were not infrequently overwhelmed by despondency and doubt as to the strength of their ideas; the enthusiasts of yesterday became taciturn; they felt the bitterness of disappointment, and adjusted themselves to the difficult requirements of life. "Revisionism" became silent, hid behind the screen of personal opinions, so much so that increased party conservatism and the ruling team's appeal to public opinion made it imperative to give priority to preserving those changes which, after all, were carried out under the pressure of the opposition. But does this mean that "revisionism" was really smashed? One could think so only if revisionism represented a determined organizational center; if, however, it is an ideological current pervading the rank and file of the Party and the organizations connected with the Party, if it links a large portion of the Party with the population by a common evaluation of the situation and by a common vision of improvement, then the announcement of the end of revisionism is just as premature as were the trumpeted triumphs of the Czar after 1905.

The ruling team in the U.S.S.R. and its branches in the "Peoples' Democracies" have no such illusions. This is best evidenced by the unceasing anti-revisionist propaganda and the use of all means not to let an opposition from the left show on the surface. For they understand that it is a potential force, widespread among the masses, unassailable by the police, and camouflaged by a resigned obedience. When the sources are not eliminated, the streams flowing from them remain alive, but the Party leadership cannot go beyond its social basis and its eye and ear always will be directed to Party conservatism rather than to an opposition which is by its very nature democratic and socialist. This is particularly clear in the "people's democracies." Even in Poland the leadership clearly abandoned the October positions: Gomulka took advantage of the conquest of the Party apparatus to destroy labor self-government, the most important achievement of the opposition, drowning the workers' councils in the "self-government conferences" directed by the Party. Yugoslavia can realize its own roads of development, for it does not have to cling to Moscow's coattails, but elsewhere, the Party leadership does not dare to go its own way, not so much because of Soviet interference as out of fear of violating Soviet standards and thus undermining the dictatorship.

IV

ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM WAS A STAGE on the road to the destruction of absolutism. There were various stops on this road before the particular nations achieved one or another form of democracy. Where the ruling class's obstinacy prevailed over the need to adjust to new social forces, there was a revolutionary catastrophe. Where sharp internal contradictions were solved in good time, ruinous upheavals were usually avoided. Nowhere could social relations be frozen at the stage indicated by the authorities.

Communism lulled itself with the myth of a society without antagonistic contradictions. The myth vanished when the leadership was forced to recognize that it was threatened from two sides: "revisionism" and "dogmatic sectarianism." According to the official estimate, the first

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danger threatens the dictatorial power, the leading role of the Party or its monopoly in social life, and strikes at the "proletarian internationalism" which is synonymous with the leadership of the Soviet Union in the "Socialist system." The second aspires to the return of Stalinist conditions, and Mikoyan in his speech at the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not hesitate to say that "if the anti-Party group triumphed, it would apply the methods of repression which the Party can never forget" to all the active followers of the XX Congress.

It is difficult to find a more antagonistic contradiction than that between a current which undermines the very foundations of the Communist regime, and concentrated forces which threaten to behead the present leaders of the Party and of the state. This is probably the most important of the changes that took place: instead of a Party monolith personified in an infallible leadership, the leadership of the Party and of the state are tacking between opposite winds. It is possible to have alternate victories over the one or the other side, but each victory over the "revisionists" strengthens the conservatives and each blow inflicted upon the conservatives strengthens the forces of the fundamental opposition. Such is the logic of each centrist government: the tensions grow and blow up the barricades which preserve the *status quo* desired by the authorities.

In order to answer the question of what might and should be the next stage of development, it is necessary to begin from an analysis of the events of 1956; for at that time both the forces aspiring to fundamental changes and the main outlines of these changes appeared. Let us recollect the most important facts: 1) the initiative of the riots came from the younger generation in the Communist Party; 2) this initiative immediately found a mass support from labor and intellectual youth, mostly organized in unions affiliated with the Party; 3) the working class became the main force of the uprising; 4) the social strata and ideological currents which aspired to the restitution of the old order did not come to the fore.

Each of these facts is important. The outbreak was the work of an inner-Party opposition with strong internal differences, united by the common aspiration to change the Party leadership. Its attack was directed against the Stalinists (Nationalists in Poland, Rakosy's group in Hungary), who were corrupt and arrogant, and humble executors of all orders coming from Moscow. The unification of this ideologically multicolored opposition was made easier by the existence of sharp frictions at the Party top, while success was assured by the widespread anti-Russian and anti-Party mood. This opposition, however, did not intend to violate the power of the Party, thinking that a change of leadership would lead to a change of the system of government. Thus, during the first phase of the upheaval, when demonstrating against Soviet interference, the crowds in Warsaw shouted: "Gomulka to power!" And similarly in Budapest: "Power to Nagy, the courageous and good Communist!" Meanwhile, in the German Democratic Republic, Harich wrote memos about the improvement of the Party and deposited them in the office of the Central Committee and . . . in the Soviet embassy.

This phase ended when the working class entered the stage. The workers gave social and economic substance to the desired personal

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changes (all shouted: "Gomulka—hundred years!"), in a revolutionary way degrading the Party from its monopolistic positions and creating direct representation of the working class in the form of freely elected Workers' Councils. These Councils were constituted as organs of labor's self-government in the plants and factories. Factory directors who were conspicuous by their servility toward the regime were often carried away on wheel-barrows, as in the old days. The Workers' Councils were supposed to become the basis of a socialized economy in contrast to a bureaucratic economy. The palace revolution was transformed into a social revolution.

Thus the lie was given to the official Communist propaganda frightening the workers with an inevitable capitalist counter-revolution if the power of the Party were shaken. The masses did not fight public ownership of the means of production. They fought only its utilization for the preservation of dictatorship, the power of the Party, and a state bureaucracy covered with privileges and being transformed into a new parasitical ruling class. The power of the Party lay in the street; it was picked up by the workers, faithful to the socialist ideals of social and economic democracy.

It could not be otherwise when the main force turned out to be the working class. It could not be otherwise when the transformation in social relations led to the proletarianization of the immense majority of the population and destroyed the bourgeoisie and the big rural estate owners. That's why the latter were absent at the mass scenes where the will of the population was manifested; that's why the main force of the future turned out to be the working class, conferring its social and political character upon the upheaval of 1956.

The post-October reaction restrained the realization of the aspirations of the working masses, destroyed several of its achievements, and killed the hopes of the internal opposition concerning the effectiveness of personal changes in the hierarchy. It became clear to everybody that as long as there is no change in the character of the Party, as possessor of an organizational and ideological monopoly, the new team, regardless of its personnel, will always be inclined, not so much to submissiveness toward Moscow, as to a compulsive sticking to Moscow's coat-tails, because that is the only guarantee of remaining in office and preserving the privileges of the ruling class. This was demonstrated even by the rebellious team of Gomulka, which could have preserved the workers' self-government that would have opened the road to a genuine socialization of production; if it could make a break with collectivization, it could just as well have defended the Workers' Councils. But Gomulka was afraid of an automonous working class, for it is the soul of any fundamental change.

Opposition in the Party drew the necessary conclusions from these institutional changes. Lezek Kolakowski formulated it clearly in his interview with the editors of the Workers' Agency in Warsaw at the beginning of 1957 (the interview was published in "Zycie Warszawy.") Characterizing the struggle of two trends within the Party, a conservative trend with Stalinist features, and a democratic trend concerned with the realization of the socialist ideal, Kolakowski pointed out that the second trend is characterized by "seeking ways to institutional safeguards

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of democratic forms of life; the conviction that the political apparatus if it is not under the permanent organized control of the community, always open to criticism and changes, inexorably degenerates by force of its own mechanism into a despotic and autocratic power which does not care either for the voice of public opinion or for the needs of the community; that economic democracy is threatened with rotting if it does not go hand in hand with political democracy; that under the conditions of nationalization of the means of production, it is necessary to fight for their socialization; that freedom of discussion is necessary for all the ideological currents which stand on the ground of socialism . . ." At the end of this extensive characterization of the democratic opposition, Kolakowski asserted:

> The sovereignty of Poland did not cease to be a vital problem; the opposition of socialist democracy to bourgeois democracy is obnoxious nonsense, for the problem is not to liquidate the achievements of bourgeois democracy, but to widen them through a system which would eliminate its fictitious elements resulting from social inequality . . .

This conception of the problems which were left to be solved after the spontaneous outbreaks of 1956 creates a platform on which all the forces of democracy can meet in one democratic and socialist oppositional trend. This is the testament of the turning-point period which became a beacon for living thought in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There remains, however, one important task of which the oppositional currents are still unaware. It is the need to forge the experiences of October into a clear program of demands, formulating the general ideology into a concrete series of tasks to be accomplished and aims to be achieved. This gap was filled to a certain extent by the Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe, which, after several studies of separate problems concerning the life of the countries of this area, published an outline program and called it "The Socialist Alternative." Judging from the first echos of the discussion and criticism of this document it may be assumed that by giving concrete shape to the problems of eliminating the totalitarian and monopolistic degenerations of Communism, the "Socialist Alternative" will become a serious factor in concentrating democratic opinion in the Communist countries.

Nobody can foresee when and under what circumstances the way will open for the transition to a new stage of development. However, two assumptions appear certain: the balance of power achieved by the Communist "enlightened despotism" is not permanent; the reach and essence of the next stage will be defined to a large extent by the degree of maturity of the democratic opposition.

Translated from the Polish by B. Wald.

ZYGMUNT ZAREMBA *is a long-time Polish socialist, now living in France. He was a socialist member of the Polish Parliament between the two World Wars, as well as a prominent trade unionist. He is a leader of the Polish Socialist Party in Exile and an Editor of the Party's publication,* Swiat.

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Albert Fried

Sidney Hook and The Bill of Rights

SIDNEY HOOK IS A COMBATIVE man who impales his opponents on the shaft of logic. The wonderful thing about logic is that you can do anything you want with it as long as you remain self-consistent. In his latest work, *The Paradoxes of Freedom*, Hook directs a lethal syllogism at Justices Black and Douglas for holding the "absolutist" view that no law may violate the express provisions of the Bill of Rights. The syllogism goes: Black and Douglas have acted in such and such a way; to act in such and such a way is to be an absolutist; Black and Douglas are absolutists. Hook has neatly impaled them.

In Hook's vocabulary the charge of absolutism is a serious one. He writes: "Insofar as psychological and historical evidence about attitudes is relevant, it shows that the stronger the attitude of absolutism, the more likely is it to be associated with fanaticism, intolerance, and reckless disregard of the consequences and costs of action." Hook never defines how strong this "attitude of absolutism" is in Black and Douglas, but he leaves no doubt that they are fanatical and intolerant in holding aloft the Bill of Rights as unalterable truths.

Against their attitude Hook contrasts the supple, open-minded, pragmatic attitude, one that is always open to change and to new ideas. To Hook a pragmatic attitude on civil liberties means that Congress may interpret the Bill of Rights as freely as the Court, that the good in civil liberties must be squared with other competing goods, and that the Bill of Rights, in a word, should not prevent the people from exercising their creative intelligence in responding to new situations. This might all be very well, but what has Hook done? By a deft turn of logic he has placed the conflict on grounds that could only be prejudicial to his opponents. For the conflict is not over pragmatic and absolutist attitudes but over why Hook sees nothing wrong in qualifying the Bill of Rights and why they see nothing right in it.

Hook agrees with the civil libertarians in granting that the Bill of Rights occupies a privileged position in American life. The Bill of Rights, in his own words, underlies "the whole structure of freedom which constitutes self-government and the democratic way of life. These are the reasons," he goes on to say, "why the Bill of Rights and certain other constitutional provisions have a prima facie validity over all other apparently justified claims in situations of conflict." But Hook never explains why the Bill of Right *should* have this privileged status. How does it apply in day-to-day "pragmatic" situations? The law is even more paradoxical than Hook thinks.

For as long as men have lived in civilized society they have projected an ideal condition of life. Their curse is always in falling short of this ideal or in suffering at the hands of those who misuse it; great crimes have been committed in the name of the highest ideals. It goes without saying that every ideal body of laws, say the Ten Commandments or the Bill of Rights, is at once *in* and *separate* from society. It is in advance of the society whose acts it regulates. Such a body of laws transcends its pragmatic use. Had the Bill of Rights not played much more than a "strategic role," as Hook puts it, it would have disappeared a long time ago.

This is another way of saying that men collectively regulate their actions by some larger conception of what they ought to be as persons. The Bill of Rights embodies America's projected ideal of itself. It implicitly declares that physical power shall not reach into the private lives of the people, nor interfere with the due processes by which they enact law, but shall be

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confined to preserving order and peace. The Bill of Rights is that law which insures that all other laws will respect the private lives and hence the public freedom of each person who is subject to them. It is America's noblest affirmation of the dignity of men.

Perhaps Black and Douglas are excessively zealous in demanding that our actions should correspond to this affirmation. But Hook is excessively indulgent to violations of the norm which he himself accepts as "prima facie." He thinks it illogical to assume that because the Bill of Rights is violated a little it will be violated a lot and then destroyed altogether. But then, we must ask, how far may it be violated without turning into something else, without *our* turning into something else? Hook is of little help on this crucially important point. He writes:

> The risks and losses of abridgement are always there. . . . The abridgment is an incipient tendency which, if unchecked, *may* result in our hurtling down the slope. Every specific act contains the germ of a habit. But our very *awareness* that we have stopped on a slope is a brake on our precipitous descent. Once we venture, as we sometimes must, on a dangerous course which may lead to our salvation in a particular situation but which may also be the beginning of our path to perdition, the only answer we can give to the question: "Where will you stop?" is *"Wherever our intelligence tells us to stop."*

The "slippery slope" is a useful simile. At what point should we stop on the slope? Do we stay there? In what direction do we proceed? Hook leaves us stranded. Consider his answer to where we should stop: "Wherever our intelligence tells us to stop." Hook raises intelligence itself to a value—in fact to the highest of all values. "Intelligence alone," he claims, "is an absolute value because, as distinct from love, kindness, knowledge, courage, freedom and every other value which is a constituent of the good life, intelligence alone is the judge of its own limitations." But then how is this judgment to be judged? Hook's absolute of intelligence leads to an infinite regression: intelligence becomes the judge of the judge of the judge . . . of its own limitations. This is hardly the end to which love, freedom, and every other "constituent of the good life" should be subordinated.

No matter what *the* absolute is, the Bill of Rights remains that absolute by which all public acts are to be judged. Black and Douglas insist on this. By their insistence on maintaining this high standard they confront the legislatures of the country, which are eager to pass laws restricting civil liberty, with a profound question. What should be done with the Bill of Rights? Certainly such laws are not passed in its name; and they have got to be justified by some standard other than Hook's "intelligence," which can justify anything. Black is perfectly right in saying that "there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by men who knew what the words meant . . ."

To read Hook expose the absolutism, so-called, of Black and Douglas, one would think he was referring to two very legalistic political conservatives. One would have no idea that these men, New Dealers in their economic and social philosophies, have always favored broad government intervention and activity. Who could Hook be referring to when he accuses "absolutists" of opposing "state power"? Certainly Black and Douglas would agree with his assertion—intended as a criticism of them—that "the state must exercise, not restrain, its power to prevent pauperization and social degradation of its citizens—evils which if unchecked are likely to erode its free political institutions." Clearly, Black and Douglas have never objected to this kind of state power but only to that state power which interferes with civil liberty.

In other words, the Bill of Rights, strictly interpreted, defends men rather

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than property. There was a time when the Bill of Rights, in particular the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, defended property against men. Since the New Deal, the Court has come to distinguish between restrictions of state power over economic affairs and restrictions of state power over civil liberties. Black and Douglas believe that the government may or should interfere with the economic power of the few in order to enlarge the economic freedom of the majority, but that it may not interfere with the freedom of speech, press and assembly of anyone. In acting on this belief, they affirm the liberal ethic of subordinating property rights to human rights. Men who lose property through taxation are not prevented from exercising their other rights as citizens; by exercising those rights they might even hope to restore their privileges. But men who lose their political rights to the slightest degree find all their other freedoms in jeopardy. In criticizing Black and Douglas, Hook completely overlooks this distinction. Their strict interpretation of the Bill of Rights does not limit state power as such; it limits state power when used for illiberal ends—ends which thwart rather than encourage the realization of maximum possibilities for the greatest number of persons.

Civil libertarians such as Black and Douglas think it is of capital importance, in realizing liberal ends, that sharp distinctions should be made in public life between overt acts and the ideas or intentions which lead to them. The First Amendment protects the autonomy of ideas and the intentions they embody. It recognizes the tremendous power of ideas in bringing men together and in producing action. In very few societies in history have ideas been free to circulate and intentions been allowed to become public under the mandate of law itself. Now this involves considerable risk, since words, intentions and actions are inseparable, though distinct. Their inseparability, however, enables Hook to observe that:

> words trigger actions when they they function as signals in situations in which human emotions have been keyed to the point of ready discharge. They play the same if a slightly delayed function when they are integral elements in the pattern of guided behavior. That is why and how ideas count in the material world. When they count in specified historical situations in such fashion as to incite, threaten, or create violence, they have no constitutional protection.

This is pure sophistry. What Hook omits to say is whether the author of words which *eventually may* lead to violent actions should be held responsible, assuming that the action takes place. Moreover, how and by whom is such a responsibility to be ascribed? It goes without saying that the Bill of Rights is suspended in the moment of violence. The whole Constitution assumes that order prevails in society, that men have time to deliberate before acting and that there is reasonable predictability in their actions. The series of examples Hook gives in *The Paradoxes of Freedom* prove nothing: a lynching scene, a riot, the ululations of a Caspar and a Rockwell. Obviously, their words become dangerous only when a violent situation is at hand. In any event, even inciters of violence have constitutional protection. The Constitution is in force as soon as the violence ends. The police are then held accountable for their actions against the alleged inciters.

The main point is that a free society must continually try to distinguish words and intentions from public actions. Hook tells us that "Scientific psychology, as well as contemporary philosophy of mind, reinforces the conclusion that whatever legal distinctions we make between 'advocacy' and 'incitement,' in practice the distinction is fundamental." But the "legal distinction" is everything. Philosophers and social scientists do not send men to prison or to the execution chamber. Only representatives of the state may legally do so. For

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just this reason the state must take scrupulous care under the Bill of Rights to locate the exact *wrong* that has been committed. Social scientists and philosophers, it may be added, have also questioned the existence of freedom, a question that could have been asked only by those who never lost it.

IT IS NOT TRUE, as Hook maintains, that those "ideas count in the material world" which "trigger action . . . in situations in which human emotions have been keyed to the point of discharge." These are not the ideas that count. These are not the ideas against which laws are made. The power of words comes not from incendiaries but generally from men who are remote in time and place from the scene of action. Effective action depends on the depth of meaning of ideas and hence on the time spent assimilating them. Those men are truly potent, or dangerous, who repeatedly assemble to think about and work out programs of social action. But then how far back into the interior of words and intentions should governments go to anticipate or punish the overt act? Hook does not say. Black and Douglas, by demanding rigorous proof of culpability in the overt act itself, may be too lenient with the likes of Caspar and Rockwell. But the price society pays for letting them speak even in potentially violent situations is small when compared to the price it would have to pay if the police, or bureaucrats of one sort or another were allowed free rein within the law to decide on the subtle connection between words and action.

Today policemen and bureaucrats have more of this freedom than they have ever had before. The Smith Act and the Internal Security Act enable the state to ascribe bad intentions rather than bad actions to groups which it wishes to prosecute. Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" formula, though vague enough in itself, has given way, since the famous Dennis decision of 1952, to an infinitely vaguer one; now the clear and present intention to possibly commit a dangerous act may be enough to establish guilt. The formula has become entirely capricious. That is why the Court since then has backtracked to a stricter defense of civil liberties. It has done so out of self-defense. For when it allows intentions to replace actions as the basis of determining guilt, the Court to just that degree abdicates its independence. It opens a hole in the legal process which policemen and bureaucrats are only too eager to fill. In the unhappy days of the Truman Court, Black and Douglas stood alone. They have since been joined by Justices Warren and Brennan. It remains to be seen whether these four will be joined by either of Kennedy's recent appointees to make up a majority.

IT IS TRUE ENOUGH that the Bill of Rights is a frail reed when the nation's security is threatened. The question is whether there is now a threat to the nation's security which requires even a slight abridgment of its freedoms. Obviously, Black and Douglas do not think that there is such a threat while Hook does. Accordingly, each side would take different risks. To Black and Douglas the good of freedom is worth the risk of insecurity. To Hook the good of security is worth the risk of unfreedom. Neither, it goes without saying, favors one to the total exclusion of the other. It is

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a question of whose response is the more correct one. It is not a question of absolutism or pragmatism.

Is there some objective criterion for judging which response is correct? Is there in fact a threat to the United States which warrants diluting the freedoms in the Bill of Rights? Hook has maintained that the Communist Party is engaged in a conspiracy to forcibly overthrow the government. The important proofs of this "conspiracy" are the violent revolutions which Communists have made and the acts of espionage which they have committed in Russia's behalf. But where Communists overthrew governments they were aided either by Russia's physical presence, as in Eastern Europe, or by the utter absence of groups and institutions capable of thwarting them, as in China and Cuba. Neither condition obtains or has obtained in the United States. The incidence of espionage has been met by laws designed for the purpose, even though the punishments have been grotesquely cruel. Britain's Communist spies—Klaus Fuchs, Allen Nunn May and Bruno Pontecorvo, to mention the most infamous—committed more serious acts of espionage than did America's, yet Parliament, unlike Congress, has never thought of branding the Communist Party a conspiracy and so denying it the rights of other parties.

Is it conceivable that any civil liberties should be abridged to counter the "threat" from the pathetic band of defeated men who make up the Communist Party in America? Black and Douglas, far from being "absolutists," have all along proved to be sensible and realistic. They have understood that now more than ever the freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, undiminished by expediency, are America's best hope.

ALBERT FRIED, *an Editor of* NEW POLITICS, *has just completed editing a volume of Thomas Jefferson's collected writings that will be published this Spring by Collier Books.*

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Paul Barton

Role of the State In Russian Trade Unions



When a so-called Communist regime comes into existence it transforms the trade unions from organs of the workers into tools of the state. They simply become executive bodies of the Communist, or state, Party.

As early as January 1918, the First National Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions proclaimed that they "should work in co-ordination with, and subordination to, other bodies."[1] Two years later, the Ninth Communist Party Congress decreed that "there can be no question of the trade union organs opposing the organs of Soviet power."[2] And it charged the unions to make themselves into "auxiliary organs" of the state, adding *a ne na oborot* ("but not vice versa");[3] in other words, they were forbidden to try to exert any kind of influence in the state.

The state has many means of controlling the unions, apart from the Communist Party's infiltration and guidance practices. It uses a variety of government bodies for this purpose, from the National Bank to the secret police. Check is kept on the unions' staffs as well as on their financial administrations and their policies.

The union organizations are not free to hire their staffs as they see fit. The persistent interference by Party secretaries and the secret police in the selection of people is not the only hindrance that they have to put up with. As in the case of the authorities and the nationalized industries, the whole set-up of the unions' staff is regulated by government instructions, which specify the number of employees allowed, their respective functions and their pay.[4]

The status of union officials is very much the same as that of civil servants. This applies partly to their rights: for example, the union employees who inspect work conditions may impose fines. But it is, above all, a question of their duties.

In the USSR union officials are liable to the financial penalties and to the sentences of deprivation of liberty prescribed in the Criminal Code for civil servants judged guilty of abusing, or failing to use, their authority.[5]

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In Czechoslovakia, for instance, a secretary of the Ostrava Trade Union Council was sentenced on July 20, 1952 to three months conditional imprisonment for having carried out his duties carelessly. It should be pointed out that this carelessness had not harmed the workers at all. He was charged with having failed to prevent the giving of bonuses to workers whose output was not large enough to justify it.[6]

A book sponsored by the Academy of Science does indeed claim that this provision has lost its significance and that the "need for its application has gone."[7] But it is still in force and similar provisions have been included in the legislation of the satellite states; they are by no means purely theoretical.

In Poland, the criminal tribunal of the Supreme Court issued the following decree: "The criminal liability prescribed by civil servants in chapter XLI of the Criminal Code covers officials of the unions and of the union federation." This decision was motivated as follows: "First, the unions and their federation tend to evolve into public institutions; second, the opinion according to which they have already become such institutions cannot be rejected."[8]

The Yugoslav Criminal Code also provides that the term "persons in office," as used in the chapter on Criminal Offenses against Official Duty, covers, besides the state official and the elected person, the "official of an enterprise or institution of social organization";[9] the category "social organization" includes, among other things, the trade unions.

THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION of the unions is also systematically controlled by government departments; this makes the work of the commissions of auditors appointed by the union congresses quite pointless. In fact, since union funds come under the heading of "public property" or "socialist property"[10]—that is, under the same heading as the property of the state, of the kolkhozes, etc.—the financial administration of the unions is subject to the same controls as that of the state institutions or of the nationalized industries in the following manner:

1) *Control by the State Bank.*—Regulations concerning cash operations, such as the Bulgarian decree of October 23, 1951,[11] oblige the unions to deposit all their ready cash in the National Bank. Of the money they receive, they may spend directly only the sums needed for immediate purposes, and the amount of even these sums is fixed by the competent branch of the National Bank. This branch also checks the cash accounts every month. In Czechoslovakia, every union organization must keep the following rules: have a current account at a branch of the State Bank; submit its budget plans to this branch; abstain from any operation that does not figure on the budget plan; carry out all its financial operations through the State Bank; deposit daily in the bank any cash on hand exceeding the sum of 10 crowns ($1.50 approximately); when withdrawing money from the current account, specify how it is to be spent within the framework of the approved budget plan.[12] Similar regulations are in force in the Soviet Union.[13]

2) *Supervision by the Ministry of State Control.*—This ministry (whose functions in some countries are carried out by a commission of the same name) is endowed with extremely wide powers to enforce the application of government decisions by all the ministries, authorities, enterprises,

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institutions and organizations, including the unions. The control of the financial administration is also within its competence. Thus it is charged with watching over the protection of public property—in this case the trade union funds—recording all the material and financial resources, seeing that they are used economically, etc.[14] It has the right to check all plans for expenditure, orders and bills, to examine the work that has occasioned the expenses, etc.[15] It is not limited only to inspecting. It can give all kinds of orders and, with the government's authorization, it may impose administrative sanctions.[16]

3) *Control of wage-funds and administrative expenses.*—Like every other institution, the unions must keep an annual record of their paid staff, of their wage bill and of credits that have been allocated to them for administrative expenses.[17]

THUS, SUPERVISION OF THE UNIONS' finances by government departments is many sided and all-inclusive. The political implications of this fact are immense. They become obvious if one tries to imagine this extraordinary organization that bears the trade unions' name, in a situation which for a genuine union would be fairly commonplace: the unions decide to go on strike, and to set up a fund for this purpose. In such a case, the unions of the so-called Communist countries would have to ask the National Bank, which holds all their ready cash, for permission for this outlay, since it did not appear on their budget plan; if the permission were granted, the unions would then send out to the strikers checks payable at a branch of the National Bank. Consequently, the employer-state would be the enemy against whom the strike is called, the banker who supplies the strike with the necessary funds and the agent who sees that these funds are promptly handed over. But there is no chance of this absurd situation arising. These unions do not protect the interests of the workers against the boss, but those of the employer-state against the workers; when a strike does break out, it is not they who lead it; their job is to suppress it and to "unmask the ring-leaders."

But all these arrangements cannot be explained simply by the general orientation of the pseudo-unions. It must also be borne in mind that they are a subsidised organization. This is, of course, rarely mentioned in public. In October 1925, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party admitted implicitly that the unions were subsidised out of state funds by telling them to take the steps necessary to be able to do without these subsidies in the future.[18] Twenty-five years later, a still greater slip was made in China, where the law concerning the trade unions, promulgated by the government on June 29, 1950, mentioned the subsidies given by the public administration and by enterprises among the sources of union funds. Article 24 reads as follows:

> Trade union funds shall be drawn from the following sources:
>
> (a) Membership dues by trade union members in accordance with the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Labor;
>
> (b) The management or the owners of factories, mines, business establishments, farms, institutions, schools and other productive or administrative units shall each month allocate to their respective trade union organizations, as trade union funds, a sum equal to two per cent of the total amount of the real wages (including those paid in currency, in kind and

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in meals) of all workers and staff members employed (excluding agents of the owners in private enterprises). Of this sum, an amount equal to 1.5 per cent of the total amount of real wages shall be used for the purpose of promoting cultural and educational activities for the workers and staff members;

(c) Income from cultural and sports activities sponsored by the trade unions;

(d) Subsidies from the people's governments at various levels.[19]

In 1958, the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the rights of the shop and factory or local union committees, promulgated on July 15, provided that all equipment and grounds belonging to enterprises and meant for cultural and athletic activities of the personnel should be placed free of charge at the disposal of the union committee, which would organize their use, while the enterprise would pay for their upkeep and for the equipment.[20] The following spring, the President told the Twelfth Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions that a decision had meanwhile been taken to extend the resources thus allocated to the unions by the works managements:

> According to the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 15th, 1958, the upkeep of all cultural equipment was laid to the charge of the economic organs. This contributes to the consolidation and extension of the basis on which the work of education is carried out. Moreover, the Council of Ministers has recently adopted, on the request of the Central Council of the Trade Unions of the USSR, an order concerning the financial resources which are to be placed at the disposal of the trade unions by the economic organs for the work of mass culture and physical culture. The unions are expected to make a sensible use of these resources in order to improve the mass-culture work among the workers and employees.[27]

It must be added that the "mass-culture work," henceforth openly financed by the factory managements, includes among other things the diffusion of Party slogans, propaganda against workers' demands ("fight against survivals from the past in the mentality of the people"), the fight against infractions of labor discipline, the activity of "Comrades' courts" responsible for the suppression of such infractions, the psychological preparation for the revision of output norms, etc.

There are still other indications, apart from occasional slips of the tongue, that unions are subsidized by the government and by the factories whose workers they organize. For instance, the gaps in the reports on the financial administration are eloquent in their way. Thus the financial report presented in March 1959, to the Twelfth Congress of the Russian unions did not so much as mention the source of the money that the unions were spending.[22] The report made by the commission of auditors to the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak unions in May 1959,[23] was not even published.

Government departments also keep check on the decisions of all the union bodies, as well as on the way they are carried out. Here, again, it is the Ministry (or commission) of State Control that plays the principal part; in fulfilling its duty of supervising and enforcing the application of government decisions, it does not merely audit the accounts and check the finances. Its job is to supervise every aspect of every ac-

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tivity and to see that all is done in accordance with government policy. For instance, Czechoslovak legislation authorized the organs of the Ministry of State Control to enter the premises of the organization that they intended to inspect at "any hour of the day or night," to examine the documents, to demand explanations, to give orders to those in charge, etc.[24] In Poland the corresponding legislation gave the same ministry the right to have its officials take part in union debates and meetings, authorized them to take the floor at these meetings and charged them to report to the ministry on every meeting they attended.[25]

Union decisions and activities are at the same time supervised by the state prosecutor's office. It should be added that in the Communist states the functions of the public prosecutor are essentially different from those in other countries. Far from merely carrying out his duties in connection with the courts, the public prosecutor is one of the cornerstones of the whole life of the state and, indeed, of society. This is an heritage of Czarist despotism. When he created the office of state prosecutor in 1722 in order to submit all the activities of the public administration to a centralized control, Peter the Great decreed that "he who fills this post is as it were our eye and represents the state." The public prosecutor remained until the end of the autocracy a general agent of the police state. The Soviet power took up this tradition in 1923.[26] And it immediately extended the powers of the state prosecutor. In the very same year his office was instructed to supervise the observance of law in the activities not only of the public administration, but also of enterprises, social associations (including the unions) and individual citizens.[27] After the creation of the satellite states, the same institution was gradually transplanted there.

In order to follow union activities closely, the state prosecutor's agents have the right to see all the circulars, instructions, resolutions and other documents issuing from any union body. They can ask the officers for explanations, inspect the union offices and order leading union bodies to investigate any aspect of the activity of subordinate bodies. When they think they have discovered a breach of law, they lodge a "protest" either with the body concerned or with a superior one. The body in question must examine the protest within ten days and inform the prosecutor from whom it came of the decisions made to deal with it. Moreover, the prosecutor can demand that appropriate steps should be taken to eliminate the causes of such a breach of law; the union body concerned must in that case carry out the orders within one month. Independently of this, the prosecutor may initiate legal proceedings against the person responsible for the breach he has discovered.[28]

IN THE APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENT control of the unions, the secret police has a place apart. It does not only supervise them from the outside. On the contrary, it infiltrates them as systematically as the Communist Party, it raises a great number of its agents to responsible positions in the unions, it takes possession of the means of communication between union committees at different levels, etc., to such an extent that it is possible to speak of a real symbiosis of the unions and the secret police.

This is another characteristic that the Soviet system has inherited from the Czarist autocracy. The police unions were, in fact, created by

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Count Vyacheslav Ivanovich von Plehve, Nicholas II's Minister for the Interior, by General Trepov, governor of Moscow, by Sergei Vassilievich Zubatov, a high official of the Okhrana (secret police), and by the priest Gapon.

From 1901 onwards, countless workers' organizations, heavily infiltrated and managed by secret agents, were founded first in Moscow, then in many industrial centers and in St. Petersburg. Their object was to make the working class one of the props of Czarism. The pseudo-unions were to use all kinds of methods, cleverly combined, to attain this end. They were to discuss economic and cultural questions, to make proposals concerning wages and work conditions, draw up programs of social legislation, provide organized leisure for the workers, fight drunkenness, propagate patriotic and religious ideas as well as a "reasonable view of the rights and duties of workers." But they were also to discredit genuine revolutionary movements: on the one hand, to show the workers that it is the "legal way" that pays and, on the other hand, to make it easier for the Okhrana to establish confidential contacts with the representatives of secret organizations, to implant *agents provocateurs* and incite them to actions which would bring down repression upon them.[29]

This first attempt failed. In proportion as they grew, the workers' organizations escaped from the Okhrana control. By an irony of history, they even provided the revolutionary wave which shook the Russian empire in 1905 with considerable organizational elements. But the lesson was not wasted. On March 18, 1921 Felix Dzerrhinsky, chief of the Cheka or Vecheka (Soviet secret police) wrote to one of his collaborators as follows:

> In order to incite the workers to work in the Cheka, and so that we may help the workers, I consider that it would be very useful to create chekist groups in connection with the leadership, let us say groups of three members (two appointed by them with our consent and one by us). The tasks of this group of three: to fight against the abuses noted by the union. Our candidate must be highly qualified, have tact, and not act thoughtlessly. Your opinion? Is it possible to make the experiment in a union? I have spoken to Kutuzov,[30] he agrees and says there are people at his place. Try it.[31]

It was probably this order that launched the infiltration of the secret police into the trade unions.

The symbiosis of the two organizations was for a long time unprovable, though well known to the workers. The documents that regulate the activity of the secret police are obviously not made public. Even the one we have just quoted was published only very recently, as of historical interest. But the party archives captured in Smolensk by German troops in 1941, lifted a corner of the veil covering this aspect of the state unionism.

The Smolensk archive for 1927 contains a list of secret topics, drawn up by the Special Sections of the OGPU (secret police) for the guidance of those who handled correspondence in the trade union organization.[32]

This list covers just about all topics with which the unions were dealing at the time when the list was drawn up, and a number of others, such as the mobilization plans, the coded or decoded correspondence, the

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guidance of individuals abroad, the administrative banishment and exile, the civil aviation flights, the issuing of visas by a special procedure, the collecting of investigation materials, which, to say the least of it, seem unusual items to come into the province of the trade unions. Now the secret police instructions specify that "The typist or copyist who types the secret correspondence and the person who delivers the secret correspondence is placed on the rolls of the OGPU." That is as much as to say that a large proportion of the office staff employed by the trade unions must be composed of secret agents.

It is not, however, merely a question of the technical personnel. As far as one can see, the union secretaries themselves come under another provision of the same regulation. This provides that "no employee (including a Party member) can be allowed to work on or to handle secret correspondence without the preliminary sanction of the local division of the OGPU, to which, as a prerequisite to permission, the personal questionnaire of the employee is sent, with the attachment of two recommendations from Party members, a photographic card, and a signed statement that he will not reveal the secrets which may be made known to him."

A union secretary who refused to submit to the secret police in this way, or who failed to obtain its approval, would therefore have no access to information about discontent among the workers, about Party instructions to the unions (even though he were a Party member), about the transfer of union officers, about the moods among the unemployed, about violations of trade union democracy both within the unions themselves and from the outside, about debatable problems which have not yet been settled by the authorities, about the wasting of union funds, about the wage scales and production norms under discussion, about spontaneous strikes, about the decline in productivity, etc. The sphere of action left to him would be insignificant. The union secretariats can function only if they are riddled with agents of the secret police.

The picture of the penetration of the secret police into the trade unions is not yet complete. Communications between union organs at the different levels play as important a part in union life as the internal functioning of each individual organ; this is especially the case in an organization as centralized as the unions in the Communist countries. The secret police controls most of these communications. The instructions quoted above specify that "secret correspondence," i.e., correspondence dealing with any one of the topics listed, should be dispatched from town to town exclusively through the field communications of the secret police. In other words, except for personal visits made by union officials, and for correspondence relating to matters of no importance, the contacts between various union organs are in the hands of the secret police.

THERE IS NO REASON to be particularly indignant about the state of dependence in which the unions of the so-called Communist world are kept by the state, and about the strict control to which they are subjected by a whole series of government departments, from the National Bank to the secret police. Such a state of affairs would indeed be revolting in the case of genuine unions. But the case here is different. What these countries call trade unions are in fact a state institution. So it is logical that

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they should be treated in the same way as all the other institutions of the totalitarian state: the ministries, the industrial enterprises, kolkhozes, the so-called Soviets of Workers' Deputies, etc.

FOOTNOTES

1 Cf. Isaac Deutscher: *Soviet Trade Unions*, London 1950, p. 23.
2 *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of the Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee*, Moscow 1953, vol. I, p. 490 (in Russian).
3 *Ibid.*, p. 491.
4 S. S. Studenikin, V. A. Vlassov and I. I. Evtikhiev: *Soviet Administrative Law*, Moscow 1950, p. 121 (in Russian).
5 Art. 109, observation 2, of the *Criminal Code of the Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of Russia.*
6 *Rude Pravo*, Prague, July 22nd and 26th 1952; cf. Paul Barton and Alber Weil: *Salariat et contrainte en Tchécoslovaquie*, Paris 1956, pp. 33–34.
7 V. F. Kirichenko: *Responsibility for Breaches of Service-Duties in Soviet Criminal Law*, Moscow 1956, pp. 50–51 (in Russian).
8 *Collection of the Decisions of the Supreme Court*, Warsaw, 1948, No. 4 (in Polish).
9 Art. 99, paragraph 1, *The New Yugoslav Criminal Code*, Beograd (sic) 1951 (in English).
10 *Collection of the Decisions of Czechoslovak Courts*, Prague, 1953, No. 7 (in Czech).
11 *Gazette of the Presidium of the National Assembly*, Sofia, 1952, No. 2 (in Bulgarian).
12 *Uredni List*, Prague, 1953, No. 158, and 1954, No. 156.
13 *Sobranie postanovlenii i rasporiazhenii SSSR*, Moscow, 1949, No. 2.
14 *Magyar Közlöny*, Budapest, 1955, p. 558.
15 S. S. Studenikin, V. A. Vlassov and I. I. Evtikhiev: *op. cit.*, pp. 201–202.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 202.
17 *Gazette of the Presidium of the National Assembly*, Sofia, 1952, No. 106 (in Bulgarian).
18 *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Trade Unions*, Moscow 1957, p. 194 (in Russian).
19 *The Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China*, Peking 1950, p. 12 (in English).
20 *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, Moscow 1958, No. 15 (art. 16).
21 *Trud*, Moscow, March 24th, 1959.
22 *Trud*, Moscow, March 25th, 1959.
23 *Prace*, Prague, May 14th, 1959.
24 *Sbirka Zakonu*, Prague, 1951, No. 38 and 1952, No. 22; *Uredni List*, Prague, 1952, No. 116.
25 *Dziennik Ustaw*, Warsaw, 1952, No. 47; *Monitor Polski*, Warsaw, 1954, No. A-50.
26 *Sobranie uzakonenii RSFSR*, Moscow, 1923, No. 10.
27 *Sobranie uzakonenii RSFSR*, Moscow, 1923, No. 48; *Vestnik Tsik, SNK i STO SSSR*, Moscow, 1923, No. 10.
27 *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, Moscow, 1955, No. 9.
29 Cf. Manya Gordon: *Workers Before and After Lenin*, New York 1941, pp. 30–34; Bertram D. Wolfe: *Three Who Made a Revolution*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1949.
30 I. I. Kutuzov, at the time president of the textile-workers' union.
31 *From the History of the Vecheka 1917–1921, Collected Documents*, Moscow 1958, p. 436 (in Russian).
32 Merle Fainsod: *Smolensk under Soviet Rule*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1958, pp. 163–165.

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THE CURTAIN RAISED.

Interview with Karl Marx, the Head of L'Internationale.

REVOLT OF LABOR AGAINST CAPITAL.

The Two Faces of L'Internationale —Transformation of Society—Its Progress in the United States.

What the Association Had to Do With the Commune, &c. &c., &c.

London, July 8.—You have asked me to find out something about the International Association, and I have tried to do so. The enterprise is a difficult one just now. London is indisputably the headquarters of the Association, but the English people have got a scare, and smell International in everything as King James smelt gunpowder after the famous plot. The consciousness of the society has naturally increased with the suspiciousness of the public; and if those who guide it have a secret to keep, they are of the stamp of men who keep a secret well. I have called on two of their leading members, have talked with one freely, and I here give you the substance of my conversation. I have satisfied myself of one thing, that it is a society of genuine working-men, but that these workmen are directed by social and political theorists of another class. One man whom I saw, a leading member of the council, was sitting at his workman's bench during our interview, and left off talking to me from time to time to receive a complaint, delivered in no courteous tone, from one of the many little masters in the neighborhood who employed him. I have heard this same man make eloquent speeches in public inspired in every passage with the energy of hate towards the classes that call themselves his rulers. I understood the speeches after this glimpse at the domestic life of the orator. He must have felt that he had brains enough to have organized a working-government, and yet here he was obliged to devote his life to the most revolting task work of mechanical profession. He was proud and sensitive, and yet at every turn he had to return a bow for a grunt and a smile for a command that stood on about the same level in the scale of civility with a huntsman's call to his dog. This man helped me to a glimpse of one side of the nature of the International, the result of

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of the workman who produces against the middleman who enjoys. Here was the hand that would smite hard when the time came, and as to the head that plans, I think I saw that, too, in my interview with Dr. Karl Marx.

Dr. Karl Marx is a German doctor of philosophy with a German breadth of knowledge derived both from observation of the living world and from books. I should conclude that he has never been a worker in the ordinary sense of the term. His surroundings and appearance are those of a well-to-do man of the middle class. The drawing-room into which I was ushered on the night of my interview would have formed very comfortable quarters for a thriving stockbroker who had made his competence and was now beginning to make his fortune. It was comfort personified, the apartment of a man of taste and of easy means, but with nothing in it peculiarly characteristic of its owner. A fine album of Rhine views on the table, however, gave a clue to his nationality. I peered cautiously into the vase on the side-table for a bomb. I sniffed for petroleum, but the smell was the smell of roses. I crept back stealthily to my seat, and moodily awaited the worst.

He has entered and greeted me cordially, and we are sitting face to face. Yes, I am tête-à-tête with the revolution incarnate, with the real founder and guiding spirit of the International Society, with the author of the address in which capital was told that if it warred on labor it must expect to have

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its house burned down about its ears —in a word, with the

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of Paris. Do you remember the bust of Socrates, the man who died rather than profess his belief in the gods of the time—the man with the fine sweep of profile for the forehead running meanly at the end into a little snub, curled-up feature like a bisected pothook that formed the nose. Take this bust in your mind's eye, color the beard black, dashing it here and there with puffs of grey: clap the head thus made on a portly body of the middle height, and the Doctor is before you. Throw a veil over the upper part of the face and you might be in the company of a born vestry man. Reveal the essential feature, the immense brow, and you know at once that you have to deal with that most formidable of all composite individual forces — a dreamer who thinks, a thinker who dreams.

Another gentleman accompanied Dr. Marx, a German, too, I believe, though from his great familiarity with our language, I cannot be sure of it. Was he a witness on the doctor's side? I think so. The "Council," hearing of the interview, might hereafter call on the Doctor for his account of it, for the *Revolution* is above all things suspicious of its agents. Here, then, was his evidence in corroboration.

I went straight to my business. The world, I said, seemed to be in the dark about the International, hating it very much, but not able to say clearly what thing it hated. Some, who professed to have peered further into the gloom than their neighbors, declared that they had made out a sort of Janus figure with a fair, honest workman's smile on one of its faces, and on the other a murderous, conspirator's scowl. Would he light up the case of mystery in which the theory dwelt?

The professor laughed, chuckled a little I fancied, at the thought that we were so frightened of him. "There is no mystery to clear up dear sir," he began, in a very polished form of the Hans Breitmann dialect, "except perhaps the mystery of human stupidity in those who perpetually ignore the fact that our association is a public one and that the fullest reports of its proceedings are published for all who care to read them. You may buy our rules for a penny, and a shilling laid out in pamphlets will teach you almost as much about us as we know ourselves.

R.—Almost—yes, perhaps so: but will not the something I shall not know constitute the all-important reservation. To be quite frank with you, and to put the case as it strikes an outside observer, this general claim of depreciation of you must mean something more than the ignorant ill-will of the multitude. And it is still pertinent to ask even after what you have told me, what is the International Society?

Dr. M.—You have only to look at the individuals of which it is composed—workmen.

R.—Yes, but the soldier need be no exponent of the statecraft that sees him in motion. I know some of your members, and I can believe that they are not of the stuff of which conspirators are made. Besides, a secret shared by a million men would be no secret at all. But what if these were only the instruments in the hands of a bold, and I hope you will forgive me for adding, not overscrupulous conclave.

Dr. M.—There is nothing to prove it.

R.—The last Paris insurrection?

Dr. M.—I demand firstly the proof that there was any plot at all—that anything happened that was not the legitimate effect of the circumstances of the moment; or the plot granted, I demand the proofs of the participation in it of the International Association.

R.—The presence in the communal body of so many members of the Association.

Dr. M.—Then it was a plot of the Freemasons, too, for their share in the work as individuals was by no means a slight one. I should not be surprised,

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indeed, to find the Pope setting down the whole insurrection to their account. But try another explanation. The insurrection in Paris was made by the workmen of Paris. The ablest of the workmen must necessarily have its leaders and administrators; but the ablest of the workmen happen also to be members of the International Association. Yet the Association as such may be in no way responsible for their action.

R.—It will still seem otherwise to the world. People talk of secret instructions from London, and even grants of money. Can it be affirmed that the alleged openness of the Association's proceedings precludes all secrecy of communication?

Dr. M.—What association ever formed carried on its work without private as well as public agencies? But to talk of secret instruction from London, as of decrees in the matter of faith and morals from some center of Papal domination and intrigue is wholly to misconceive the nature of the International. This would imply a centralized form of government for the International, whereas the real form is designedly that which gives the greatest play to local energy and independence. In fact the International is not properly a government for the working class at all. It is a bond of union rather than a controlling force.

R.—And of union to what end?

Dr. M.—The economical emancipation of the working class by the conquest of political power. The use of that political power to the attainment of social ends. It is necessary that our aims should be thus comprehensive to include every form of working-class activity. To have made them of a special character would have been to adapt them to the needs of one section —one nation of workmen alone. But how could all men be asked to unite to further the objects of a few? To have done that the association must have forfeited its title of International. The association does not dictate the form of political movements; it only requires a pledge as to their end. It is a network of affiliated societies spreading all over the world of labor. In each part of the world some special aspect of the problem presents itself, and the workmen there address themselves to its consideration in their own way. Combinations among workmen cannot be absolutely identical in detail in Newcastle and in Barcelona, in London and in Berlin. In England, for instance, the way to show political power lies open to the working class. Insurrection would be madness where peaceful agitation would more swiftly and surely do the work. In France a hundred laws of repression and a mortal antagonism between classes seem to necessitate the violent solution of social war. The choice of that solution is the affair of the working classes of that country. The International does not presume to dictate in the matter and hardly to advise. But to every movement it accords its sympathy and its aid within the limits assigned by its own laws.

R.—And what is the nature of that aid?

Dr. M.—To give an example, one of the commonest forms of the movement for emancipation is that of strikes. Formerly, when a strike took place in one country it was defeated by the importation of workmen from another. The International has nearly stopped all that. It receives information of the intended strike, it spreads that information among its members, who at once see that for them the seat of the struggle must be forbidden ground. The masters are thus left alone to reckon with their men. In most cases the men require no other aid than that. Their own subscriptions or those of the societies to which they are more immediately affiliated supply them with funds, but should the pressure upon them become too heavy and the strike be one of which the Association approves, their necessities are supplied out of the common purse. By these means a strike of the cigar-makers of Barcelona was brought to a victorious issue the other day. But the society has no interest in strikes,

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though it supports them under certain conditions. It cannot possibly gain by them in a pecuniary point of view, but it may easily lose. Let us sum it all up in a word. The working classes remain poor amid the increase of wealth, wretched amid the increase of luxury. Their material privation dwarfs their moral as well as their physical stature. They cannot rely on others for a remedy. It has become then with them an imperative necessity to take their own case in hand. They must revise the relations between themselves and the capitalists and landlords, and that means they must transform society. This is the general end of every known workmen's organization; land and labor leagues, trade and friendly societies, co-operative stores and co-operative production are but means towards it. To establish a perfect solidarity between these organizations is the business of the International Association. Its influence is beginning to be felt everywhere. Two papers spread its views in Spain, three in Germany, the same number in Austria and in Holland, six in Belgium, and six in Switzerland. And now that I have told you what the International is you may, perhaps, be in a position to form your own opinion as to its pretended plots.

R.—I do not quite understand you.

Dr. M.—Do you not see that the old society, wanting the strength to meet it with its own weapons of discussion and combination, is obliged to resort to the fraud of fixing upon it the imputation of conspiracy?

R.—But the French police declare that they are in a position to prove its complicity in the late affair, to say nothing of preceding attempts.

Dr. M.—But we will say something of those attempts, if you please, because they best serve to test the gravity of all the charges of conspiracy brought against the International. You remember the last "plot" but one. A plebiscite had been announced. Many of the electors were known to be wavering. They had no longer a keen sense of the value of the imperial rule, having come to disbelieve in those threatened dangers of society from which it was supposed to have saved them. A new bugbear was wanted. The police undertook to find one. All combinations of workmen being hateful to them, they naturally owed the International an ill turn. A happy thought inspired them. What if they should select the International for their bugbear, and thus at one stroke discredit that society and curry favor for the imperial cause. Out of that happy thought came the ridiculous "plot" against the Emperor's life—as if we wanted the wretched old fellow. They seized the leading members of the International. They manufactured evidence. They prepared their case for trial, and in the meantime they had their plebiscite. But the intended comedy was too obviously but a broad, coarse farce. Intelligent Europe, which witnessed the spectacle was not deceived for a moment as to its character, and only the French peasant elector was befooled. Your English papers reported the beginnings of the miserable affair; they forgot to notice the end. The French judges admitting the existence of the plot by official courtesy were obliged to declare that there was nothing to show the complicity of the International. Believe me the second plot is like the first. The French functionary is again in business. He is called in to account for the biggest civil movement the world has ever seen. A hundred signs of the times ought to suggest the right explanation—the growth of intelligence among the workmen, of luxury and incompetence among their rulers, the historical process now going on of that final transfer of power from a class to the people, the apparent fitness of time, place, and circumstance for the great movement of emancipation. But to have seen these the functionary must have been a philosopher, and he is only a *mouchard*. By the law of his being, therefore, he has fallen back upon the *mouchard's* explanation—a "conspiracy." His old portfolio of forged documents will supply him

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with the proofs, and this time Europe in its scare will believe the tale.

R.—Europe can scarcely help itself, seeing that every French newspaper spreads the report.

Dr. M.—Every French newspaper! See, here is one of them (taking up *La Situation),* and judge for yourself of the value of its evidence as to a matter of fact. (Reads): "Dr. Karl Marx, of the International, has been arrested in Belgium, trying to make his way to France. The police of London have long had their eye on the society with which he is connected, and are now taking active measures for his suppression." Two sentences and two lies. You can test the truth of one story by the evidence of your own senses. You see that instead of being in prison in Belgium I am at home in England. You must also know that the police in England are as powerless to interfere with the International Society as the society with them. Yet what is most regular in all this is that the report will go the round of the continental press without a contradiction, and could contine to do so if I were to circularize every journal in Europe from this place.

R.—Have you attempted to contradict many of these false reports?

Dr. M.—I have done so till I have grown weary of the labor. To show the gross carelessness with which they are concocted I may mention that in one of them I saw Felix Pyat set down as a member of the International.

R.—And he is not so?

Dr. M.—The Association could hardly have found room for such a wild man. He was once presumptuous enough to issue a rash proclamation in our name, but it was instantly disavowed, though, to do them justice, the press of course ignored the disavowal.

R.—And Mazzini, is he a member of your body?

Dr. M. (laughing)—Ah, no. We should have made but little progress if we had not got beyond the range of his ideas.

R.—You surprise me. I should certainly have thought that he represented the most advanced views.

Dr. M.—He represents nothing better than the old idea of a middle-class republic. We seek no part with the middle class. He has fallen as far to the rear of the modern movement as the German professors, who, nevertheless, are still considered in Europe as the apostles of the cultured democratism of the future. They were so at one time—before '48, perhaps, when the German middle class, in the English sense, had scarcely attained its proper development. But now they have gone over bodily to the reaction, and the proletariat knows them no more.

R.—Some people have thought they saw signs of a positivist element in your organization.

Dr. M.—No such thing. We have positivists among us, and others not of our body who work as well. But this is not by virtue of their philosophy, which will have nothing to do with popular government, as we understand it, and which seeks only to put a new hierarchy in place of the old one.

R.—It seems to me, then, that the leaders of the international movement have had to form a philosophy as well as an association for themselves.

Dr. M.—Precisely. It is hardly likely, for instance, that we could hope to prosper in our war against capital if we derive our tactics, say from the political economy of Mill. He has traced one kind of relationship between labor and capital. We hope to show that it is possible to establish another.

R.—And as to religion?

Dr. M.—On that point I cannot speak in the name of the society. I myself am an atheist. It is startling, no doubt, to hear such an avowal in England, but there is some comfort in the thought that it need not be made in a whisper in either Germany or France.

R.—And yet you make your headquarters in this country?

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Dr. M.—For obvious reasons: the right of association is here an established thing. It exists, indeed, in Germany, but it is beset with innumerable difficulties; in France for many years it has not existed at all.

R.—And in the United States?

Dr. M.—The chief centers of our activity are for the present among the old societies of Europe. Many circumstances have hitherto tended to prevent the labor problem from assuming an all-absorbing importance in the United States. But they are rapidly disappearing, and it is rapidly coming to the front there with the growth as in Europe of a laboring class distinct from the rest of the community and divorced from capital.

R.—It would seem that in this country, the hoped-for solution, whatever it may be, will be attained without the violent means of revolution. The English system of agitating by platform and press until minorities become converted into majorities is a hopeful sign.

Dr. M.—I am not so sanguine on that point as you. The English middle class has always shown itself willing enough to accept the verdict of the majority so long as it enjoyed the monopoly of the voting power. But mark me, as soon as it finds itself outvoted on what it considers vital questions we shall see here a new slave-owner war.

I have here given you as well as I can remember them the beads of my conversation with this remarkable man. I shall leave you to form your own conclusions. Whatever may be said for or against the probability of its complicity with the movement of the Commune we may be assured that in the International Association the civilized world has a new power in its midst with which it must soon come to a reckoning for good or for ill.

R. LANDOR

MR. LANDOR'S *interview with Karl Marx appeared in the New York* World, *July 18, 1871.*

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Lee Baxandall

A Man's A Man

—The Further Adventures Of Brecht in New York

A PLAY'S A PLAY, one might think. But no, a play is what is done with it, and what is done is extremely, even radically, particular to each single production. This is what one concludes from the competitive versions of Brecht's *Mann Ist Mann* that recently premiered in New York.

Two versions of a single play, and an avant-garde work at that? And they opened on consecutive nights? Yes; yet there was little surprise in New York, there were only occasional comments about the ill planning and the waste involved. One would have been naive not to have expected some such development. Naive indeed, for the adventures of Brecht in America read like a catalogue of the American temper. Brecht was himself a sardonic champion of the Schweikian spirit of adaptibility. Somehow it rubbed off on his works, which have shown a chameleon-like acclimation when set down amid the American flora and fauna. In accord with the nation's love of bathos, the playwright has been sentimentalized. His toughmindedness has been diluted to accommodate the nation's meagre political sophistication. His characters have been made to speak like New Jersey plumbers and Iowa housewives, because Americans dislike "strangeness" in their entertainments (though they love exoticism). His stages have been provided with all manner of naturalistic trappings so that the spectator will feel his pragmatic love of familiar detail reassured.

Why not, then, expect that the American way of life will show itself in the conditions of production, as well as in style of interpretation? And so it has happened. The free economy, bulwark of the now desperately besieged American ideology, did its work for years by keeping Brecht, with other "difficult" authors, off the stage or at least off Broadway. Cheap goods drive out dear. At last, however, the foreign market's respect for Brechtian saleability brought about a reappraisal among New York buyers.

Could this unlikely product be packaged for mass distribution? Apparently it could. The real-estate men, the brokers and benefit performance ladies and chubby balding angels who are Broadway's power elite, might be persuaded. And a qualitative change occurred in the nature of the free economy's impact on Brecht. Phase two: idiotic competition. First, *Mother Courage,* object of a lengthy court battle between Eric Bentley and the Brecht heirs for rights to produce it first. (Bentley won but the play still awaits production.) And now, improbably, *Mann Ist Mann.* As *A Man's A Man,* directed by John Hancock in Eric Bentley's adaptation, it reached the tiny Masque Theatre stage on September 19, just one night after the Living Theatre's version directed by Julian Beck, called *Man Is Man* by translator Gerhard Nellhaus. One of these versions followed the typical and unhappy course of rooting itself in flaws of the American temper. The other chose to utilize the American situation, rather than be used by it. It was a fine success.

IN THIS REGARD, it is important to to note that a recent characteristic of U. S. competition has been its *lack of competitiveness.* Or rather, the range of product differentiation is exceedingly small, and the significant competition is carried on by the advertising men. Publicity becomes all-important. And such too is the case on big-money Broadway. A depressing product sameness lies behind the PR tinsel of this plaything for the investment and diversion of the expense account set. However, should one search in more primitive regions of New York theatre, where never a benefit performance is sold, one finds that the earlier phase of free economy refreshingly prevails: it is still possible for the superior stag-

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ing to win through. Good reviews are awesomely important, of course; but the reviewers come to the cramped dark dens of small money theatre seeking quality. They use different standards; the sheen and glamour wanted by the expense account set are not so important. Thus, the lynch law of the free economy decreed that the highly touted Living Theatre version should flop and the unknown Hancock's should prosper. The strong man wins and the weak man dies—as the merchant in *The Exception and the Rule* explains.

Fortuitously, the differing titles of the two versions accurately reflect their relative merits and afford a ready example of what is involved. *Man Is Man,* Nellhaus' rendering, is the safe and literal way to take the German title into English; no denying that. But since when has creative success resulted from playing it safe? This literal approach resulted in a stiff title, difficult to speak. Moreover, it is nothing other than itself, the three inscrutable words Man—Is—Man. It suggests little, alludes to nothing and impatiently awaits explication. How different, then, is Bentley's title! *A Man's A Man* is as accurately translated from the German as Nellhaus' choice, since the more colloquial phrase has no exact equivalent in German. Bentley has taken liberty, the self-justifying license that is creativity and that nothing else can be.

Moreover, Bentley's choice at once alludes beyond itself. Burns' poem is known to everyone; it connotes a quaint 19th century insistence upon the value of selfhood, irrespective of social pressure and category. What matter if the disappearance of individual identity becomes the play's biting subject? Bentley's title throws us without further ado into the context of the play's concern. In short, the title is equal to the work.

THE LIVING THEATRE as it performed *Man Is Man* appeared incapable of having won, two scant summers earlier, the first prize at Paris's international theatre festival. Though many of the actors were the same, and Judith Maline played the Widow Begbick and Julian Beck directed, the whole production suffered from amateurishness. The acting was dull, imprecise and unshaped; the sets were most awfully improvised and inadequate; the music was uninteresting and detracted through its monotony; the actors could not sing, nor could they employ *Sprechstimme* with effect; costumes were ill-conceived; and in short, there was nothing, not one performance nor director's ingenuity, which could redeem the evening from tediousness.

One did not feel that the translator had been betrayed. On the contrary—Gerhard Nellhaus, whose translations enjoy the favor of the Brecht heirs in America, got no worse than he merited. His script was a sad piece of work. He began by using Brecht's 1953 revision of the play, which doubtless pleased the Brecht heirs. It is highly dubious, however, that Brecht's alterations had served the script well. Then, too, Nellhaus failed to cut the script significantly. This omission at once endangered the production's success. For *Mann Ist Mann* is perhaps Brecht's most ungainly play. Its authentic dramatic idea is unfortunately entitled to less than full-length elaboration.

Thus, if the drama is to be played with the coherence that stylization requires, the script must be cut, made tight and coherent. This Nellhaus failed to do; moreover, he burdened the actors with an English language clumsiness that better actors than these would have struggled in vain to subdue. One song offered this absurdly inappropriate Gilbert-and-Sullivan ditty: "Oh, in this sunny clime / Many men get lost sometime!" The hero, a dockworker from Kilkoa, is constantly referred to in Nellhaus's abstract and ungraceful prose as "the day laborer Galy Gay." And a peculiarly pedantic soldier cries out, when Sergeant Fairchild divests himself of his troublesome gonads: "He's shot off his manhood!" Such cumbersome word choices, together with the stumbling-stones of the translator's interminable Germanic

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clauses in mid-sentence, would intimidate any director. The script first needs style before actors can give it life.

Style was precisely the virtue of the Hancock-Bentley production. They began by clipping some 35 minutes from the Living Theatre's playing time. This was necessary. For only a tight script that justifies itself in every scene and every moment may be successfully stylized. Contrariwise, such an inchoate play as this, should it be left in the raw, can only be muddled through, for coherency will not be coaxed from it. Most important, however, was the detached and lively intelligence that Hancock brought to his work. His actors *knew* why they handed out a cigar, or accepted it; they *knew* that the temple scenes had to reflect, as it were in a distorting mirror, a Kiplingesque incomprehension and disdain for inferior races. They must not accept Brecht's ironically elaborated "local color" at its face value—as happened at the Living Theatre. Without intelligence there cannot be dramatic style; and without style the theatre is of necessity cramped within the limitations of the participants' personal mannerisms.

Where Julian Beck's sets looked like makeshifts meant for rehearsal use, John Hancock had conceived with designer David Reppa a stage that attractively and pointedly localized the action. Moreover, the element of sideshow and vaudeville that is inherent in Brecht's script was developed by Bentley so that the performance was part and parcel of a mock Army Recruiting Rally. Huge posters, jazz, girls and a robust sergeant all encouraged the audience to enlist, while Brecht's script showed how easy it was to adjust to military life. The actors' faces, hidden behind white greasepaint and reddened eyesockets, evoked simultaneously the carnival of a recruiting gala and the depersonalized uniformity and exhaustion of fighting men. Stinking dirty uniforms (unlike the Living Theatre's tidy linens) bespoke the excrement of battle among men.

Hancock's Widow Begbick (Olympia Dukakis), although too young, possessed the needed quality of hard and lusty gameness. (Judith Malina's Begbick reminded one of the comic Witch in Little Lulu.) Similarly, the Living Theatre's Galy Gay was a dull and passive object of capital M Metamorphosis. Hancock's, played by John Heffernan, was a likeable and impulsive dolt who, once having seen "how things are" in the world, actively and excruciatingly threw himself into being Jeramiah Jip, The Human Fighting Machine. At the close he moved like an enfuriated automaton—nevertheless, an automaton that acted for a soul in torment. The audience felt the full terror of an alienated human being.

Hancock previously directed numerous plays as an undergraduate at Harvard University, including *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* and an earlier version of *A Man's A Man*. With the current production he enjoys his first success in the New York theatre. Eric Bentley, although the leading American exponent of Brecht for twenty years, recently underwent severe criticism of his translations as well as obstruction of them on the stage. Such attacks should now have their end. For the confrontation of the Nellhaus and Bentley versions, so wasteful in general, at least inescapably demonstrated the superiority of the latter's work. One can quarrel with certain of Bentley's amendations. But he respects the author's intentions and he has the talent to recreate a work within the context of a foreign land and language. That is what's important.

However, the Living Theatre's signal failure is puzzling, the more so in view of their fine production of *In the Jungle of Cities*. One possible explanation—it is no more than that—lies in the company's affinity for plays of the character of *The Connection*, works that revel in lassitude, anarchic license and disorder. Certainly that is the basic movement of *In the Jungle of Cities*. The hero Garga bursts forth from the inhibitions of Philistine existence to wallow in a Brechtian version of Beatnik Heaven replete with

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cheroots, leisure, squalor, sex of both varieties and lots of alcohol. *Mann Ist Mann,* on the contrary, moves Galy Gay from a primitive do-as-you-wish anarchy; it progressively restrains him by every modern means of order and discipline. Repeatedly, it demonstrates that "the easy way," the natural impulse that feels good now, leads but to entrapment.

Only the most strenuous self-discipline can enable one to escape being molded to one's society. Thus, in the former work the basic action is the unleashing of a temperament. The latter play conversely demonstrates the repression of human impulse. Now the Becks are producers of *The Connection* and *The Apple,* two of our generation's messiest plays; and they are leaders of a peace organization whose anarchist members are noted for their lack of cohesion. Is it not likely that the Becks may find *Mann Ist Mann* uncongenial, not to say psychologically alien?

Surely their staging of the work suggests this conclusion. But however it is, the failure of style has to find its eventual cause in a failure of understanding. The Living Theatre was cognizant only that the play dealt with a man-turned-into-a-fighting-machine. It draped the entire script in this blanket interpretation, as casually as the soldiers throw a canvas over Galy Gay's "elephant." And, since intelligibility in every gesture, each line and action, was not sought, Mr. Beck's actors dully blundered about under this blanket idea. The play showed itself as bulgy and unruly as Gay's elephant. Hancock, in contrast, nicely examined and in proper style articulated each bone and sinew and joint of this awkward pachyderm-play, and saw that it all worked well in its parts and as a whole. With the result that finally *A Man's A Man* got to its feet and shambled grotesquely, terrifyingly across the New York stage.

INCIDENTALLY, THERE APPEARS to be a good deal of confusion even among informed radicals visiting the two productions as to which is the superior; and this confusion, I have come to believe, must be based in large part upon *expectations* of which company will perform Brecht more faithfully, or more radically, or more uncompromisingly. On expectations, needless to say, the Living Theatre performance wins hands down. For Mr. Bentley has been under attack of late, charged with diluting or perverting Brecht's communism. These charges and innuendoes are based largely on the Freudian bias that lately has appeared in Mr. Bentley's criticism, it would seem. The fact is that Mr. Bentley has demonstrated a scholar's concern for the author's intentions. He has not let his critical views interfere with his treatment of Brecht texts to any important degree. Thus the attack on Bentley by Eleanor Hakim in *Studies on the Left* is misguided to the extent that it fails to recognize this distinction. Mr. Bentley has in fact done a lot more for getting the unvarnished Brecht across in this country than have almost any of his detractors.

The Becks, on the other hand, with their General Strike for Peace activities and their accumulated reputation for hip iconoclasm and their proclaimed purist approach to Brecht, bear with them an aura of radical saintliness. This aura and the expectations that are entailed, I would suggest, ought to bear more critical scrutiny than some radicals seem inclined to apply. For the Living Theatre is frequently more impressive in theory than in performance, in intention than in result.

LEE BAXANDALL *paid a six-week visit to the Brecht Theatre in Berlin last year and is an Editor of the magazine,* Studies on the Left.

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Notes From Abroad

Francis Roy

The First Period of Algerian Independence

ONE DAY BEFORE Algerian independence was solemnly approved in the referendum of July 1, 1962, Ben Khedda, head of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (The GPRA) announced the dismissal of the three heads of the Army's General Staff including its chief, Colonel Boumedienne. Shortly thereafter, Ben Khedda's star fell; Colonel Boumedienne resumed his post and Khedda was ousted by Ben Bella, head of Algeria's only legal political organization—the FLN—who was "elected" leader of a one-party state. (On November 30 the weak Communist Party was outlawed.)

The events in recent months moved rapidly and much of their confusion inheres in a struggle between personalities and factions based less on genuine social and ideological differences than on ambitions for power; struggles which are increasingly removed from the true needs of the Algerian people.

To decipher the meaning of the struggle it might prove useful to review synoptically the evolution of the major component parts of the Algerian nationalist movement.

ON NOVEMBER 1, 1954, France's Premier Mendès-France ordered harsh repressive measures to counter a sudden outbreak of terrorism in Southwest Algeria. He dissolved the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), the old radical organization created by Messali Hadj, and ordered the imprisonment of its leaders.

The MTLD, before its dissolution, had for some years been divided into two conflicting factions: the "centralists" (so-called because they had a majority on the Central Committee) who favored collaboration with the liberal wing of the Algerian French bourgeoisie and, on the other side, the partisans of Messali Hadj who rejected such a compromise. The "centralists," together with the Oulémas (an association of extremely reactionary religious fanatics) joined forces in 1955 with a pro-Nasserite group, the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA). The new organization was the National Liberation Front—the FLN. This coalition won the adherence of Ferhat Abbas and Ahmed Boumendjel, two leaders of a middle class organization which had favored collaboration with the French administration.

Meanwhile, the followers of Messali Hadj—the more militant and advanced forces of Algerian nationalism—reorganized as the Algerian National Movement (MNA). The FLN, determined to win control of the Algerian revolution and aided by money and arms from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, successfully eliminated the MNA within Algeria. However, the MNA remained as a powerful force among the 400,000 Algerian workers living in France, many of whom were politically conscious trade unionists familiar with all forms of working class struggle.

By creating the Algerian Workers' Trade Union Federation (USTA), a

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purely Algerian trade union organization, the Messalists retained the potential of an autonomous political expression of the Algerian working class in the midst of the FLN-led revolution. Confronted by this threat the FLN waged a campaign of extermination against the Messalist trade union cadres: On September 20, 1957, Ahmed Semmache, treasurer of the USTA Federation of France, was assassinated. On September 24, the USTA representatives for the big Renault and Panhard works, Mellouli Said and Hocine Maroc, were assassinated. On October 7, Abdallah Filali, house painter, deputy General Secretary of the USTA Federation of France, one of the greatest of the Algerian revolutionary leaders, sentenced to death *in absentia* in 1954 by a French military tribunal, was killed by 4 bullets in the back. On October 26, Ahmed Bekhat, metal worker, General Secretary of the USTA Federation of France, former member of the CGT unions in Algeria, was found murdered in the northern outskirts of Paris.

The decapitated MNA eventually sought safety in a political alignment with the FLN and via direct negotiations with the French government. But that did not stop the FLN from continuing to assassinate remaining union leaders of the USTA. In March 1958, the MNA turned toward Gaullism. (Meanwhile, Messali, himself, ordered the killing of those Messalists who opposed associating with Gaullism.)

It was through such methods that the FLN established and maintained its supremacy.

HOWEVER, ONCE THE BAUBLES of power began to glitter, the FLN leadership itself was torn by internal discord. One group was led by former "centralists" Ben Khedda, Mohammed Yazid and Saad Dahlab, and by two former members of the defunct CRUA —Mohammed Boudiaf and Krim Belkacem. The competing faction was formed by other members of the CRUA who rallied behind Ben Bella, supported by the more conservative elements under the leadership of Ferhat Abbas and Boumedienne.

Each faction accused its opponents of "neo-colonialism," of "betraying the revolution," of collaborating with the French . . . etc. That both groups held similar policies only made the abuse more virulent. As Jean Daniel, the most reliable spokesman of the FLN in the French press during the war, rightly said: "Absolutely no doctrinal opposition has appeared among them so far." (*L'Express*, August 30, 1962.) It was a power struggle rooted in the necessity of transforming a shaky coalition into a body capable of organizing a one-party state.

This conflict developed, between July and September 1962, into a complex crisis which, after a number of surprising shifts and tragic episodes, finally ended in the victory of Ben Bella and Colonel Boumedienne. On September 20, Ben Bella's Political Bureau placed before the Algerian people a single list of 196 deputies to the Constituent Assembly without even the right to change the order of names or to cross one out. There was practically no election campaign and the votes were cast in an atmosphere of apathy which strongly contrasted with the first days of July. The Assembly picked by Ben Bella with the help of Boumedienne's army then chose Ben Bella as Premier and Boumedienne as Minister of War.

A PRECONDITION FOR THE one-party state in Algeria was the victory of the Army's General Staff under Colonel Boumedienne over the regionally organized guerilla forces.

At the time of Independence the bulk of the Army of National Liberation (ALN), together with its General Staff, was stationed *outside* of Algeria — in Tunisia and Morocco. These troops, situated in the exterior, were former peasants transformed into professional soldiers of a more conventional type army. By contrast, the soldiers of the FLN *within* Algeria remained peasants and they were the ones who did most of the fighting.

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These troops of the interior were divided into six regions, called *willayas*, plus the "Autonomous Zone of Algiers." The *willayas* held a degree of autonomy and their governing councils, because they were closer to the onel Boumedienne, just as the creation times able to take issue with the top FLN leadership.

After independence, the troops from Tunisia and Morocco could enter Algeria. They had to establish themselves in the *willaya* zones and for this it was necessary to disrupt, if not actually dismantle, the internal structure of the *willayas*. The guerillas, those who had borne all the weight of the fighting, were, of course, unwilling to be absorbed by the army of the exterior. But the elimination of the *willayas* as distinct bodies was essential for the centralized state power which was to establish itself in Algeria. This power could not assert its authority as long as the new nation was dominated by the armed forces of the interior, closely connected with the local peasantry from which they were drawn.

The "reconversion" of the army meant giving a military monopoly to the General Staff, that is, to Colonel Boumedienne, just as the creation on July 22, 1962 of the Political Bureau of seven members of the FLN meant giving the monopoly of political power to Ben Bella and his group. The firm resolve of the General Staff and the Political Bureau to carry out this "reconversion," before having obtained any legal status, led to the famous July 1962 struggle between them and *willayas* III and IV.

During its session which lasted from November 26 to December 1, 1962, the FLN's Political Bureau considered the creation of new military forms which would no longer coincide with the old *willayas*. If carried out, this change would put an end to all autonomist tendencies.

Willaya IV, having only opposed one clique's ambition for autonomy to another clique's desire for hegemony, was politically annihilated though the struggle erupted again on October 29 when shooting between Ben Bella's followers led by the one-time pimp, Yaacef Saadi, and members of the *Willaya* IV took 30 Algerian lives. *Willaya* III, on the other hand, emerged from this episode without very serious losses. It was too strong for the General Staff and the Political Bureau to undertake an armed operation against the *Willaya's* stronghold in the Kabylian mountains. Kabylia enjoys a disguised autonomy, based on an unstable and fragile balance of power.

FOR THE ALGERIAN PEASANT land ownership is a question of life and death. The economically active population of Algeria is divided into 2,800,000 agricultural workers, small, medium and big land owners and 700,000 workers outside agriculture. Of these 700,000 workers, 400,000 work in France where they often live without their families. This shows the very limited size and importance of the industrial proletariat in Algeria. Of the 2,800,000 persons active in agriculture only about 500,000 own land; nearly 2,300,000 own nothing and live in a permanent state of semi-starvation. Of the approximately 500,000 land-owning Algerians, 390,000 own less than 24 acres. Their land is generally infertile since most of the good land was taken over by the Europeans and turned into vineyards. This is a typical example of colonial exploitation of an underdeveloped country: the colonizers use the land for the production of goods (in this case, wine) for which the metropolitan country provides the only market. Employment, then, is restricted to a seasonal and migrant labor force which, in its nature, is defenseless against oppression and exploitation.

The peasant question was inevitably one of the FLN's most urgent problems; the Algerian peasants fought for the independence of their country but they wanted land, too. The first FLN program, in 1956, formulated at a time when the Algerian war was changing from a terrorist struggle into a massive war, demanded land reform, the nationalization of the banks and

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French industrial enterprises (that is, in fact, of all the large enterprises). However, by February 1962, when the likelihood was growing of the FLN soon coming to power, the FLN-sponsored National Council of the Algerian Revolution met at Tripoli that month to draw up a new FLN program and produced nothing but a list of vague phrases integrated into a traditional nationalist ideology.*

As soon as independence was proclaimed, Algerian peasants and workers began to take over the Europeans' lands and their abandoned apartments and factories.

None of the groups struggling for power wanted to take upon itself the responsibility of putting an end to this state of affairs throughout Algeria. But once the opposition was eliminated by Ben Bella, once the Assembly was "elected" and the government legally constituted, things changed.

Ben Bella's government launched "operation tillage" to improve as far as possible the disastrous state of agricultural production. At the same time, a government decree of October 22 annulled all the operations involving *vacant property* that had taken place since July 1. Both the big land owners and the small peasants who had settled on the lands of the European land owners were told to move on.

The same decree set up committees of management to be elected by the peasants and approved by the district administration; they were to run the abandoned property, but without ownership rights. The lands still belong to their legal owners.

Since then, Ben Bella has not stopped talking about the land reform, but always in the vaguest terms. It is still impossible to get even the most general idea of the proposed reform. It seems likely that it will be rather like Nasser's, since it has the similar aim of providing a Bonapartist regime with a social base.

In mining and industry, Ben Bella and his government constantly claim that they are firmly resolved to respect the Evian Agreements which provide for the preservation of the present ownership of mines, petroleum and industrial enterprises.

Most Algerians have always lived in appalling hovels. With independence won, they began to move into apartments abandoned by some 700,000 Europeans. Yet, Ben Bella's government quickly dispossessed the squatters.

SINCE THE MARCH of the General Staff's army on Algiers, the masses have been terrorized and have become apathetic. And in a political atmosphere where the people are hungry and demoralized by unprincipled power-struggles only a dictatorship such as that of Ben Bella and Colonel Boumedienne can flourish.

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* The program was adopted without any serious discussion. Speaking of the Council session, Jean Daniel wrote:

> One would look in vain for Jacobins and Girondins, for Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, in short for ideological differences. In Tripoli, the constitutional program was adopted unanimously and in a few hours . . . *All the work was finished in two days but the congress lasted fourteen days.* (*L'Express*, June 21, 1962.)

Thus, while it took "a few hours" to vote on a text as important as the program of a future "revolutionary" government, twelve days were not enough to decide which team would take power.

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The following is the second exchange on Negroes and the Labor Movement stemming from an article (Organized Labor and the Negro Wage Earner) by Herbert Hill, National Labor Secretary of the NAACP, that appeared in our second issue. The first exchange can be found in our third number (Spring 1962). We look forward to continuing the debate and discussion. Indeed, we anticipate a mailbag full of letters based on the exchanges and letters below as well as on Gus Tyler's article in this issue. Needless to repeat, there is no biased selectivity in letters printed. All views are welcome.—The Editors.

AN EXCHANGE-2:

Negroes and the Labor Movement

Record of the "Left Wing" Unions

To the Editor:

The Exchange on Negroes in Trade Unions continues to ignore the experience of a number of left wing unions. Professor Lipset in particular appears ignorant of both the achievements and routine practices to be found in International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), United Electrical Workers (UE), and, to some extent, in Packinghouse and Auto locals. Another union across the bay from Mr. Lipset's campus, the Marine Cooks and Stewards, also did very well in fighting racism until Harry Lundberg's union helped the government to destroy it.

Some misleading and painfully familiar themes are cropping up in this Exchange. One of these is the advice that Negroes should beware of rank and file bigotry and place their trust in enlightened leaders. As C. Vann Woodward has shown, Negroes bought this advice eighty years ago to their own sorrow. Mr. Hill is, of course, only sensible to "share Mr. Lipset's concern with . . . the racist impulses of American workers," but he and the NAACP will not, I hope, lose sight of other more hopeful working class characteristics. Of course these ignorant white workers are bigoted, but they do have the same class problems as the majority of Negroes; one is almost embarrassed to repeat the obvious—the two groups will rise together or not at all.

The democratic task is to combat this bigotry in the best way possible, by emphasizing the joint interests of unionists of both races. It is in the accomplishment of this task that a democratic union proves itself. Lipset is on shaky ground when he argues that Meany and others shirk this task because most workers are racists. Perhaps they are, but outside the South few locals will support a slate which runs on a program of racial bigotry. Not only do Meany and others know this, but their unions are not really so democratic that membership values are automatically represented by the leadership. Meany's China policy is, of course, but one case in point.

It is necessary to probe more deeply into the motivations of "those [local trade union leaders] who depend on support in the shop or local" and therefore "feel inhibited about trying to force union members to change their behavior." Usually these leaders, like the national officers, are relatively conventional and lack the sophistication necessary to wage a winning democratic struggle. Often they have grown so accustomed to power that

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they have a basic distrust in democracy.

These conservative leaders know also that for various reasons the battle for racial equality has been waged most vigorously by the dissident "more leftist minority" which Lipset describes; these are his "union activists . . . who attend meetings" and plague the leadership. For years this radical opposition has challenged local leaders on a number of popular questions—wage patterns, line speed, grievances, all the nagging shop issues. They form a potential alternative local union leadership; they are about the only significant opposition most unions have.

In the past, standard techniques have rather easily disciplined this opposition; red-baiting has been a popular device, but Negro-baiting is not unknown, although less overt. The critics have also helped to discredit themselves by their involvement, in varying degrees, in Communist opportunism. But, let national union leaders begin a real struggle for Negro rights, and these local leftist forces will improve their position. My own feeling is that the union establishment senses this threat; the A.F. of L. has fifty years of experience in fighting its internal opposition, and it is probably now sacrificing the Negroes' ambitions to its own fears that radicals—*not* racists—will gain strength in the locals.

Professor Lipset also misreads the situation, I believe, when he says that no basic solutions to racism can "be found within the structure of organized labor acting unilaterally." Here again I believe the tendency to read the left wing unions, not only out of the C.I.O., but completely out of American life, is simply fatal to our understanding. They have used national conventions, the union press, bargaining sessions, and shop campaigns as ways of instructing the membership on its stake in civil rights. A.F. of L. and C.I.O. unions can learn from this experience; some already have taken similar measures. Once George Meany decides, as Harry Bridges and Julius Emspak decided years ago, that this kind of education is desirable, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. will repeat the democratic racial practices of its expelled unions.

My own views are undoubtedly colored by several years of contented membership in UE, but I do think that NEW POLITICS does the Negro a real disservice if it does not call attention to the record of these unions some time during this discussion.

WILLIAM DOYLE

History Department
Chabot College

Mr. Lipset Replies:

It is difficult to deal with criticism which ignores what you say, or which simply attributes statements to you which you never made, or which are the precise opposite of what you said.

Mr. Doyle states that I ignored the achievements in the race relations field of a number of "left wing unions." My brief comment pointed to the contrast between a "left" and "right" union in the same industry, the NMU and the SUP. I urged that the former had a good record precisely because it had been "dominated for many years by a powerful dictatorial Communist apparatus," while the much more democratic SUP continued segregation. Where the "left-wing," or more accurately the Eastern oriented, are involved in democratic unions, they find some of the same limitations. How many Negroes has Mr. Bridges succeeded in getting into the San Francisco Clerks local of the ILWU?

Mr. Doyle states that I wrote that Negroes should "place their trust in enlightened leaders." What I wrote was "trade union leaders . . . must be subjected to a barrage of criticism for their failings on the supreme moral issue of the twentieth century. Leaders, whether union or political, react to pressures . . . Picket lines should be at least as effective outside union halls or Congressmen's offices as they have been outside of Woolworth's."

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Mr. Doyle is unfortunately equally in error in discussing other matters, Thus as his one example of unrepresentative reactionary union leadership, he cites "Meany's China policy [as] . . . but one case in point." All the opinion data I know of indicate that the overwhelming majority of the American people, union members and non-members alike, agree with Mr. Meany in opposing recognition of the Communist regime in China. There are, of course, many matters on which Mr. Meany and other labor leaders are out of step with their membership. In fact, on the whole, the executive of the AFL-CIO are to the left of their members or more civil libertarian than them on most issues of public policy. For example, the data from Stouffer's famous study of popular attitudes towards civil liberties for Communists, and political and religious noncomformists, indicate that *most union leaders support these rights, while the large majority of union members oppose them.*

Mr. Doyle suggests that there is a relationship between the support of Negro rights by union leaders and the strength of "leftist forces" in their unions. John L. Lewis and James Hoffa have had an excellent record in support of Negro rights (the UMW has integrated locals in the South), but I am unaware of significant pockets of Eastern oriented politics in their organizations.

I did not suggest that Negroes or other advocates of civil rights should look to Eastern oriented political groups or unions for leadership or advice since I do not believe such groups are genuinely interested in civil rights. Totalitarians, whether of the pro-Russian or the pro-Nazi variety, are basically interested in power, and they will adopt a variety of tactics while struggling for power. Both wrap themselves in the heritage of socialism. Nazis supported some Communist led strikes, while the Communists joined with the Nazis to vote the Social-Democratic government of Prussia out of office in a referendum in Germany before 1933; the Cuban Communists worked with Batista as long as he was useful to them; the Argentinian Communists have been allied with the Peronistas. Eastern oriented groups have claimed to oppose colonialism, capital punishment, and race prejudice to gain office. In power, the Communists have deported a number of minority peoples from their homelands and continue to discriminate against Jews; they have used force against various colonial nations which they rule, Georgia, Hungary, Tibet; and most recently, the Russian rulers have restored the medieval policy of the death penalty for economic crimes, stealing, embezzlement, and bribery. The East German Communist regime (like the West German government) employs former Nazis in various levels of government, yet it has the audacity to criticize the West German Christian Democrats and Social Democrats for paying billions of dollars in reparations to the state of Israel and other Jewish organizations. The fact that Eastern oriented political and labor leaders in this country have nothing to say against such activities by the Eastern power elite leads me to suspect that their claims to oppose racism, colonialism, or capital punishment, have as little relevance to their true aims as the Nazis' prepower propaganda about workers' rights or socialism had to theirs.

To give Negroes false illusions about the depth of popular white support for their rights does them no service. Negroes can make and have made many gains, but they and those of us non-Negroes who want to support them must realize that these gains depend on the effective use of militant pressure and electoral tactics. When businessmen, union leaders, and politicians can be shown that they can be hurt by not supporting Negro rights, then Negroes progress. Negroes have many white supporters in this society, but the Eastern oriented are not among them. They want to use the Negroes, as they have used other exploited groups around

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the world, but their objective is power for the "New Class," not any form of equality.

Mr. Hill Replies:

Mr. Doyle's assumptions regarding the alleged racial practices of the Communist-dominated trade unions bear little, if any, relationship to the realities. It is necessary to inform Mr. Doyle of the fact that local unions affiliated to Harry Bridges' International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) in Portland and San Pedro rigidly exclude Negroes from membership and thereby deny Negro workers the opportunity to secure employment through ILWU hiring halls. In addition, there are virtually no Negroes admitted into the San Francisco clerks' local of the Longshoremen's union, even though the NAACP and other groups have repeatedly protested the anti-Negro practices of the ILWU in these areas.

Surely, Harry Bridges who has boastfully compared the operation of his union to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the Soviet Union and is therefore able to impose his policies upon the union in a wide variety of questions must bear direct responsibility for the undemocratic practices of ILWU locals in Portland, San Pedro and elsewhere. George Meany, at least, excuses the racist practices of AFL-CIO affiliated locals by piously informing us of "local union autonomy" but what autonomy for local unions is there in the Longshoremen's union on the West Coast?

Mr. Doyle should be informed that Negro members of the ILWU have recently organized their own anti-Bridges caucus. When I questioned a former long-time supporter of Bridges regarding this he told me that Bridges, like Communist trade union leaders, was a white man first and everything else second.

As for the United Electrical Workers (UE), which Mr. Doyle cites, its record, on the whole, was certainly not better than other CIO affiliates at the time. When Jim Carey's anti-Communist International Union of Electrical Workers obtained collective bargaining rights at the large Philco plant in Philadelphia where the UE held the contract for many years, it was found that the UE local had made a tacit arrangement with the company not to enforce the seniority and promotional provisions of the union contract in relation to Negro workers. As a result most Negro workers were limited to menial and unskilled job classifications and denied equal seniority and promotional rights throughout the plant. A sustained program of joint activity between the NAACP and the International Union of Electrical Workers made possible the elimination of the discriminatory practices of the UE and brought about the promotion of qualified Negroes into production and other occupations for the first time.

Any discussion of the role of Communists in the American labor movement must include some reference to the record of Communist-controlled unions after June 1941 when, in the interests of Soviet foreign policy, the American Communist Party dumped its "leftist" baggage and emerged as a super-patriotic, jingoistic, strike-breaking outfit. Communist-controlled trade unions which for several years had denounced the war as "an imperialistic war" and passed resolutions affirming that "the Yanks are not coming" overnight proclaimed that "The Red Army's War Is Our War." (*Daily Worker*, June 25, 1941.) American Communists became the most ardent advocates of the "no-strike pledge" and open strikebreakers, and in unions under their control they instituted vicious piece work and incentive systems. They supported restrictive legislation designed to curb civil liberties and the independence of the trade-union movement. The Communists were the only group in the entire labor movement to support the National Service Act to conscript labor. The Party even congratulated the federal government for using the infamous Smith Act against the leaders of the Minneapolis Truck

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Drivers Union, the very same Smith Act which was used to send their own leaders to jail a few years later.

As open strikebreakers Communists in and out of trade unions called upon the federal government to "use armed force . . . to break this (the strike of the Machinists in San Francisco, November, 1944) or any other strike." In the historic Montgomery Ward strike, the *Daily Worker* (June 19, 1944) slandered the courageous union men in a strikebreaking editorial which declared: "Those who violate the No-Strike Pledge are scabs and should be so treated." There had never been a group which had engaged in such open reactionary practices in the entire history of the American labor movement.

The most perfidious aspect of Communist Party policy in this period was on the crucial issue of civil rights. In reporting *(Daily Worker*, September 16, 1941) a Negro Communist conference held in New York City, Party leader Ben Davis wrote: "Communists were disturbed by the increasing struggle of Negroes for jobs in defense plants. . . . Many of the Negro groups and newspapers are not clear on the international situation." Then, Mr. Davis "urged the Negro people to be ready to sacrifice." It was during this period that Communists asserted that "the foes of Negro rights should be considered as secondary." The Party viciously attacked the March on Washington Movement which forced President Roosevelt into issuing Executive Order 8802, the first federal fair employment practices order. They attacked A. Philip Randolph, the leader and organizer of the March On Washington movement as an "enemy of the war effort" and accused him of impeding "national unity."

The urgency of the fight for Negro rights in the United States demands a consistent program under bold leadership, whose responsibility is to the needs and interests of America's Negro population and one that never subordinates these concerns to the foreign policy of Soviet totalitarianism.

Working Class Attitudes

To the Editor:

It is rather startling to see Herbert Hill, noted for his militancy and intransigence, agreeing with S. M. Lipset that the rascist sentiments of the rank-and-file are the cause of the discriminatory policy of the unions and going on to accept Lipset's thesis (unmentioned in his statement) on working-class authoritarianism. It seems that Hill has conceded himself into a box.

Lipset's main argument is that the working class, because of marital instability, certain child-raising techniques, use of physical punishment and a high level of aggression in their day-to-day lives, show greater authoritarian attitudes than does the middle class. He supports his position by skillfully reworking the material on the IBM cards that Professor Stouffer collected for his book, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties.*

If this conclusion is true, where does it leave the Negro in America who, because of vicious social deprivation and segregation, has only known the most grinding poverty and the accompanying correlates mentioned above? If these factors caused authoritarianism, can the Negro workers be any less authoritarian? Should significant political participation be extended to a group that surely must harbor authoritarian propensities? Less sophisticated reasons have been given in the past for not extending equal benefits to minority groups. Needless to say, this is not Lipset's intent. He has proven in too many areas his dedication to the civil rights movement. But it is an unintended consequence of his position.

I think that it has been demonstrated that working class attitudes are less libertarian than upper income groups regarding both civil liberties and minority rights. But there is no necessary correlation between attitudes recorded on interviews and behavior. For one, upper income groups are more sophisticated, have greater education and know how they are expected to re-

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spond. The difference in scores is fifty years of affluence.

It has been popular among traumatized ex-radicals to ascribe many of the failures of the democratic left to the working class. Hill, on the other hand, blames a loss of vitality on the part of labor leaders.

Contrary to Hill's thesis, I am sure that a review of the speeches, programmatic statements, resolutions and actions by the union leadership would show that they are infinitely more liberal and more sensitive to the social and economic consequences of discrimination now than they ever have been. *But they don't care enough.* As the entirely justified pressure from the Negro community accelerates, the lag between the demands and the performance is more noticeable.

The major problem resulting in conflict between the Negro community and the trade union movement is their relative position in society today. The Negro community, sustained by victories in the South, Supreme Court decisions, and growing African and Asian nationalism, is militant, aggressive and oriented toward direct action. On the contrary, the unions, bedeviled by a declining membership, automation and charges of corruption, are more defensive and definitely in retreat. Given this posture, it is small wonder that unions have not been able to respond to the challenge of the civil rights movement.

Lipset's view of leadership seems an inadequate one. There are numerous examples of union leadership acting in other areas where the rank and file has notoriously conservative views. For example, polls indicate that union members are not for industry-wide bargaining, but no industrial union leader could operate on this level. There are, of course, vast differences between the emotional content of the two problems, attitudes on racism and industry-wide bargaining. However, the leadership of unions manages to confront (or ignore) the latter attitude but not the former.

The function of democratic leadership is not to submit to every view of the rank and file, however aberrant they feel it to be, nor is it to institutionalize expressions of opposition opinion. But one function is to see that all safeguards are taken to insure the existence of strict procedural democracy.

Leadership presents an alternative way of operating the strength of the union toward goals that are constantly being redefined. It does not mean that there is or should be a one-to-one relationship between the policies of the leaders and the attitudes of the members. If the rank and file hold conflicting goals (economic justice and racism), it is the function of leadership to demonstrate this incompatibility and offer an alternative leading to equity for all races.

While a comradely exchange is in order with Hill and Lipset, there is less disposition to treat William Gomberg's remarks in that fashion. They are truly amazing. He must have forgotten the communications that the NAACP sent to the National AFL-CIO late in 1958 and early in 1959. There were some excellent constructive suggestions. To date this correspondence has not been answered. Hill's subsequent actions should be seen as the abandonment of polite, ineffective suggestions for frontal attack. Without condoning every action of the NAACP, it is hard to criticize the change in tactic.

Gomberg may feel that Meany's "personal attitude on this question is above reproach," but I doubt if that sentiment is shared by many—black or white. If Gomberg's psychognosis (Meany is "right" on the question, but out of frustration lashes out at the persecuted when prodded) is replaced by another (Meany in prepared statements sounds good, but in an extemporaneous situation when challenged, he exposes his basic lack of sympathy or understanding of the problem). I think it makes more sense.

One last word. The UAW at its last convention elected "Jack" Edwards to the executive board, the first Negro so honored. It was a magnificent act and Edwards can be expected to do an out-

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standing job. However, a word for a loser. Horace Sheffield, founder of the Trade Union Leadership Council and one of the founders of the Negro American Labor Council, was an active campaigner for the position. His actions helped lead the way for the election of a Negro to the board. His courage, intelligence and political skill are unquestioned. Never has a loser looked so good.

BILL GOODE
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, Wayne State University

Mr. Lipset Replies:

I agree with most of what Bill Goode writes in his comments on Herbert Hill's statement. I feel, however, that he seeks to draw too many implications from what I had previously written. It is quite true as he implies that lower-class economically and psychologically deprived Negroes do not make the best citizens. One of the difficulties well known to all groups which seek Negro support is that they have a low rate of participation in elections in Northern cities, or for that matter in attendance at union meetings. And it must be admitted that the experience of the Negro has not prevented him from his own forms of bigotry. Anti-Semitism is strong in Northern Negro communities, as is prejudice against other white ethnic groups with whom the Negro has had contact. Some of my recent research has involved analysis of the social roots of the proto-fascist Coughlin movement of the 1930's, and survey data from that period indicate that Coughlin was backed heavily by Negroes, as well as by poor and unemployed whites.

But the fact that lower-class Negroes or whites reflect the tensions in their environment clearly does not justify their being barred from political rights. For, in addition to the moral issue involved, their weight in the polity is much more affected by the groups they join and identify with, than by their attitudes. If Negroes are recruited to the political system by trade unions and the democratic left, they will be a force for political democracy as well as for economic and social equality. If they are abandoned and turn to Negro racists or Communists they will help to undermine democracy. But the fault will not be theirs, it will lie with those who fail to build a movement for racial equality which has its roots in the democratic left. The European and American workers served as an effective mass base for increased political democratization because men who believed in democracy helped to create movements for economic equality.

Goode's remarks concerning the role and attitudes of American trade-union leaders are in my opinion essentially correct. However, I think he ignores the question of intensity when he points to the fact that union leaders have ignored membership attitudes on many matters other than the racial one. As long as a union delivers the goods economically, its leaders are "free" to support many measures, particularly political, about which the membership really does not care much. And as he notes, union leaders can and often have taken positive action in the race field without asking for membership approval. But to do this involves political risks, and most union leaders will not take such risks unless they have to. And, unfortunately, the less union leaders have to worry about opposition the more liberal they can be. Thus, the first Negro to be elected to the UAW executive board was elected after all effective opposition to Reuther had almost vanished. While the UAW was divided among powerful factions, most of which had significant leftist leadership, no Negro was chosen for such an office. It is also important to note as Goode does that Edwards' election is related to the fact that the activities of the Negro American Labor Council embarrassed the UAW officialdom.

Althougn I have already taken more space than I can expect any editor to permit, I would like to call attention to two reports on unions and racism which are particularly significant. Some years ago Dietrich Reizes reported (in the *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol.

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9, 1953) on a situation in which UAW members who supported Negro rights to equality on the job *opposed* their rights to move into a neighborhood largely inhabited by white members of the union. The union had educated them to view the Negroes as fellow workers on the job, but residential propinquity involved other issues in the minds of the workers, "social acceptance and property values." The Education Director of the local who wrote a letter to a newspaper supporting residential integration was publicly repudiated by the President and Executive Council of the local in response to strong membership pressure. Many members felt that it was proper for the union to defend the rights of Negroes as workers, but that it was improper for the union to "interfere" on the issue of residential segregation.

The second relevant tale comes from the July, 1962 issue of the British publication *Socialist Commentary:* "When the management of a factory in Banbury, Oxfordshire, proposed to employ a Pakistani, some workers threatened to walk out. The official policy of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, which organizes the plant, is to repudiate the color bar in all its forms, but this policy seems to have been ignored by the leadership of the factory branch, which held a secret ballot on the issue. The result showed that members had voted 591 to 205 against the firm employing colored workers; a further 900 abstaining. Thankfully, the lead given by the union's national officers proved to be of a very different caliber from that of the local officials. Mr. Jack Cooper, the general secretary, has opened an inquiry and has declared that in any case the factory members will have to withdraw their color-bar since branches cannot contract out of national policy. There will be more such cases, and when they arise the responsibility of union leadership must surely be to foster standards of decency and tolerance, not weakly submit to the pressures of discrimination and prejudice." Amen!

Mr. Gomberg Replies:

Mr. Meany does not need me to speak on his behalf. May I observe, however, that if history is recalled, that it ought to be recalled completely.

I remember how an outraged Meany personally escorted Philip Randolph right through the lobby at the Houston AFL convention some years ago, and personally announced in the presence of the Southern delegation that discriminatory treatment such as that extended to Mr. Randolph made it impossible to hold future AFL conventions in the South.

Mr. Edwards, the new Board member of the UAW, may well explain "I'll take care of my enemies, may heaven save me from my friends." Does Mr. Goode feel that Mr. Edwards' election was a significant gesture because of the fact that a Negro was elected to the UAW executive board, or because the best available man who was incidentally a Negro was elected to the executive board? Mr. Edwards, about whom I've heard nothing but good things, is portrayed as a beneficiary of "worcmij" by Mr. Goode, rather than as a human being realizing his aspirations. This is exactly the kind of "comradeship" that kills; these abstract lovers of mankind who would destroy any individual on its behalf. First the abstract working class were their hero-victims. Now it's the abstract Negro.

Charges Unions With Lack of Idealism

To the Editor:

It strikes me that the Gomberg-Lipset-Hill discussion of racial bias in the trade union movement (NEW POLITICS, Spring 1962) misses the basic factor behind the labor movement's failure in this field. That factor is the lack of ideals on the part of the leadership of the union movement.

I shall exclude the building trades unions and the teamsters, neither of which can be held up as a paragon. But even in the so-called better unions, there can be little doubt but

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that ideology is now passé, (if, in fact, it ever was a genuine factor). Union officials are no more interested in better race relations, in equal treatment for Negroes, than they are in a millenium. There is only one thing that really interests the top level, middle level, and the lower level leadership of the labor movement—their own jobs.

Ask any member of our Ivory Tower Set to name the best union in the country and chances are the International Ladies Garment Workers Union will head the list. Yet, what were the accomplishments of the ILGWU at its last convention? Primarily, Mr. Dubinsky succeeded in electing his son-in-law a Vice President. Secondarily, the ILG has given the most anti-union elements a demonstration in union busting that is without recent equal.

The chief interest of the union official is to safeguard his job, a comfortable job, incidentally, when compared with going back to the shop. To protect his job, he most follow the path of least resistance. And this means that he must accept the position taken by the leader of the union, whether or not he agrees, or face the return to the hated shop, or the oblivion of retirement.

In the few genuinely democratic unions, such as the Typographers, there has been a similar situation. The difference here being that the officials' jobs depend upon pandering to the vocal minority which probably controls the election of officers because of non-attendance by the majority. The ITU, incidentally, has recently gotten a better record on employment of Negroes than have most other unions.

Lipset seems to me as being extremely naive when he assumes that the vocalizations of union leaders carry any sincerity. A poll of union leaders would undoubtedly show them to be further advanced than the membership—especially since they know the proper words the investigators desire. But the average union official, after giving the college professor pollster the proper answer, joins his fellows in their prejudice.

As for Gomberg's statement that Meany atoned for his gratuitous insult to Randolph, I doubt the accuracy of that statement. Meany has done nothing to indicate that he admits he made a "boo-boo." his stand on race relations remains precisely what it has been for years—some slightly overheated ozone compounded with paralysis. The fact is that unions have done nothing about admitting Negroes into skilled jobs because union officials don't really care. The status quo is good enough and certainly better than going back to the shop.

As long as our trade unions remain exclusive associations whose primary aim is, as stated by Samuel Gompers, an undefined "more and more," (which in essence has come to mean more and more graft, corruption, nepotism, and protection of the status quo), so long will our unions remain among the last strongholds of Jim Crowism; so long will cutters, pressmen, pressers, carpenters and all the other skills be kept the private preservers of white majorities.

The answer lies not in simply a new outlook on race relations, but a complete revamping of our trade unions starting with pie-card, unprincipled organizations, where the primary interest of officials is jobs for themselves and their offspring.

Rutgers University B. K. JOHNPOLL

Supports Hill's Charges

To the Editor:

Mr. George Meany's attacks upon the activities of Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, is an attempt to justify the years of cruel neglect of the rights of Negro and other minority workers within the labor movement. It is not surprising that a willing participant in last year's unjustified AFL-CIO Executive Council censure of A. Philip Randolph because of his efforts to eradicate racial bias within the labor movement should, one year later, find such pas-

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sion to denounce a man such as Mr. Hill. It is apparent that Mr. Hill's pointed and accurate charges of racial bias by the labor movement have found their mark. It is also apparent that Mr. Meany's remarks are directed beyond Mr. Hill and strike at all those who are fed up with tokenism as labor's solution to discrimination.

Had Mr. Meany displayed the passion which he has used against Mr. Hill and the NAACP on behalf of racial justice within the labor movement during the decades of his leadership, there might not be need of a Labor Secretary of the NAACP. It has been, in large measure, because of his inertia in this matter that organizations such as the NAACP and the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) must publicly call the AFL-CIO to task for its failures. It is pious hypocrisy for Mr. Meany to pass the buck for discrimination to the "local level" and to "prejudiced rank and filers" and to thus wash his hands of the task of leadership.

Had President Kennedy displayed the same posture in the James Meredith matter and proffered "high velocity education" to the howling mob that stormed Oxford, Mississippi, we might well have seen the end of James Meredith as a student and as a living person. We can be but thankful that it was President Kennedy and not Mr. Meany who made those fateful decisions.

Racial discrimination is fully as evil as corruption and racketeering. It is the most pregnant symbol of the moral decline of the labor movement. It must be eradicated with the same forcefulness that has been directed against corruption. It requires leadership at all levels, but such leadership must start at the very top of the American labor movement. Such leadership is still lacking.

Mr. Meany attacks Mr. Hill and the NAACP for the charge that Negroes and Puerto Ricans are the victims of discrimination within the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. The substance of these charges is true. This Association has direct knowledge of the conditions of Negro and Puerto Rican members of the ILGWU. We have found that such workers are allotted the lowest paying, least skilled work in the garment industry. With few exceptions, they are denied entrance into the high-paying, skilled jobs which are filled through ILGWU hiring halls. They, together with other members of the ILGWU, are denied democratic voice within their locals and within the International itself because of the tight-fisted control of the present leadership. The NAACP charges concerning the ILG WU are poor ground indeed on which to attack the accuracy of Mr. Hill's efforts.

On trial is not Mr. Hill's and the NAACP's record on behalf of social justice within and through the labor movement. This program has been in the best interests of the labor movement and its members and in the best traditions of a free society. What is on trial is the wholly less forthright record of the AFL-CIO in the fight against discrimination.

Surely Mr. Meany knows that the Negro workers of this country face a terrible social and economic crisis. A major part of the burden of technological unemployment has fallen upon the Negro, and the pace of such unemployment is quickening. Solutions must be found for this generation of Negro workers and their families and not just hopeful platitudes for unborn generations to come. Unless and until the leadership of the AFL-CIO displays the willingness to cope with this crisis of American society with effective and forthright action, the militant work of the NAACP, the Negro American Labor Council and Mr. Herbert Hill must continue and indeed must expand and spread.

Our Association stands with Mr. Hill and congratulates him for his contributions to the building of a social structure of justice for all workers.

DANIEL J. SCHULDER
President, Association of
Catholic Trade Unionists

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Book Notes



People and Life 1891–1921. By Ilya Ehrenburg. Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. 545 pp. $5.95.

One of the very best of modern journalists, Ilya Ehrenburg became a newspaper correspondent quite accidently. Here was this young man who had joined the Bolshevik underground in Russia, served time in prison, lived as an exile in France and subscribed to *Utro Rossii* (Russia's *Morning*), a conservative newspaper. Disapproving of that paper's Paris correspondence, he submitted a Paris story that was refused. Thereupon he sent it off to *Birzhevye Vedomosti* (Stock Exchange Gazette) and the story was published. Thus he became the wartime Paris correspondent of Czarist Russia's Wall Street Journal.

Not just this episode but the entire life of Ilya Ehrenburg was a paradox. He is a man who abhors conformists, who experimented with the most daring styles and schools of poetry and fiction, whose closest friends perished at the hands of the revolution they had helped to make, who had been denounced as the most bourgeois of writers himself, and who devoted a lifetime of loyal service to Soviet Communism.

To those who have a stereotyped image of the Communist, this book will be an amazing experience. And to all who seek insight into the background and history of Communist intellectual life, it is an indispensable sourcebook. This volume contains the first two books of the Ehrenburg memoirs. Thus far six have appeared in Russia. In many ways the author is making belated and moving amends to his friends who were destroyed in the camps and prisons of the Stalin regime. He writes of Mandelstam, the poet, Meyerhold and Tairov, the great innovators and artists of the Russian stage, of the poets Tsvetayeva and Markish and many others whose "crimes" in art brought them to concentration camps and death.

Now Ehrenburg writes—and it is good that Russian youth reads: "The epithet 'monolithic' is often used as a term of praise in this country; but a monolith is a mass of stone. Human beings are far more complex." It is of course a measure of the "thaw" in Soviet culture that these memoirs can be written.

For many it will seem appalling that reminiscences of the years 1917–1921 can be written in which the name Trotsky does not even appear. Much will seem strange and even repelling to someone searching for a complete and honest summary of a tangled life. But it is a sign of great change, and for the better, that *this* much can be told. And it is told by a man with keen eyes and sensitive ears, with passion, with insight and with heavy burdens on mind and conscience.

J. C.

The Literature of Communism in America. *A Selected Reference Guide.* Robert Finley Delaney. Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 1962. 433 pages.

This massive bibliography is a monument to Cold War scholarship. Delaney, whose biographical experience was gained in Navy schools and the Catholic University library, has shoveled together thousands of titles, with brief annotations. The scholarship of his "Introduction" is sufficiently illustrated by this typical statement: "For

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a tough-minded and realistic estimate of the native Communist problem J. Edgar Hoover's *Masters of Deceit* is undoubtedly the best and most authoritative." His definition of Communist is truly catholic if not neccesarily Catholic: included under "Pro-Communist Literature" are the anarchist Alexander Berkman, the social-democrat Algernon Lee, Lewis Lorwin, Harry Overstreet, Daniel DeLeon, and, *mirabile dictu*, Arthur Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World*, which is annotated as "A secularistic view of science which parallels the Marxian position."

The value of the bibliography can be sufficiently tested by looking at the few pages devoted to "History of American Marxism." Under the subheading "Before 1919," there are only 12 items. Of these, 3 are devoted to the IWW, one is a crackpot work by a Blair Coan, one is a 1918 pamphlet by Fraina, one is a 1920 review of the Mooney case. This leaves six items including the unimportant Jesuit work, Cathrein's *Socialism*, but Hillquit's *History of Socialism in the U.S.* is not there (it is to be found later under "Splinter Groups"!), nor are the important histories by Quint, Kipnis, Nathan Fine, or Yellen (the last three are relegated to "Pro-Communist Literature" along with Eddington). Similarly, under "Biography," there is Coleman's old life of Debs, but no mention of Ginger's *The Bending Cross*.

The annotations often have to be seen to be believed. Boris Nicolaievsky, listed for his *Karl Marx* (with Maenchen-Helfen), is identified only as a former researcher at the Marx-Lenin Institute in Moscow. DeLeon is identified as "a friend of Lenin." George Spiro is identified as a pseudonym for Marlen, instead of the other way 'round, and, to boot, given carelessly as the author of two of Trotsky's major works. Cathrein's obscure Jesuit work is described as a "standard treatment," but Hillquit's history is labeled "biased." This word is maid-of-all-work with Delaney: even Big Bill Haywood's autobiography has to be labeled "biased" just in case some of the faithful might be misled. There is much more of the same thing. A. A.

The Muckrakers 1902–1912. Edited and with Notes by Arthur & Lila Weinberg. Simon and Schuster, 1962, 435 pp. $7.50.

Renewed interest in the fine journalists and writers of the early part of this century who devoted themselves to exposure of the evils of our far from *egalitarian* industrial society will be stimulated by this very useful anthology. The education of youth today would be quite incomplete without knowledge of the awful "muck" so brilliantly brought to public attention by Ida Tarbell, Lincoln Steffens, Upton Sinclair, Will Irwin, Ray Stannard Baker, Charles Edward Russell, Edwin Markham and the others whose magazine articles are here compiled.

Perhaps the revived attention being given to the muckrakers is a reflection of the need for just this kind of journalism today. Many years have passed since Steffens wrote of the shame of our cities but Boston today is as corrupt as Minneapolis in Steffens' day. And the scandals and neglect in most big cities of this country, so many years after all the old muck had been raked up, would show that mere surface reform is far from enough to eradicate the shame.

Perhaps one essay in this collection will raise some question about who are the wronged and who the wrongdoers. Ray Stannard Baker in "The Right to Work" pours out his sympathy for the scabs rather than for the striking coal miners seeking the first basic improvement of working conditions in the coal fields. But many of the muckrakers took capitalism for granted and reform was often abstracted from the society which generated the evils they exposed.

But in retrospect there has been change and there has been progress and crusading journalism had a lot to do with both. J. C.

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KILL AND OVERKILL—The Strategy of Annihilation. By Ralph E. Lapp. Basic Books, New York, 1962, 179 pp. $4.95.

KILL AND OVERKILL, a lucid and informative book, traces "the great game of nuclear strategy" from Hiroshima to the present. The author's main conclusion is that the arms race has made security a very scarce commodity. He particularly attacks the notion that "the more weapons a nation has, the more secure it will be." This misconception he attributes to the failure of the military strategists to adjust from the age of rifles, artillery, and planes, to the age of thermonuclear bombs and ICBM's.

Other areas of nuclear strategy subjected to critical review are: the excessive secrecy in matters of national life and death; governmental ambiguity as to whether we might strike first with nuclear weapons; and the increasing possibility of an accidental nuclear war.

In a section dealing with civil defense, Lapp dismisses the present program as totally inadequate and outlines one which he considers to be "feasible, and not fantastically expensive. . . ." However, he ends this discussion with the comment that "the only defense in which mankind can find any real, enduring hope is disarmament."

In his last chapter the author suggests five points which would improve our security: 1) revise our missile program to make it clearly retaliatory rather than first strike; 2) cease production of nuclear bombs (the present stockpile is over 30,000 megatons); 3) declare outer space "off limits" for military operations; 4) establish a rapid international communications system for the prevention of war; 5) make, *and publish*, a thorough study of the effects of nuclear war.

R. L.

THE WAFARE STATE. By Fred J. Cook. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1962. $4.95.

IN THE BIOGRAPHICAL material distributed by his publisher, Fred Cook is identified as the author of simplified histories for teen-agers on the American *Revolution* and *World War II*. Knowing this, the reader is equipped to understand Cook's approach to history.

If his theory of the Cold War could be put into one sentence, it is this: the Cold War started because Franklin D. Roosevelt died.

Drawing heavily on D. F. Fleming's *The Cold War and Its Origins*, Cook spins the tale of an inexperienced Harry Truman surrounded by the "keepers of the status quo" who were "biased" against Russia, who did not understand Russia's strategic interests in East Europe nor the differences between U.S. and Russian conceptions of democracy and freedom.

When it comes to a summary statement about the aims of the Cold War rivals, Cook's version runs something like this:

The Warfare State's real intent is "the extension of the capitalist system throughout the world at the expense of the Communist system."

"But the world is too vast, too complex to be ruled or contained by one people or system," and the Warfare State is doomed to failure.

On the other hand Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence and "we will bury you" speech are only the expression of "what he feels to be the inherent superiority of a system that must eventually triumph through its own worth."

The net effect of the simplifications and double standards pretty much destroys this book's worth as a study of the military-industrial complex in determining U.S. foreign policy. Far from being an antidote to the Radical Right, it is grist for its mill.

S. B.

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THE WOUND IN THE HEART. By Alan Guttmann, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York City. 292 pages. $5.95.

MR. GUTTMANN SEEKS to analyze Americans' reactions to the Spanish Civil War in terms of America's liberal democratic tradition. He discusses the political spectrum of the thirties from right to left paying close attention to the academic view toward each. He invokes Mario Praz in his discussion of the right wing fascination with violence and sex. He accepts the Rossiter thesis in finding American conservatism very close to liberals by virtue of their sharing the same American liberal tradition. He quotes Daniel Bell as his authority in finding radicals impotent because they took positions on the issues of the day without accepting the premises of the society which shaped those issues. And he accepts Trilling's view that the liberals, never faced with strong intellectual opposition, became "complacent and finally effete."

Ironically, it is this effeteness which sorely limits this book and causes the author to terminate with a discussion of Ernest Hemingway and the theme of "primitivism versus progress" in much of the literature and art concerning the War. He considers that "Hemingway's vision of the Spanish war has its roots in a very *American* tradition of thought and feeling"—along lines of Natty Bumppo, Melville, Walden Pond, Huck and Jim, et cetera. "Here, as elsewhere, we found in the Spanish War a mirror reflecting the image of our own unquiet desperation."

Unfortunately Guttmann does not expose the escapism inherent in this desperation. Spain's romantic view of its primitivism was a defensive posture taken by a country which had become the backwash of European progress. Such was Unamuno's conscious effort, for instance. Our romantic view, on the other hand, was an irresponsible failure of recognizing our relative position in the world, a failure which in the political sphere accounted not only for our neutrality in the face of Guernica but today accounts for our alienation from the reality of American military support for so many despotic regimes.

J. K.

THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT: CLUB POLITICS IN THREE CITIES. By James Q. Wilson, University of Chicago Press, 1962, 370 pp. & index.

THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT IS A comparative study of various reform liberal groups within the Democratic Party: the California Democratic Council, the Independent Voters of Illinois, the Democratic Federation of Illinois and the New York reformers.

Mr. Wilson, former Stevensonian Democrat turned Party Conservative, believes that the failure of reformers is their inability to understand American political reality. Decisions in both major parties are arrived at through a non-democratic process; professional politics demands groups, individuals, and structures pursuing their own parochial interests rather than broad political principles and cosmopolitan ideals. All of which meet with Mr. Wilson's approval.

The middle class groups in pursuit of broad idealistic politics coupled with a program for democratizing the Democrats cannot cope with party reality, according to Wilson. Party power centers are alien to such politics. The reformers narrowness of appeal sets the limits on their accomplishments as well. They tend to disappear or coalesce with the professionals.

Wilson sets up as the consistent opposite pole to professional and parochial politics, independent socialist ideas; an alternative he respects but of course rejects.

The book poses real questions which the reformers must consider or go the way of the past reformers inside the Democratic Party. Of course life—not Wilson's book—will force these groups to either face or dodge their dilemma.

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It is to be hoped that they face the questions and resolve them in a radical democratic manner and not by succumbing to Wilson's type of conservatism.

Wilson presents valuable material on party structure, basic problems of reform, and the middle class nature of reform ideology. But the volume suffers from a certain abstractness—it skimps on discussion of reform relations (or the lack of them) with labor and other groups. It fails to discuss large scale trends in American society and relate them to possible changes in the static party system he describes. Nevertheless, here is an extremely intelligent book, refreshingly different from the run-of-the-mill "studies."

S. L.

Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 1933–39. By A. L. Rowse. W. W. Norton. 1962. 124 pp. $3.00.

A slim volume on a timely subject by a noted British historian this book goes over ground that has been covered before. But Rowse brings the personalities of the time to life in a vivid and personal manner that few historians have achieved. Many will disagree with his views on imperialism but few will be able to refute his case against Chamberlain, Simon, Hoare and all the rest. The author also shows the peculiar role of the *Times* in its baleful advocacy of surrender to Hitler.

"The total upshot of their efforts," Rowse writes about the appeasers, "was to aid Nazi-Germany to achieve a position of brutal ascendency, a threat to everybody else's security or even existence, which only a war could end. This had the very result of letting the Russians into the centre of Europe which the appeasers—so far as they had any clear idea of policy—wished to prevent. . . ."

J. C.

Marx vs. Russia. *With an afterword by Hans Kohn.* J. A. Doerig, ed. New York, F. Ungar, 1962. 198 pp., $3.50.

This was originally published in Stuttgart as *Marx Contra Russland* by the Swiss historian. It consists of excerpts from *The Eastern Question*, a collection of articles originally published in the *New York Tribune* by Marx and (though Prof. Doerig apparently does not know this) by Engels, between 1853 and 1856; put into book form by Eleanor Marx and Edward Aveling in 1897. Professor Doerig's preface states that he also collated "a number of scattered clippings of individual articles from the *Tribune*." There is no way of knowing what this means, but it would seem to indicate, at any rate, that he did not go back to the original publications. This is a pity, since *The Eastern Question* was itself an excerpting from the original articles, in many cases, and one that was not done too reliably.

What Doerig has taken from this early collection are Marx's attacks on the Russian autocracy and its reactionary politics, a favorite theme of his.

However, an adequate selection from Marx and Engels' articles on Russian policy cannot possibly limit itself to the material gathered by the Avelings in 1897. Such a wider selection was in fact published ten years ago by Blackstock and Hoselitz as *The Russian Menace to Europe* by Marx and Engels (Free Press, 1952). Doerig does not mention this book, although he discusses some of the bibliographical history of the articles in question. It must be reported also that his excerpts are unaccompanied by any dates or any other reference to either the original publication or to their publication in *The Eastern Question*. They are simply rootless passages, existing by themselves. The attitude implied by this is made explicit by the editor in absurd remarks about "the eternal antithesis

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between East and West and the timeless validity of Marx's dicta . . . " and in the following bit of nonsense: "for Karl Marx antagonism between capital and labor took second place to the eternal duel between East and West, in which his sympathies, despite all strictures, lay unequivocally with the West."

H. D.

Darwin, Marx and Wagner, *A Symposium*. Henry L. Plaine, ed. Ohio State University Press, 1962. 165 pp.

This is an outgrowth of a 1959 Ohio State conference on the subject of Jacques Barzun's book about these three figures, presenting seven otherwise unconnected papers. Bentley Glass estimates the extent to which Darwin's views are still accepted in the field of biology (more now than before, he believes). Richard Hofstadter's "Darwinism and Western Thought," the best section of the book, gives an excellent sketch of social Darwinism. Joseph Kerman's essay on Wagner I found interesting and informative In "Marxism Behind the Iron Curtain," Leonard Schapiro is quite strong in emphasizing that Stalinism is not based on Marxism. While his essay ranges over the history of Russian socialism, it is not an attempt at a brief history but rather, apparently, a series of evaluative thoughts. Bertram Wolfe's "A Century of Marx and Marxism" devotes itself mainly to proving that Marx was all wrong. It does not give a sketch of either Marx's ideas or of the development of Marxism, except for a few scornful words.

This leaves the two most general papers, which are easily the least interesting in the volume. Andreas Dorpalen muses on "Man and His Destiny" and accepts Barzun's use of the three protagonists as materialist whipping-boys. (Glass and Hofstadter, on the other hand, reject Barzun's antimaterialism, in cogent passages.) After a careful reading of Chauncey D. Leake's "A Century of Confusion" I can only surmise that Dr. Leake decided to illustrate his subject rather than discuss it.

A. A.

Aneurin Bevan: Cautious Rebel. By Mark M. Krug. New York, Thomas Yoseloff, 1961. 316 pp. $5.00.

Dr. Krug is an assistant professor at the University of Chicago, this is the first published biography of Bevan, there are twice as many footnotes as there are pages, and the main facts of Bevan's career are adequately listed. There is little to be said for the book beyond this. That Dr. Krug is continually appalled by Bevan's radical politics would not disqualify him as biographer provided he showed competence in grappling with these distasteful ideas; but he is in fact incapable of any political comment other than the vulgarest and shallowest. This is evidenced most sadly when Krug takes up that part of Bevan's career which will most strenuously test every biographer: the Labor leader's political disintegration from 1956 on, when, with blurring speed, he broke with "Bevanism" and went over to much of Gaitskell's politics. Why did this happen? The exclusive content of Krug's answer is: pure-and-simple careerist ambition. Moreover, to our author this is virtually the sole motivation of Bevan throughout his career, for, on this theory, Bevan's radicalism was only another mode of seeking power. Thus Bevan was a careeist when he stood out almost alone for principle and socialist militancy, and he was a careeist when he accommodated himself to the party leadership. Our biographer is very . . . American.

H. D.

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AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT. Ray Ginger, ed. New York, Hill & Wang, 1961. (American Century Series paperback.) 205 pp.

GINGER PRESENTS "a representative work" or essay from each of twelve thinkers from around the turn of the century. The broadness of the title is, then, misleading: a single generation is under consideration, as he stresses in his preface. Included are John Dewey's "The School and Social Progress," Veblen's "The Intellectual Pre-eminence of Jews in Modern Europe," C. S. Peirce's "The Century's Great Men in Science," O. W. Holmes' "The Path of the Law," William James' "The Energies of Men," Commons' "Use-Value and Exchange-Value," Turner's "Significance of the Frontier," C. H. Cooley's "Personal Competition," E. A. Ross' "System of Social Control," Debs' speech, "The Issue," Gompers' "Unionism versus Socialism," and Jane Addams' "A Modern Lear."

Ginger's preface explains that his selections are "representative" but not "most representative" of the given man's work. In fact, several are distinctly marginal. However, his claim that there is "much enlightenment and stimulation" in this potpourri is beyond cavil.

A. A.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF UPTON SINCLAIR. Harcourt, Brace and World. New York, 342 pp. $6.95.

UPTON SINCLAIR IS PRODIGIOUS and indestructible. He wrote his autobiography in his eighty-fourth year; it is his seventy-first or seventy-second book. He seems to remember everything in his astonishingly eventful life: his shabby genteel and penurious childhood; his education in New York, above all his self-education, for he learned philosophy, languages, etc., with the same dogged determination that he later wrote his books; his unhappy and practically celibate first marriage; his numerous literary failures as a youth, which did not prevent him from turning out an ocean of books and articles; his success with *The Jungle*, which made him famous throughout the world at the age of twenty-eight; his activities as a socialist; his vehement support of Wilson and the First World War; his leadership of EPIC in the great California struggle of 1934; and his quiet literary production since then. Sinclair has had a rich and fascinating life.

All the more reason why his autobiography is disappointing. He presents himself to us as though he were a character in one of his novels, or as though his life were a cause and nothing more. He is a moral Gradgrind presenting the facts and only the facts. One searches in vain for depth of feeling or for imagination—unless he *tells* us how he felt and imagined. The book, in short, is only one more in his endless stream.

All of his celebrated crankiness and cantankerousness is in it. He still rails against the evils of "John Barleycorn," to which his father and so many of his friends succumbed. He remains an incorrigible health monger and faddist. His most recent interest is "long-range telepathy." Cities are Babylons, modern art and literature are degenerate, sexual libertinism has gotten out of hand, and he has no regrets about his own arch-Victorianism. Where is socialism in all of this? It is only another tree in Sinclair's lush forest of Good Causes.

Yet there is something winning about Sinclair. He is the product of a different age, perhaps of a different race of Americans. Like Jane Addams, LaFollette, Altgeld, Norris, Brandeis and others of that generation, he dared to live for ideals. America produces fewer and fewer such people. We have become tough-hearted realists who ruthlessly ply the main chance and are never made fools of. But we may turn out to be the biggest and most tragic fools of all.

A. F.

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THE AMERICAN LIBERALS AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Christopher Lasch. Columbia University Press, xvi, 290 pp. $6.50.

THE YEARS BETWEEN 1917 and 1920 were among the most critical in history. They were the years in which the Russian Revolution moved from liberalism to the consolidation of Bolshevik power. What was America's response to this event? What should it have been?

Mr. Christopher Lasch gives an admirably written account of the response by American liberals. He divides the liberal community into "war liberals" and "anti-imperialist liberals." War liberals, as represented by Wilson, believed that the United States went into the First World War to save democracy; with this justification they were enabled to act as autocratically as the autocrats. The anti-imperialists were skeptical of the war and were more genuine in their professions of democracy.

Both welcomed the February Revolution, but for different reasons: the war liberals because it would induce the Russians to fight; the anti-imperialists because it brought democracy to the Russian people. They split over the October Revolution; the war liberals hated the Bolsheviks for Brest-Litovsk; the anti-imperialists were friendly and thought that Russia would inevitably return to democracy.

Unfortunately, Mr. Lasch has stitched together two studies and they come apart in every chapter: first, a critical history of American policy toward Russia; second, a study of liberal attitudes and opinions. He never makes clear what their relationship is and hence why he is drawing it. His thesis seems to be that liberals, being optimists and righteous in their attitudes, did not understand the Russian Revolution or the First World War for what they really were. What Mr. Lasch is complaining about is the liberals' failure—war liberals and anti-imperialist liberals alike—to understand the brute and tragic reality of history as well as he does. It is, after all, a question of attitude.

A. F.

Letters From an English Friend

To the Editor:

NEW POLITICS improves with every issue—No. 4 is really deserving of Hollywood superlatives. . . .

One thing I would mention as I am writing anyway—

Paul Jacobs' rejoinder to Harry Lipset (p. 176 issue No. 4) made me very nostalgic. Just like the good old days of "For . . . For . . ." ("For a Lasting Peace! For a People's Democracy!"). Lovely! The only flavor missing was the hyphenated epithet ("left or right-wing-national-chauvinist-Trotskyist-Zionist").

Seriously, I thought Jacobs' attitude was the very one we are all trying to shed. If someone takes the trouble to write a lengthy letter, surely it is not asking too much to treat it seriously. If it is not worth treating seriously it is certainly not worth publishing. I found Lipset's letter very reasonable and, in the main, unanswered by Jacobs' sarcasm and cheap retorts.

Incidentally, although I would not describe myself as a Labour Zionist, I also appreciate the fact that Israel has done a great deal for its Arab minority—while retaining my right to be highly critical of the shortcomings of her policy. It is by no means a case of "either/or" as Jacobs' seems to insist.

Apart from this flea in the ointment, I have enjoyed everything in NEW POLITICS—and learned much.

Melvin Durden
Essex, England

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Costs are going up. Starting January 7, a new postal increase goes into effect which will raise our mailing expenses. Our printer who likes and admires the magazine, must be paid to produce it. Promotion expenses are higher than ever and we have been doing a good deal of promotion to obtain new subscribers.

All of which adds up to the fact that we need your financial support to assure publication.

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Thanks

Our thanks to those who responded to our request for volunteers as translators, clerks, secretaries. As a result of our appeal, we now have a corps of translators (thus far German, French and Spanish) as well as a number of secretarial helpers. We can use many, many more. Do let us know if you can help.

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